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Southeast Asia Report



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15 June 1984

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DEPUTY HEALTH MINISTER NOUTH SAVOEUN DESCRIBES CONDITIONS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Bertil Ekerlid: "More Than Half a Million Children Suffer From Malnutrition"]

[Text] Kampuchea's Vice Minister of Public Health Nouth Savoeun is visiting Sweden the first week in May, in response to an invitation by the Swedish Red Cross. He will be the first minister to come here from the Phnom Penh government.

Since Sweden does not recognize Heng Samrin's government, no political discussions are expected, other than those handled at a routine level by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Among likely questions to be discussed are those of development assistance.

"We will discuss our cooperation in Kampuchea and our future activities there," said Anders Wijkman, secretary general of the Swedish Red Cross, in reference to Nouth Savoeun's visit.

The Swedish Red Cross operates a hospital in the province of Kompong Chnang. Their medical team consists of three persons.

The Red Cross would like to expand its activities there and even set up hospitals in other provinces.

"Foreign delegates are extremely restricted," says Anders Wijkman. "We have extended an open-ended offer for increased assistance, but so far it has not been accepted."

Another question which will be discussed is the children's home in Phnom Penh to which the Red Cross has donated money.

"We would like to have some opportunity to inspect and check on the operation, but that has been difficult," says Anders Wikjman.

The assistance from the Swedish Red Cross to Kampuchea amounts to about 2.5 million Swedish kronor, of which the main part comes from SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority].

"The needs are enormous and Kampuchea needs additional help," says Anders Wikjman. "They must also receive development assistance. The Western powers only concentrate on disaster aid."

The People's Republic of Kampuchea was proclaimed on 7 January 1979. The previous democratic government of Kampuchea--under the leadership of Pol Pot--was overthrown with the assistance of Vietnamese forces. Since then guerrilla forces have waged war against the Vietnamese-supported government of Heng Samrin.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET has published two earlier reports about the political and military situation in today's Kampuchea as well as reports about the food problems. The serious health situation in the country is the focus of the third and last report. The earlier articles were published on 13 and 15 April.

The health situation in Kampuchea continues to be serious. Half a million children run the risk of sustaining lasting defects due to malnutrition. Malaria and tuberculosis are spreading.

"We have discovered that seven-year old children have a lower intelligence level than they would normally have, due to the lack of meat consumption when they were two years old," says Nouth Savoeun, vice minister of public Health in Heng Samrin's government.

"Thanks to the contributions made by international aid organizations, two million children have escaped the danger zone," he continues.

Malnutrition among children in Kampuchea is also linked to the increased birth rate during recent years. During the Pol Pot era families were scattered and few children were born. Now that they have been reunited and returned to a normal routine, childbirths have increased at a rapid pace.

The birth rate today is five percent and children can be seen everywhere, not least in Phnom Penh. Those seen in the streets are happy and vivacious. but their swollen bellies and lightbrown strands of hair are telltale indicators of malnutrition.

Lack of Vitamins

The monotonous diet results in that children do not get the vitamins and proteins they need. Ok Sophon, director of a hospital in the province of Kompong Speu, says that powdered milk and canned meats are the foods most needed. This is the same answer I received at this hospital in November 1979.

There is no program for family planning in Kampuchea, but abortions are available to those who wish to have them. "Three children in each family would be just right," says Nouth Savoeun.

There are presently eight central hospitals in Kampuchea, five more than in 1979 according to the minister of public health. There is a hospital in each province, i.e., 20, and besides four military hospitals in the western and northern parts of the country where fighting is going on between the Vietnamese and guerrilla forces controlled by Pol Pot, Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk.

There is a great shortage of medical personnel in Kampuchea. Many doctors were killed during the regime of Pol Pot. In 1975 there were 550 trained physicians in the country but in 1979 only 55 remained, according to various sources. Some of them fled abroad.

Doctors on Bicycles

"Today we have 157 trained doctors, 45 pharmacists, 15 dentists, 204 assistant doctors and 1,537 midwives," says My Samedi, dean of the medical faculty in Pnom Penh, and Vice Secretary General of the Red Cross in Kampuchea.

Thirty doctors have been equipped with bicycles and medical bags in order to work in the mountainous regions in the northern parts of the country and visit tribes who have little contact with the rest of civilization.

My Samedi is experimenting with producing medicines from plants. He shows a special kind of bark which is ground into a powder and used for healing eczema.

Today there are 700 students at the medical faculty which in the beginning of the seventies had a capacity for 3,500 students. There is a great shortage of trained teachers, and as yet there are no textbooks in the Khmer language.

My Samedi shows the lecture hall which is shaped like an amphitheater. The chairs have been donated by the Swedish Red Cross, a fact noted on a metal plaque on the wall.

Small Food Rations

A visit to the 17 April hospital in Phnom Penh, probably demonstrates the difficulties which exist in hospital care in Kampuchea today. There is

only one toilet available for 400 patients in the hospital and the food rations are very marginal. "The allotments per patient are the same as they were 5 years ago," says the chief physician at the hospital, Oum Saphan.

He also talks about the shortage of blood and serum. "We also lack lamps for the operating tables. Sometimes we even have to put an ambulance outside and turn on the car lights in order for us to be able to see in the operating room."

Oum Saphan says that they often run out of both water and electricity without any warning and that they have to go to the market to buy fishnets to use for sewing thread.

Currently there are three doctors from East Germany working at the 17 April hospital. We meet one of them in a corridor. He confirms what has been said earlier: There are too many people in the hospital and there is a great shortage of equipment. But, strange as it may sound, it somehow all continues to function.

"Conditions have improved significantly compared to the situation in 1979," stresses the vice minister for public health. "At that time I worked in a hospital and admitted entire families at a time. I, myself, had to help carry out the corpses. It was not even possible to find coffins."

Malaria and Tuberculosis

At that time the majority of the population suffered from malaria and tuberculosis. The rate of illness declined as hospitals were established in the provinces and medicine became available, but now these diseases are again on the upswing, according to Nouth Savoeun.

"We no longer have plague, smallpox or cholera," says My Samedi. "Malaria, tuberculosis and malnutrition are our great health problems today."

The vice minister of public health reports that the French Red Cross has been successful in its campaign to combat malaria in the four provinces Pny Vieng, Kandal, Phnom Penh and Takeo.

Nouth Savoeun also points out that the World Health Organization, usually holds an annual conference on malaria in the region. Heng Samrin's government will participate in such a conference this year for the first time. It will take place in the city of Ho Minh in Vietnam.

9349

CSO: 3650/190

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS ON 'PATRIOTIC CONTRIBUTIONS' OUTLINED

Phnom Penh KAMPUCHEA in Cambodian 16 Feb 84 p 3

[Text] [Question] What is the difference between the patriotic contribution and land taxation of the old social regime?

[Answer] Our present system of patriotic contribution differs from the taxation on farm land of the old social regime in goal and in substance. The old social regime protected some groups and classes, the suppressor classes, the feudal lords and the capitalists. Thus the land taxation of the old regime aimed at strengthening central control which brutally persecuted and suppressed the former forces.

During the Pol Pot regime, which massacred and slaughtered people indiscriminately, the spirit and the sentiments of the people had been suppressed. That regime forced people to carry heavy tasks of works and starved them to skeletons until they were extremely weak, almost dead. Furthermore, the agricultural harvests which resulted from the people's sweat and blood had been sent to serve the strategies of their masters in Peking.

Our present system has the people as the proprietors, as the masters of their own works. Therefore, to pay patriotic contributions is to increase the strength of the state authority of the people who work for the interest of the people. The present patriotic contributions improve the people's rights as their own masters to earn a living which contrasts the taxation of the old social regime which relentlessly persecuted the people's interest.

[Question] What are the purposes of patriotic contribution?

[Answer] After 7 January 1979, our people crossed the period of racial massacre; their lives encountered a great deal of hardship, that is why our nation had not decided on patriotic contributions. Now, 5 years after the liberation, agricultural productions have been pushed ahead, people's lives have been gradually stabilized and in it lies our cause of defense and building the vast country day by day with our difficult financial conditions. Along with it, the state must be forced to ask for people's participation to solve all complicated problems in order

to push vigorously the cause of defense and to build the motherland by increasing production and stabilizing the living of the people. The offering of patriotic contributions confirms the rightful interest and the obligation of the citizens in utilizing the farm lands making the farmers happy in production, thus deleting the old idea of forcing contribution on lands according to their wishes without clear basic interest.

[Question] For what parts are the patriotic contributions to be paid?

[Answer] Patriotic contributions are planned according to the value of the lands given to the family, to the individuals or to the solidarity group for improving production. Those who use more farm land must pay more patriotic contribution and those who use less must pay less. The kind of lands considered for paying patriotic contributions are plantation lands for rice paddy, corn, yams, special kinds of potatoes and all kinds of vegetables together with land for annual industrial plantation and long term plantation. Lands for house construction and gardening planned by the state are not considered for paying patriotic contributions.

[Question] What are the political purposes of paying patriotic contributions, of restoring the farm lands and of clearing and widening new lands.

[Answer] In order to encourage people to till the land and to clear new lands for cultivation, the state is allowing 2 and 5 contribution-free years for clearing and tilling the new lands beginning with the first year of annual harvest.

[Question] What are the obligations for exemption from paying patriotic contributions?

[Answer] To make patriotic contributions fit the situation and for guaranteeing the living conditions of the people, the state, in part, reduces or allows exemptions for all patriotic contributions for any works that do not produce crop harvestings due to natural disaster or destruction.

For the old age family, for those who are fatigued, weak, unable to do any work or who become sick and not able to work, patriotic contributions are either totally or partially exempted.

Special attention is paid to those families who attributed much to the revolution, such as those families having parents, spouses or children living jointly with sacrificial fighters, the handicapped or police still in service. They are considered partially exempt from participation in patriotic contributions every year. The family benefactors for the revolution are the military and police families still serving to fight in the ranks.

[Question] To what lands shall the patriotic contributions be applied to?

[Answer] One hundred square meters (1 acre) of land is considered for the payment patriotic contributions in kilograms of paddy. These are divided into three categories of payments for three different areas of lands:

Provincial areas which lie around the Tonle Sap River and along the Mekong Delta must pay 1 kg of paddy per 100 square meters of land.

Provincial areas which lie near the sea and on the highlands must contribute 0.8 kg per 100 square meters [of land].

Those provinces which lie on the mountain must pay 0.6 per 100 square meters [of land].

Apart from those crops, the lands for planting all vegetables, flowers, canes, tobaccos, cottons, coconuts, variety of beans, lotus, pepper and other edible crops without any limit, must pay 1 kg of paddy per 100 square meters [of land].

[Question] What kind of contributions shall be provided for one area of land with different fertility?

[Answer] Each area of land, small or big, must differ in fertility. In order to participate in truly justified contributions, categories of land must be clearly divided based on the amount of contributions characterized by the conditions of the land, that is, rich land pays a higher contribution than poor land. But at present, agricultural products are still unstable; the state has not explored and analyzed a variety of lands to fit various techniques of production. The state machinery and cadres in our quarter do not have enough opportunity to distribute categories of land at each base. Therefore, our state has fixed three categories of contributions applicable to the three big areas of the whole country according to Article 6 of the statute declaring patriotic contributions. In an area where contributions are applied, there are no guarantees for justification, but they are first steps to facilitate the job of various contributions necessary for the farmers to participate according to medium income levels. This is the application of Subdecree 100 A.N.Kr of the Council of Ministers. There are a number of quarters in which good lands and bad lands exist together and if there are contributions to be made according to those conditions it will influence people's lives. Therefore, the People's Revolutionary Committee must examine and propose to the Ministry of Finance considerations reducing contributions, in part justified for the category of bad lands which produce less crops.

[Question] How are the patriotic contributions made?

[Answer] The patriotic contributions are planned to be given in the amount of paddy but they can be given in cash according to the value of paddy bought by the state at the base.

Apart from that, if people who live near to the state paddy warehouse can easily transport their paddy to the warehouse, the state will also accept paddy contributions. The state plans to ask for contributions once a year after harvesting the rainy-season rice crop.

For those bases that are able to grow in the dry season or to plan another kind of crop, patriotic contributions can be asked for two or three times annually.

[Question] What are the maximum patriotic contributions for fertile land and abundant crop harvests?

[Answer] Lands for such plantation crops as vegetables, flowers, cane, tobacco, fruit bearing plants etc... provide more abundant harvests than paddy. However, according to Article 6 of the statute clarifying patriotic contributions, [payments] must be made at 1 kg per acre. At this time, we have just planned the patriotic contributions according to the square meter along with the categories of land. On the other hand, income according to the kind of crops with maximum production will be planned carefully in a later time.

Every category of crop with maximum harvest, if compared with paddy, shows that contributions are still less; however, if we speak of investing funds and the total work force at the time of growing these crops, it is much more. This comparison with paddy led us to consider that contributions for every category of crop must guarantee the interest of the growers every time they spend.

Moreover, for every crop as mentioned above the state must encourage people to improve production and maintain necessary materials for the industry and for export.

[Question] What are the duties of every citizen in paying patriotic contributions?

[Answer] Each citizen who uses land has the duty of telling the exact area of his land, of paying fully the patriotic contributions as listed in the contribution plan, and of paying exactly according to the time fixed by the Revolutionary People's Committee of the quarters. Furthermore after paying contribution they must obtain receipts.

Each citizen has the obligation to condemning any person creating anti-patriotic contribution activities and those greedy persons bluffing and cheating [on their] patriotic contributions.

[Question] What are the rights of the citizens in paying patriotic contributions?

[Answer] Each citizen who sees anybody or his own family paying incorrect patriotic contributions to the bases is obligated to complain to the Revolutionary People's Committee in the quarters or to the state authority authorized to supervise the problems. The state authority who receives any complaints must solve the problems for the complainants in a period no later than 1 month. After the problems are resolved, if the contributions are over paid, they must be returned back to the contributors and, if under paid, they must be payed in full.

[Question] After a citizen has payed patriotic contributions, must he pay another kind of contribution?

[Answer] Patriotic contributions are the only joint shares for the state from the land users. The bases cannot impose arbitrarily every joint share on people who use land. But patriotic contributions are not joint collections which people share like money or like the work force for establishing culture, society, or health for the bases. As the maxim says, "The state and the people cooperate in their work."

For joint collection, the central base must still use [the contributions] based on patriotic and voluntary awareness of the people.

[Question] If a farmer living in Quarter A uses land in Quarter B, to which quarter shall he pay his patriotic contributions?

[Answer] Article 7 of the statute concerning patriotic contributions requires that the People's Revolutionary Committee of the quarter in which the land is situated has duty to control and decide on how much should be paid to the state in contributions.

Therefore, the farmer living in Quarter A and cultivating land in Quarter B must contribute his share to the Quarter A.

[Question] What is the connection between selling paddy to the state and paying patriotic contributions?

[Answer] Selling paddy to the state and paying patriotic contributions to the state are different services. Any farmer who sells his paddy to the state is paid poorly. On the other hand, paying patriotic contributions is the farmer's obligation for the cause of defending and building the country. In paying patriotic contributions, people can pay in cash obtained from selling paddy to the state or money obtained from any other income such as raising cattle or from skills in any other job. Therefore, income from patriotic contributions is not based entirely on selling paddy to the state. In other words, people can pay patriotic contributions before selling their paddy if they have money from other sources or they can pay patriotic contributions before selling their paddy to the state.

[Question] Does the farmer's family who has not become a member of a solidarity production group pay patriotic contributions higher than the limit clarified the statute concerning [patriotic] contributions?

[Answer] The amount of patriotic contributions in Article 6 of the statute concerning patriotic contributions is being decreed for a solidarity production group as well as for the farmer's family who produce individually. Allowing the farmer to become a member of a solidarity production group is done on a voluntary basis, that is, the farmer cannot be forced to become member of a solidarity production group by way of paying higher contributions. Patriotic contributions encourage farmers to become collective workers by incentive, by and through the political aims of a solidarity production group.

This is done to allow a solidarity production group to pay its share to a collective budget. At present, no solidarity production group has plans to create a collective group so the policy of encouraging such a creation cannot be applied.

7429

CSO: 4212/42

PRESS, RADIO MARK HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY

BK190834 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT 19 May 84

[Text] Phnom Penh, 19 May (SPK)--The Kampuchean press has devoted entire pages illustrated with pictures in praise of the qualities and virtues of the late President Ho Chi Minh as his 94th birthday (19 May) approaches.

In an editorial, the paper KAMPUCHEA calls President Ho Chi Minh the symbol of the fraternal alliance of the revolutionary movement of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, with socialist countries and the national liberation movement, and with the working class and workers throughout the world.

For its part, the paper of the People's Army of Kampuchea says in its editorial: The Kampuchean people express their gratitude to this eminent figure, President Ho Chi Minh, for his teaching which has enabled them to win resounding victories over French colonialism, U.S. imperialism, and particularly over the Pol Pot genocidal clique--Beijing's zealous lackey--and to build the PRK which, step by step, is progressing toward socialism.

Every invader has had to capitulate before the peoples of Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Laos, who have benefited from his teaching and got their strength from their militant solidarity.

We are determined, notes the paper, to prove the spirit to fight and win over any enemy, to preserve for eternity the Kampuchea-Vietnam-Laos solidarity and the spirit of mutual assistance, to strengthen the solidarity with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend world peace and socialism, and to contribute to making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability, and happiness.

After extolling the revolutionary virtues of President Ho Chi Minh, the paper PHNOM PENH calls on all cadres to model themselves on the president to successfully achieve the task of building socialism in Kampuchea.

The Radio Voice of the Kampuchean People says: Founder of the Indochinese Communist Party and animated by a noble spirit of proletarian internationalism, President Ho Chi Minh cemented the bonds of friendship, solidarity, and strategic alliance of the three Indochinese countries.

Cadres, combatants, and people of Kampuchea are determined to follow the heroism and the revolutionary virtues shown by President Ho Chi Minh, to raise their spirit to struggle to build the fatherland, to temper themselves and maintain a revolutionary way of life, and to successfully carry out the resolutions of the sixth plenum of the KPRP Central Committee in order to loyally serve the interest of the people, concludes the Voice of the Kampuchean People.

The photos on the first pages of the papers show President Ho Chi Minh working or relaxing with gardening.

The paper PHNOM PENH devoted almost a full page to the President's theories and his activities taken from the collection of anecdotes "The Beloved Uncle Ho."

CSO: 4219/47

VODK VIEWS VIETNAM'S 'TRICKY MANEUVERS'

BK260628 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
25 May 84

[Station commentary: "Whether the Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors are Fooling Us or not Depends on Whether They Are Going To Withdraw All Their Aggressor Troops From Kampuchea"]

[Text] After being seriously defeated in all fields during the 1983-1984 dry season because their offensive plan was seriously defeated and their diplomatic maneuvers were also shamefully and bitterly defeated, the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have made every effort to repeatedly stage their diplomatic maneuvers. They said they will partially withdraw their aggressor troops from Kampuchea at the end of May. They have pretended to be flexible. They have made some statements pretending that they want to resolve the Kampuchean problem.

The world has realized such tricky maneuvers of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. The Hanoi Vietnamese enemies have tried to fool everybody. Although caught and exposed, they are stubborn and continue trying to dupe everyone.

The diplomatic history of the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy is one of cheating. The Vietnamese cheated at the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences. They also cheated at the 1973 Paris conference. Concerning the Kampuchea-Vietnamese border, they have cheated since 1967. Relating to Thailand and ASEAN, the Vietnamese enemy also cheat. They have declared that they respect the sovereignty of other countries, but in reality they have repeatedly violated other countries' sovereignty. They even dared to mislead the United Nations. At the beginning of 1979, they dared to send a telegram to misinform the United Nations.

The Le Duan Vietnamese enemy have made many declarations regarding the withdrawal of their aggressor troops from Kampuchea, but in reality they have not withdrawn a single soldier from Kampuchea. They have sent more reinforcements and weapons to Kampuchea. They have sent 20,000-30,000 fresh soldiers to Kampuchea in each season to replace and reinforce their forces in order to continue their war of aggression in Kampuchea and genocide against the Kampuchean race. Nobody is surprised when the Hanoi Vietnamese

enemy aggressors pretend that they want to resolve the Kampuchean problem and restore peace in Southeast Asia. Everyone has clearly realized the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors' tricky maneuvers. Every year, when they are more seriously defeated in the military field, they make every effort to launch their diplomatic maneuvers. When they fail to threaten others with their military means, when nobody is afraid of them and no one kneels to accept their conditions, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors pretend to be flexible and act as if they want to resolve the Kampuchean problem. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have played this trick for many years, but they have always failed. This year, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors want to play this old trick to fool everybody. They will be definitely and shamefully defeated.

The Kampuchean people, peoples in the world, various countries in the region, as well as different countries throughout the world have clearly determined that complete Vietnamese aggressor troop withdrawal from Kampuchea in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolutions is the key to resolving the Kampuchean problem. Whether the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors are fooling us or not depends on whether they are going to withdraw all their aggressor troops from Kampuchea. As long as the Vietnamese enemy do not withdraw all of their aggressor troops from Kampuchea, all of their statements are only propaganda, lies, and tricks in order to prolong their war of aggression and continue to occupy Kampuchea.

CSO: 4212/52

COMMENTARY ON CONTINUING 'STRUGGLE'

BK300648 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
29 May 84

[Station commentary: "The Kampuchean People and Democratic Kampuchean National Army and Guerrillas Pledge To Fight More Vigorously Against the Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors and Seize Greater Victories in the 1984 Rainy Season"]

[Text] The Kampuchean people's struggle against the Vietnamese Le Duan aggressors, expansionists, annexationists, and race exterminators has entered the sixth rainy season. During the past six dry and five rainy seasons, our struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors has made a long journey. We can see the light of victory more clearly with every passing day. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Le Duan aggressors have suffered more serious difficulties and a total impasse. Their state of defeat can be seen more clearly every day.

During the 1983-84 dry season which has just ended, the Vietnamese Le Duan aggressors have suffered a deeper headlong dive. They have suffered more shortages of fighting forces. However, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have not given up their aggression. Despite the fact that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have suffered serious defeats in the sixth dry season and are facing more difficulties on the battlefield in the current sixth rainy season, the war of aggression has continued fiercely and the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have further massacred the Kampuchean people in a most barbarous and cruel manner in accordance with their policy to exterminate the Kampuchean race and annex the Kampuchean territory. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors are continuing to massacre the Kampuchean people with conventional weapons and toxic chemicals. They have tortured the Kampuchean people, detained them in strategic hamlets, banned them from launching production drives to earn a living, and robbed them of their farm tools, rice strains, and cattle in order to prevent them from growing any crops. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have continued to recruit the Kampuchean people and force the Kampuchean youths to fight and die in their place.

The Vietnamese war of aggression is still continuing fiercely. The scale of this war has not reduced. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have continued to sow great destruction against the Kampuchean nation and people and carried

on their diplomatic maneuvers in preparation for the 1984 UN General Assembly. The Vietnamese war of aggression in Kampuchea has now entered the sixth rainy season, but there is still no sign indicating that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors are preparing to withdraw their aggressor troops from Kampuchea in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolutions and the international community's demand. The sending of Van Tien Dung, the most cruel, barbarous, and fascist cat's-paw of the Vietnamese Le Duan enemy, to carry favor with their Soviet boss in Moscow, clearly indicates that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors will not withdraw from Kampuchea. On the contrary, they are preparing to push forward. Thus, the Vietnamese war of aggression in Kampuchea remains a grave threat to peace, security, and stability in Southeast Asia and the Asian-Pacific region. For this reason, the peoples and countries in this region and other peace and justice-loving peoples and countries in the world have continued to pay great attention to the Kampuchean problem and have demanded that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors withdraw all of their aggressor troops from Kampuchea in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolutions. These peoples and countries have further supported the struggle waged by the Kampuchean people and the CGDK.

On their part, our Kampuchean people, Democratic Kampuchean National Army and guerrillas, and our CGDK continue to unite within the great national union and pledge to fight more vigorously against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, expansionists, annexationists, and race exterminators in this 1984 rainy season and strive to fulfill all tasks on the forefront, in the rear, and in the military, political, and diplomatic fields in order to make another important advance in this sixth rainy season and create good conditions for more effective and more vigorous struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in the coming seasons until we can drive all the Vietnamese enemy aggressors from our beloved Kampuchean territory.

CSO: 4212/52

VODK CARRIES STATEMENT DENYING WOMEN CAPTURED

BK260510 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
25 May 84

[24 May statement by spokesman of Democratic Kampuchean National Army's
320th and 450th Divisions--read by announcer]

[Text] 1. Some foreign reports said that the Vietnamese enemy captured 70 women of Democratic Kampuchea's transportation corps on Thursday, 17 May 1984, while they were bringing supplies to the battle at Damnak Chek on South Sisophon battlefield. It was said that this news was revealed by Ni Kan, commander of the 320th Division, and Sok Pheap, commander of the 450th Division.

2. We would like to make it clear that both Ni Kan and Sok Pheap were engaged in the battle with the Vietnamese enemy at the front and were therefore in no position to give any information to either local or foreign newsmen.

Moreover, the report that the Vietnamese enemy captured 70 transportation women of Democratic Kampuchea on South Sisophon battlefield was a false story, for at the time the women were purportedly captured by the Vietnamese enemy, Damnak Chek was completely under our control.

3. It has been observed on many occasions that foreign reports were made about South Sisophon, alleging that the Vietnamese enemy had conducted various activities to inflict so many losses and so much damage on the Democratic Kampuchean National Army while quoting this or that commander of Democratic Kampuchea as the source of information. Such stories are exaggerated tales intentionally and systematically fabricated to disparage Democratic Kampuchea and boost the prestige of the Hanoi aggressors.

Domestic and foreign opinion should understand that the Hanoi aggressors have planted agents to feed wrong information to journalists in their psychological warfare in the service of their aggressive policy. The Hanoi aggressors are conducting such acts to serve their aggressive designs. However, truth always remains truth. The Hanoi aggressors can fool people

only some of the time. Realities on the Kampuchean battlefield, in the international arena, or in Vietnam have repeatedly unmasked the lies and deceptions of the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors, making the name of the Vietnamese Hanoi aggressors stink more and more every day in the belief of local and foreign opinion.

[Dated] 24 May 1984

[Signed] The spokesman of the 320th and 450th Divisions, South Sisophon battlefield

CSO: 4212/52

BRIEFS

SRV-ASSISTED RICE HUSKER--Phnom Penh, 3 May (SPK)--A rice husker capable of processing 60 to 78 metric tons of paddy per day has just been opened at Tonle Bet, Kompong Cham Province. The rice husker was built with Vietnamese aid. Deputy Secretary of Kompong Cham provincial party committee Khim Sophal highly appreciated the efforts of Vietnamese specialists and workers and deeply thanked the Vietnamese party, Government, and people for their disinterested and timely assistance to the rebirth of the Kampuchean people. [Text] [BK040145 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0411 GMT 3 May 84]

DELEGATION TO LISBON--Phnom Penh, 2 May (SPK)--A delegation of Kampuchea's Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) led by Chem Snguon, deputy minister of Justice, left Phnom Penh on 1 May for Lisbon to attend the international conference of solidarity with the Nicaraguan people, which will be held in this Portuguese city beginning 6 May. It was seen off by Prach Sun, vice chairman of the KPRP Central Committee's Commission for Foreign Relations, and Sok An, secretary general of the Kampuchean Committee for the Defense of Peace. [Text] [BK040145 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0447 GMT 3 May 84]

CSSR PROPAGANDIST DEPARTS--Phnom Penh, 2 May (SPK)--Evzen Paloncy, director of the Svoboda Publishing House of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee, left Phnom Penh on Tuesday at the end of his 9-day visit to Kampuchea. During his stay, he was received by Men Saman, member of the Central Committee and chairman of the Commission for Propaganda and Education of the KPRP Central Committee. He also met with other Kampuchean officials responsible for propaganda. [Excerpt] [BK040145 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0449 GMT 3 May 84]

RED CROSS, NEWSPAPER DELEGATIONS--Phnom Penh, 2 May (SPK)--My Samedi, general secretary of the Kampuchean Red Cross, left Phnom Penh on 1 May for the CSSR where he will attend the consultative meeting of socialist countries' Red Cross. On the same day, Khieu Kanharith, director general of KAMPUCHEA newspaper left for Moscow to attend the celebration of the 72d anniversary of PRAVDA and the fourth conference of director generals of socialist countries' party papers, which will be held in the CSSR. [Text] [BK040145 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0404 GMT 2 May 84]

CHEA SIM HANOI STOPOVER--Phnom Penh, 30 May (SPK)--Chairman Chea Sim, who is leading a delegation of the National Assembly, made a stopover in Hanoi on 28 May en route to visit Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He was greeted on his arrival and departure by Xuan Thuy, vice chairman of Vietnam's National Assembly. [Text] [BK300757 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0436 GMT 30 May 84]

SIEM REAP MILITARY OPERATIONS--Comrade Kit Buma, the woman member of Parliament from Siem Reap Odor-Mean Chey constituency noted the following about the situation in the province: During the last 6 months of 1983, the enemies effort was very active in the form of subversion with hit and run attacks as well as food seizures from the people; at the same time, they tried to spread a psychological war to divide national and international solidarity, especially between Kampuchea and Vietnam. The provincial revolutionary armed forces and the provincial people apparently showed a great level of strength both in quantity and quality. Despite all these difficulties and sacrifices, our provincial armed forces joined closely with people, authorities, militants, and especially with the Vietnamese army to actively clean up the enemies from inside and outside. They swept the strategic fronts four hundred sixty-two times, they killed 166 enemies on the battleground, and they wounded 200 enemies and made 120 others confess. They also captured 12 enemies and seized 85 arms with ammunition, and 139 mines of all kinds. [Excerpts] [Phnom Penh KAMPUCHEA in Cambodian 16 Feb 84 p 3] 7429

CSO: 4212/42

STORY FEATURES FRIENDSHIP WITH SRV WORKERS, TROOPS

Vientiane NOUM LAO in Lao 15-20 Mar 84 pp 9, 10, 13

[Article by Bengsaivang: "Red Rose In Keo Mon"]

[Text] To the friendship and memory of our Vietnamese neighbors who are carrying out [their] international duty in our country.

A car traveled along a road going up a mountain and stopped in front of a road leading to a group of houses with thatched roofs and mud paint. Sengthong jumped out of the driver's compartment and held a small package in his hand.

"Sen! Please have Det tell them to go back first. I will stop by here (he pointed to the group of houses) for a moment. I will get off here." Sengthong turned to talk to a person who was sitting in the car.

"Thong! Hurry up. It's very hot!"

"All right! As soon as I meet Miss Ha I will go back."

Sengthong walked up the steps and went in the door with a sign saying "Benh Vien Cong Dan Cau Duoing So Hai", "Hospital For Bridge And Road Workers No 2."

"Chao Dong Chi, "Hello, comrade" said Sengtong.

Chao, "Hello, comrade" said a Vietnamese female medic in a white uniform who greeted Sengthong in front of the road leading to the house. "May I help you?"

[I would like to see Miss Nguyen Thi Ha.]

"Miss Nguyen Thi Ha! Miss Nguyen Thi Ha!" The medic repeated the name, and her face which was happy a second ago turned sad.

"Is she here?" asked Sengthong, smiling shyly.

"Please have a seat and wait in the guest room." Sengthong walked to the guest room where he had had a chance to sit many times before. The medic opened a cupboard, put a [glass] and a [teapot] on the table, opened and poured sweet-smelling Nghe Tinh tea into the pot, and poured in hot water.

"Where are you from," she looked at him and asked.

"I am from Vientiane. Our convoy came from Sam Neua."

"Really? You must have stopped by here many times. How do you know Miss Nguyen Thi Ha?"

"Last September when this road was being cleared I drove past this area. At that time I was lucky to find this hospital, or I wouldn't be alive today."

"What happened?"

"I had appendicitis when I was down there. When I got up here I went to the hospital and had an operation."

"Oh, so you know this area well. Please have some [tea] and wait." Sengthong sat there by himself in deep thought. He could see no one here he knew. The doctores here were all new. Maybe it was their turn to go back to visit their homes. When this road is finished the neighboring Vietnamese will hand over the road to [Laos], and the hospital personnel who serve the road and b.idge workers will return to their own country because the construction agreement for this communication route did not cover a lengthy stay. By then Nguyen Thi Ha will have left this place to return to her homeland on the other side of the border. Oh, he really missed and loved her.

"Hello, comrade! said a doctor who walked in. This interrupted Sengthong's thought.

"Chao, Hello. How about you? How are you doing?"

"Lately I've been fine." The medic in the white uniform returned and sat on a chair beside them and gave cups of tea to the doctor and guest Sengthong.

"Is Miss Nguyen Thi Ha here?" Sengthong asked the doctor shyly.

"Nguyen Thi Ha! She was..." The doctor did not speak clearly.

"This is a personal story." Sengthong began to tell the story of himself and Nguyen Thi Ha to the doctor.

"Last September my friends dropped me off here for an appendectomy because of the sudden symptoms. If I did not have the operation in this hospital I don't know how I would be alive today.

"It was winter then, and it was very cold around here. I felt the pain of my wound. Nguyen Thi Ha took care of me and always made me happy. I never met a girl who was as talkative, polite and friendly with me as much as Nguyen Thi Ha. When I refused to drink cow's milk (I didn't really like it) she said, 'If you don't drink cow's milk (canned milk) you will not be strong. If you are not handsome no Vietnamese girls will love you, and there are many beautiful Vietnamese girls here!' Sometimes I could not help laughing. She said that Vietnamese girls would not marry anyone without a head or with damaged intestines. Once she fed me with cow's milk and I missed my friends. I was sad and she asked directly, 'Who is it?' I did not know what she would ask me about, and she hurried to answer with a smile who that Vietnamese girl was. When going to treat an old lady in bed, Nguyen Thi Ha always smiled and said, 'mother, I a Vietnamese brought you some rice. You must eat a lot so you will be strong and so you can return home.'

"At night in the office after the doctor had finished talking, Nguyen Thi Ha spoke about the duty of the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union members. These members had to work to the utmost in their duty in fraternal Laos. They had to work on specialized tasks, and protect and raise high the banner of solidarity and friendship. 'The truth is the spirit of treating patients, not only our Vietnamese workers but also the Lao cadres and people who have come for help in our hospital. In the nation of [Laos] Lan Xang we met poor people who had just been saved from the War of Aggression of the imperialists the same as in our Vietnam. We spoke of our love to those poor people as we do in our Vietnam.' Later on I learned that Nguyen Thi Ha was a secretary or assistant secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union in this hospital."

"Please have a drink of water." The doctor continued by saying that last year he had not yet come to work here. "At that time Comrade Thanh was the chief of the hospital. That is why I do not know you."

"That is true. I can see that most of you are new. Miss, what is your name?"

"I forgot to introduce myself. I am Bieh Van. The doctor's name is Thinh." They talked quietly and Sengthong continued.

"When I was better and it was getting close to the time to leave the hospital Nguyen Thi Ha had a chance to talk to me a lot. Each day I saw her face and her smile, and heard her laughter. When she went to work far away I waited and was worried. Later on, one day Miss Ha asked me, 'Where's your home, Sengthong?'"

"In Savannakhet. It's close to Route 9."

"Have you ever seen the Vietnamese Army pass by that area?"

"Oh! In wartime, especially the Lam Son 719 village was a place for the Vietnamese Army to stay. At that time a company Staff officer named Van Hung stayed at my house. I will tell you about Uncle Hung. He was a kind man. He helped my father lead the people to escape the enemies' attack. At night they went to the battlefield and returned many days later. When he came he would pat me on the head (at that time I was not very big) and then he went out to the battlefield. I missed him and waited until he was back. I was happy to see him back. When the fighting was intense I did not know why he gave a picture of himself with his family to my father and our family."

"Was it a nice picture?" Miss Ha asked.

"Oh, it was really beautiful. Uncle Hung has six children, and the third one was a girl. I saw a beautiful little girl in the picture, and I fell in love with her. He saw that I liked to look at the picture, and he said that when I grew up I could become his son-in-law. His daughter's name (here he pointed at the picture of his third daughter) was Ha (their last name was also Nguyen). His home was in (Eintheng) in Nghe Tinh Province."

He was in (Eintheng), Nghe Tinh Province? she repeated.

"Yes, according to what he said. It was a fierce time for the Lam Son 719 operation. One evening I saw my parents cry, and when I asked them why, my father told me that Uncle Hung would no longer come back. He had sacrificed his life. On that day I cried for I really felt sorry that he had died. He had been away from his family for 6 years."

"Please have a drink of water," the doctor encouraged him, lifting a glass of tea.

"What happened next? Did Nguyen Thi Ha know Uncle Hung?" interrupted the medic at his side.

"I don't know! When I told Uncle Hung's story she looked this way and that and put her head down. She might have been doing that to keep from laughing. When I mentioned this I felt embarrassed, but that was the truth! Later I was very worried about her. When I was lying down in the ward and heard her voice in the prescription room I felt better. When I heard her footsteps coming towards me I was happy. However, I did not dare to tell her that I really loved her. I did not know if we could get married even though we loved each other. It was because of her job that I met her and fell in love with her!

"Oh, God! A pair of sweet eyes, lovely face, beautiful body, pure spirit and strong in her task, [my love] where are you now? Have you forgotten already? At times you sang the song "You Should Not Go Back" by

(Quan Ho Pak Ning). There was a time when you sang "Dok Champa." You sang a song when you went to Uncle Ho's mausoleum. Where are you now? Why don't you come to me so I can see you and feel better before I leave today?" Sengthong was longing for Nguyen Thi Ha for a moment and dreamt of her.

Sengthong continued. "The day that I returned to Vientiane to the unit, Nguyen Thi Ha had said that whatever happened I should bring that picture back for her to see. So I said, so Uncle Hung is a relative of yours, right?"

"No, but if your Uncle Hung was from Nghe Tinh and lived in (Ein Theng) it is possible that he might be from the same district or the same canton."

"All right, I will try to bring the picture back as you wish. Uncle Hung was buried close to my house. If you know [them], please pass along the picture and my regards to daughter Ha, and his family.

I got into the car slowly. Ha handed me my stuff. The cool air blew by, wild banana leaves along the marsh waved, and a flock of mynah birds sang far away.

Ha hurriedly reached out her hands and said goodbye to me again for the last time, down there where this road meets the others." Sengthong spoke and pointed to where the road branched off.

"My convoy traveled on. Oh God, it was as if I had left my heart here! It has been almost 2 years, and today I have a chance to come here. This time I have the picture for Nguyen Thi Ha along with some figs from my mother! My mother asked me to bring a Lao skirt so that if she returned to Nghe Tinh she could look for Uncle Hung's family and give the Lao skirt which my mother wove to Miss Ha's mother as a sign of love to her."

"Is that right? Now I will tell you the truth! Our Nguyen Thi Ha is dead," the doctor said sadly.

"What? What did you say?" Sengthong asked, puzzled.

"Nguyen Thi Ha is dead because of a bomb left over from the war. The bomb was on a tree branch at the edge of the road. When she was watching the people clear the road the tree fell down, the bomb exploded, and Nguyen Thi Ha, an active medic and an excellent member of the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union, lost her life."

"Oh God! Nguyen Thi Ha! Miss Ha!" Sengthong exclaimed and moaned over and over. He looked at the picture and the gifts with sad disappointment.

"We just buried her over a week ago," the doctor said sadly. The woman medic wiped her tears with a handkerchief. Sengthong got up and walked back and forth slowly in the guest room.

"Let's go to see Nguyen Thi Ha's place," Sengthong persuaded the doctor and the woman medic, and slowly they walked out of the living room door.

Nguyen Thi Ha's bedroom was still kept the same. Books on specialized tasks were still on the desk as before. The places to sit and sleep still remained the same, except that on the table there was a red rose which represented the loneliness of the room that she no longer lived in. The woman doctor opened Nguyen Thi Ha's [case] and picked out a small book.

"There's a picture in here," she said and handed the book to Sengthong.

"Oh, God! Uncle Hung! Miss Ha!" Sengthong cried softly. The two pictures had come from the same negative.

"Oh, God! Why didn't Ha tell me that this Nguyen Thi Ha is the same as the Miss Ha in the picture and Miss Ha the daughter of Uncle Hung. Now who will tell me she loves me to add to my strength in life! Though I could not tell whether my love and Ha's would be joined or not, I wanted my love always to be beautiful. Alas, my luck! The war separated me from my love."

"Sengthong, in war or in battle it is certain that we might lose our dearest heart, but we still have our lofty and excellent love for the revolutionary duty... Seng, I feel the utmost sympathy for you. It is true that the war is over and we have won, and all the hardship has gone, but we will never be able to forget the bitterness."

"Dr Thinh and Bich Van, what can I say?" said Sengthong softly and slowly with tears in his eyes.

The three of them walked out of the house toward the north. At the top of the [thatch] hill there was a new grave and over it there was a stone inscribed with the name of Nguyen Thi Ha...

Sengthong walked toward the grave, bowed his head and placed on the grave a red rose he had picked in front of Nguyen Thi Ha's residence (the rose bush had been planted when Sengthong came for treatment).

Looking at the red rose through his tears he seemed to see the red rose petals as big as a red flag, and when the wind blew the rose stem it looked as if the red flag was waving. But when he wiped away his tears he saw instead the red rose on the grave. When he wept the red rose looked like a flag.

My beloved country will be forever grateful to the proletarian internationalist combatants! Our love and friendship will be firm forever! Unable to keep his feelings in his heart, Sengthong cried loudly. He turned to hold Dr Thinh and medic Bich Van. They were silent and could only stare at each other with love.

"Comrades Thinh and Bich Van, please give this gift to Nguyen Thi Ha's mother."

Sengthong's car left Keo Mon to join the others with love. The people in this neighboring hospital are Sengthong's friends. No one else knew except Sengthong, Dr Thinh and Bich Van, the medic.

9884

CSO: 4206/120

BRIEFS

JAPANESE AID--Tokyo, 29 May (KYODO)--Japan exchanged notes in Vientiane Tuesday to give 1,045 million yen (\$4.5 million) in grant aid to Laos for construction of a medicine development center, the Foreign Ministry said Tuesday. Ministry officials said Laotian hospitals--4 in the capital and 121 in provincial areas--depend for 95 percent of their medicine needs on foreign imports and the Laotian Government has sought Japanese aid to build such a center. [Text] [OW290251 Tokyo KYODO in English 0214 GMT 29 May 84]

TREE PLANTING DAY--Vientiane, 19 May (OANA-KPL)--The Council of Ministers recently issued an instruction on the observance of the national tree planting day (18 June). The instruction evaluates work in planting trees and related fields as well as forest conservation throughout the country since the issuing of the Council of Ministers' instruction on tree planting in 1980 in which it has been stated that there are still some areas and services which need to improve ways to deal with the problem. The instruction issued to all the ministries, state and mass institutions sets out the targets, among others, that each individual must plant 5 to 10 tree saplings on the day. The instruction says that the public must be thoroughly further informed on the importance of forestation in general and its implication to environment and lives as well as its economic significance. Furthermore there is a need to reassess the forestry work throughout the country and draw some concrete lessons so that work in the field can be effectively improved. There must be bodies responsible for allocating the places for tree planting, at the easily eroded areas, public places for instance. Also important, the instruction reads, one needs to sow, select saplings and committees in charge of the maintaining and caring for the young trees in particular. In the preparation, committees must be appointed to, among others, see to it that technical advisers are on hand for the public so as to assure the best result in carrying out the national tree planting day. [Text] [BK191000 Vientiane KPL in English 0856 GMT 19 May 84]

INSTRUCTIONS ON CHILDREN'S DAY--Vientiane, 23 May (OANA-KPL)--The president of the National Committee for the International Year for the Child Phoumi Vongvichit recently issued an instruction on the celebration of the International Children's Day (1 June) to be observed throughout the country. Phoumi Vongvichit who is also vice chairman of the Council of Ministers in his instruction also assessed the work in child care in general and their education. In this, it has been evaluated that, since last year International

Children's Day there has been marked improvement in this respect in which there have been close coordination among the schools, kindergartens, parents associations, administration and public organizations. In view to make the day more meaningful, the instruction gives some guidelines regarding preparations for the event. Included in the preparation work, the instruction reads, the kindergartens, creches must present their reports of their activities, and on the other hand the administration, organisations of women, youths, pioneers, and trade union along with associations sponsoring education and children should also inform the public of their contributions in this regard in the period of a year. Kindergartens and creches furthermore must train children to present artistic performances on the occasion. At the rallies the best achieved individuals [as received] in the field of child care will be presented with certificates or items of acknowledgement for their deeds. And reports are to be pooled at the National Committee for the International Year for the Child. [Text] [BK231259 Vientiane KPL in English 0900 GMT 23 May 84]

KHONG DISTRICT ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT--The work of the mass organization has been greatly expanded, reinforcing its role as a political organization of the party. It effectively implements the policies of the party and government. The youth union [organization] has been extensively expanded and has completely wiped out white cantons [areas where there is no LPRF presence--FBIS]. It now has 1,339 members including 647 women. The women's organization has also been able to wipe out white cantons, and it now has 5,417 members. Trade unions which represent the working class are also growing at the same pace as the other organizations. At the end of 1983 there were 818 cadres and government employees who became trade union members. This number included 221 women. [Excerpts] [Vientiane NOUM LAO in Lao 15-20 Mar 84 p 7] 9884

CSO: 4206/120

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH NSC CHIEF PRASONG SUNSIRI

BK310444 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 31 May, 1 Jun 84

[Part one of "exclusive interview" with Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, Thai National Security Council secretary general, by unidentified reporter--date, place not given]

[31 May 84 p 4]

[Text] Question: How do you assess the result of the Vietnamese dry-season offensive which was launched early this year?

Answer: The Vietnamese dry-season offensive this year was not so successful. If we review the overall situation during the dry season which started in February, we will find that the offensive came later than the previous years. The size of the Vietnamese troops employed in this year's offensive was also smaller than the previous offensives.

Question: Can you please elaborate?

Answer: The Vietnamese employed regiment-size troops in their previous dry-season offensives, but this year, the size has diminished to battalion or even company levels. Moreover, such military hardware as tanks and artillery guns employed by the Vietnamese to support their ground troops in the outgoing offensive was of smaller scale than the previous years. I have information to back up the point.

On the other hand, the resistance forces of the tripartite coalition government have grown stronger than the previous years. The Khmer guerrillas have also taken more military initiatives against the Vietnamese than the previous dry seasons.

Furthermore, the military initiatives were not restricted to the border areas. The resistance forces mounted the counter-offensive deep inside Kampuchea. They have penetrated into and taken military initiatives in the interior of Kampuchea from the areas north of Tonle Sap in Siem Reap to Battambang. Kompong Thom, Kompong Chan, and even Mondulkiri which is close to Vietnam are also areas covered by the resistance's counter-offensive in this outgoing dry season.

As a result of the stepped-up military initiatives mounted by the resistance, the Vietnamese turned for the first time to MI-8 helicopters and modified Antonov-26 aircraft for use in the suppression of the resistance operations in the interior.

The Vietnamese had used MI-8 helicopters to airlift their ground troops too. The helicopter gunships are also equipped with rockets in their operations to repress the resistance forces.

The Antonov-26 transport aircraft was modified and used in pallet bombing against the Khmer guerrillas.

Question: You said that the Vietnamese employed a smaller size of troops in this year's dry-season offensive than the previous years. How come?

Answer: The Vietnamese tried to muster up regiment-size forces in their offensive against three resistance strongholds, i.e. the stronghold opposite Phra Phalai border pass of Sisaket Province, the stronghold at Ampil, opposite Ta Phraya District of Prachin Buri, and at Sok San opposite Borai Sub-district in Trat. But their operations were not so successful. The Vietnamese could only inflict damage on the camps and other buildings at the strongholds mainly through artillery shelling and drive about 80,000 Khmer civilians across the Thai-Kampuchean frontier.

Their only major success is that we have had to bear the burden of providing refuge and feeding the refugees (laugh).

The Vietnamese could not employ regiment-size forces in their offensive because they had to pull back some units from the border to defend their strategic positions in the interior which were threatened by the resistance.

The fact that the Vietnamese could not overrun the Ampil stronghold and that they could not afford to employ tanks in ground attacks as before are clear indications that the Vietnamese have become weaker while the resistance has in turn grown stronger.

Question: You said the resistance forces had taken more military initiatives than the previous dry seasons. How do you evaluate the impacts of their military operations on the Vietnamese dry-season offensive this year?

Answer: The resistance guerrillas have mounted successive attacks on Vietnamese strategic positions in the interior, including townseats, airports and depots as well as warehouses in Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, Kompong Chham and Kratie. They also stepped up sabotages along strategic logistic routes linking Phnom Penh and the provinces in the interior to the areas near the Thai-Kampuchean border.

The results are:

--About four million litres of fuel oil were destroyed. The tanks to be deployed in military operations and the trucks to be used for transportation could not therefore be fully made use of. That is a reason why the

Vietnamese did not employ tanks in military operations in the offensive near the Thai border and why the Vietnamese were forced to start using carts to transport ammunition and artillery cartridges to their troops near the border for the first time this year.

The Vietnamese forces near the border were partially pulled back to the interior to guard strategic rear-line positions.

--The Vietnamese were forced to delay their annual offensive to February, the latest ever, simply because they have had to make their rear-line bases secure.

--The Vietnamese were forced to intensify the use of Tonle Sap as an alternative logistic route to transport supplies to the front line because of the increased sabotages along Highway No 6 and No 5 which run along the edge of the vast water reservoir. They have increased the use of barges and ferries to transport the logistic supply through Tonle Sap but then, the resistance could also harass the transportation via the waterway. They are not safe.

I have been told by international relief workers based in Kampuchea that travels along highways and roads inside Kampuchea were not safe at all.

Question: Are there any other reasons why the Vietnamese delayed this year's dry-season offensive?

Answer: Yes. If you remember, the offensive was mounted exactly when Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach wound up his tour of Indonesia and Australia. While trying to drive a wedge into the unity within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its friend, Thach also wore a mask of a peace-maker. In this context, I think that the Vietnamese delayed the offensive partly because it was still waiting for the results of Thach's tour. But Thach failed and therefore, the Vietnamese launched the offensive immediately after his return.

Some people thought early this year that the Vietnamese might not launch the annual offensive this year, but I have insisted that the Vietnamese must mount the seasonal onslaught. I argued that it would come after Thach's tour.

Question: How is the fighting situation now?

Answer: The fighting near the Thai-Kampuchean frontier has died down substantially because the monsoon rain has started to fall down. At present, the Vietnamese troops must mainly take care of their positions.

Question: How is the situation on the Sino-Vietnamese border?

Answer: Tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border has escalated substantially since Hanoi and Moscow staged a joint naval exercise during 13-16 April. The Soviet warships which participated in the exercise at Haiphong included

Minsk aircraft carrier and Ivan Rogov amphibious ship. Soviet middle-range bombers, including the TU-16's, the TU-95's and the TU-142's, also joined in the exercise which involved the landing by Soviet marine troops at Haiphong.

Beijing has beefed up its forces along the frontier by increasing its ground troops to about 400,000 now as well as boosting the number of bombers and jet interceptors at airbases near the border.

Furthermore, just early this month, the Chinese dispatched a number of warships loaded with about 2,000 marine troops to the areas near the Spratly archipelago, claimed by both rival sides as belonging to their territory.

The tension there is now very high.

["Second and Final Part" of "Exclusive Interview" with Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, Thai National Security Council secretary general, by unidentified reporter--date, place not given]

[1 Jun 84 p 5]

[Text] Question: Phirun Chatwanitkun, a member of the CPT's Central Committee, recently gave an interview in which he urged the government to abrogate the Anti-communist Act. How would you respond to his call?

Answer: As a matter of fact, the government has allowed communist members who have surrendered to the government to move freely in accordance with law and order. The defectors have never been threatened or hurt. Phirun himself can do likewise if he gives himself up to the government. Look at his friends. Have they been threatened by the authorities?

As to his call for the abrogation of the Anti-communist Act, I would say it is...to much of a condition. It's nonsense. Who does he think he is? The CPT is a political party which aims at seizing power through violent means. It is the only political party which commands an armed unit. Even the communist parties in Italy, France, Japan and the United States, for example, are struggling within the parliamentary system.

With an armed force, how can the CPT claim that it is fighting for democracy? There are many political parties here, and what if the CPT joined them on the parliamentary stage--with an armed force behind it? Do you think it would be fair to the unarmed political parties? Politics is, in essence, a struggle among political parties or interest groups within the framework of the established rules of the parliamentary stage. I stress the "rules of the game," and within the rules various political parties must learn to compromise their interests.

In fact, we have given them (CPT members) the chance to take to the parliamentary stage. Why don't they do it? Some of them have defected to the government, and have stood in general elections. Whether they have been elected or not does not matter. What matters is they are determined to fight through the correct channels, and they always have a chance to run in elections.

If they want to change a law, the Constitution or other institutions, they can do so through parliamentary means.

Question: If they were to dissolve their armed force, would the government agree to legitimise the CPT?

Answer: They can set up a political party in accordance with the law. They are now avoiding whatever offers we have made; how can they apply for the registration of the CPT when it has an armed force? It is against the law which governs the formation of political parties.

Question: How do you assess the rift within the outlawed party which reared its ugly head during the Fourth Party Congress? What is the present situation?

Answer: The present status of the CPT is at its lowest level ever since its inception. The party, its armed force and its front organizations have extremely eroded. It's an extreme and all-rounded erosion.

The CPT is now in the stage of retrospective adjustments. It has to adjust itself as a result of rifts within the party, particularly conflict within the leadership, which is essentially a power struggle. The struggle within the leadership is still sharp and fierce. This is the general picture of the CPT at present.

To make the picture clearer, I think we should look back into the past. In my analysis, the history of the CPT should be divided into four phases.

The CPT started to adopt the violent means of struggle in August 1965. The party envisaged a so-called "people's war" in which it expected to seize state power, and theorized that a people's war can come about under the following six conditions: the war must be waged under the leadership of the CPT, the masses must join in the war, the CPT and its supporters must struggle on all fronts, be it economic, political, cultural or military, the CPT must be self-reliant in every aspect, and the CPT must be supported by foreign "friends."

Now, I will review each phase in detail.

The first phase: This phase covers the period from August, 1965 to 14 October 1973. During this period, the government and authorities still did not understand the strategy of the CPT to realize a people's war, and the government authorities then concentrated on military operations to repress communist insurgents.

In other words, the government then treated the CPT as if they were bandits. The government then thought that CPT insurgents could be wiped out in short time. During the period, the government threw massive troop numbers into sensitive areas infiltrated by communist guerrillas, including Na Sai and Na Hinkong villages in the northeast and Phatthalung in the south.

But the large-scale military offensives backfired, since villagers who had connections with or were relatives of communist insurgents just did not understand why the government had to resort to force, and the CPT made use of the situation to recruit new operatives from dissident villagers.

The major characteristics of the first phase can be epitomised by a saying which was the popular: The stronger the repression, the stronger it grows.

The second phase: It lasted from 14 October 1973 till 6 October 1976. We call this phase a period of "blooming democracy." Students and intellectuals in the urban areas were then highly keen on political activities, and Maoist thought, Marxism and Leninism were widely disseminated and studied. The government was then very unstable, and policy-makers were divided over strategies and tactics to cope with CPT. The situation then was further exacerbated by social disorders; the masses were instigated and mobilised in a flurry of tumultuous demonstrations. It was 2 years of turmoil and instability, which affected efforts to formulate clear strategies and tactics against the CPT.

On the other hand, the CPT exploited the situation to recruit new members and forge alliances with potential sympathisers. The armed force of the outlawed party also intensified its military activities in the jungle and rural areas to further fuel the turmoil.

The third phase covered the period from 6 October 1976 to October 1977. During this period the government and the authorities started to establish a clear line of thinking for the suppression of the CPT. They were determined to effectively repress the CPT. In retrospect, the government made sweeping arrests which involved not only communist members but also sympathisers. The government faced harsh criticism for the sweeping arrests, which pressured a large number of students and intellectuals to take to the jungle. The surge from the urban areas into the embrace of CPT in the jungle was then the strongest ever.

The fourth phase: From October 1977 until now. The government started to pay attention to the strategy of placing political offensives before military operations, and geared its anti-communist efforts towards the destruction of the six factors of a people's war. The promulgation of a law to pardon all people involved in the 6 October 1976 riot helped ease the political tension between students, people, and politicians on one hand, and the government on the other hand.

The Communist Party was thus deprived of an asset to make use of in its political campaign to alienate the people from the government. Moreover, the government succeeded in prompting China to stem aid to the CPT. The CPT-run "Voice of the People" radio station was also closed down as a result of the successful negotiations with China.

The government also stepped up psychological campaigns against the banned party. The abrupt change in the "Indochinese situation," which involved the rift within the three countries in Indochina and the conflict between

China and the Soviet Union, also affected the CPT. The flow of aid to the CPT from neighbouring countries was cut off, and the internecine struggles within the party intensified.

As a result of these factors, the CPT has eroded in every aspect.

The rift among CPT leaders still exists, and ideological confusion continues to prevail in the rank and file of the party.

Some people in the party still could not get divorced from Maoist thought, which had been already renounced by China.

The CPT, which had been all along supported by China, just could not adapt to the new situation. However, despite the dramatic shrinking of the CPT, the outlawed party still adheres to the violent line of struggle, and is attempting to adjust its thoughts. It still has an armed force and it is still fighting.

I think that our anti-communist strategy, which was established in the fourth phase, is correct and we should pursue it. We must be open-minded and coordinate efforts in our struggle against the CPT. We must bear in mind that communists are not ordinary bandits, but political bandits who are seeking power by force.

Question: What are the lessons the government has drawn from past mistakes in the anti-communist struggle?

Answer: What was conspicuous throughout the three phases was that we did not realize that the CPT thrives on national rifts. Therefore, we must try to preserve our democratic system through which conflicts can be settled and compromises made by various interest groups. Democracy is in essence a brain-storming system to settle national conflicts and problems.

The government should be in the middle of the road. Neither extreme leftist nor extreme rightist government contributes to anti-communist efforts. The government in the third phase was extreme rightist and as a result, a record number of people and students were forced by its narrow-mindedness to defect to the CPT.

I oppose every form of extremism, because if you are not in the middle of the rank, you will see the person next to you leftist or rightist despite the fact that he is distant from the extreme leftist or rightist in the row.

Question: You said the rift within the CPT leadership was still sharp. Can you identify the poles of the rift and assess the balance of power between the factions?

Answer: I think it's useless to publicize the factions. I would just say that they are facing difficulties within the outlawed party, and the struggle for power among the leadership is very fierce.

Question: You said the CPT is now in the stage of making adjustments. Can you please elaborate?

Answer: It is modifying its lines of thinking, and adjusting its tactics to win back the hearts of defectors, but the strategy remains unchanged, particularly the strategy to overthrow the government by force.

Question: Can you tell us the directions of the adjustments?

Answer: Since many communist members and sympathisers have defected to the government and returned from the jungle to urban areas, the CPT has sent operatives into towns and the city to try to persuade them to return to the jungle, as well as to look for potential supporters.

But I can assert that the CPT still does not have the capacity to win the loyalty of the target groups and to organize them. It's very difficult. What they (the CPT operatives who have sneaked into the urban areas) can do now is to study the situation and wait for windfalls, hoping that they can exploit and fuel rifts, and if some group is off-guard, they can step in and try to influence the thoughts and actions of the group.

They also try to spread their views through the mass media--without having to pay advertisement fees. Some newspapers have published their views just because they wanted exclusive stories. I don't know if the papers collected advertisement payments from them. If not, you should not publish their views because it appeared that they could publicize their propaganda. It's not good. I think what they could do is try to blow up and aggravate some conflicts, but it is very difficult for them to direct students or labourers who have been disillusioned with the outlawed party, and the only thing they can do is to mingle with the masses in any demonstration and to push the situation out of control. This is about all they can do now. In this regard, we must continue efforts to correct all weaknesses in the political, economic and social areas.

Question: How about the relations between the CPT and foreign communist parties, particularly the Chinese Communist Party?

Answer: All I can say is that the Chinese have suspended all aid to the CPT. Judging from a resolution by the Fourth Party Congress that the party will continue seeking aid and support from foreign countries, the party will continue looking for foreign aid, but how successful it will be is another matter. Of course, it must look for aid from communist countries, and now that the Chinese have stemmed aid to the CPT, it must look for new sources of assistance.

Question: What is the possibility of the CPT seeking aid from Indochinese countries?

Answer: As I said, only communists will support communists and moreover, the CPT and the Indochinese communists were once friends. We are closely monitoring whether Laotian, Vietnamese, or even Russian communists will give aid to the CPT, and if so how much they will support the Thai communists.

GOVERNMENT DECLARES AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY

BK250901 Bangkok BANGKOK WORLD in English 25 May 84 p 3

[Text] The government this morning declared today "African Liberation Day" to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Organisation of the African Unity which has been formed as an African liberation movement.

In a message issued by Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila to the United Nations Council for Namibia, the government said: "In commemorating this occasion, we are reminded of the urgent need for a total liberation of Africa which, indeed, cannot be considered free until the whole continent is free."

The message was read out by the Thai Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, M.L. Phiraphong Kasemsi, to delegates attending the session at the ESCAP building.

The message said the Namibian people were still being oppressed by forces from Pretoria and the Thai Government took great pride in its firm and consistent support for the United Nations' effort in finding a peaceful and just solution to the Namibian conflict.

Reiterating this stance, the message said the Thai Government also wished to reaffirm its full support for the legitimate cause and the struggle of the Namibian people who were represented by the Southwest Africa People Organisation (SWAPO).

It said the SWAPO had been recognised by the UN General Assembly and had been asked by the OAU to be the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people.

The UN Council for Namibia will conclude its Bangkok session today with a declaration calling on South Africa to end its illegal occupation of the African state.

CSO: 4200/807

KUOMINTANG VILLAGERS FLEE AFTER SUA ATTACKS

BK250447 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 25 May 84 p 3

[Text] Chiang Mai--Many former Kuomintang highlanders have fled their homes following Wednesday's attack by Shan United Army [USA] elements, which killed five people and wounded three.

A field police report said about 200 USA troops crossed the border into Ban Nong Uk or Ban Arunothai, inhabited by about 250 Kuomintang families who hold Thai citizenship.

The USA force encircled the village, about 60km from Chiang Dao District townseat, and pounded it with mortars, damaging three houses, the report said.

Armed KMT members returned fire and managed to push the intruders back into Burma after a 2-hour clash.

The report said the USA kidnapped 13 KMT villagers from a nearby forest at the height of the fighting. One of the victims, a 19-year-old girl, was shot dead when she tried to escape and another was wounded. The fate of the other hostages remains unknown.

It was believed that the USA forces have retreated to their Doi Kieu Pa Wok base, about 4 kilometers inside Burma, opposite Chiang Dao District.

Thai Border Patrol Police from the First Company and Second Infantry Battalion troops yesterday rushed to the village and reportedly found five bodies, one of them a USA trooper.

Three wounded villagers are being treated at the Maharat Hospital in Muang District.

Village headman Laowang sae Hwang reportedly told Third Army Deputy Commander Maj-Gen Ruamsak Chaikomin that USA troops entered his village on 9 May demanding 50,000 baht and 100 "thang" (one thang is equivalent to 15 kg) of rice as a protection fee. He said the USA also accused the villagers of trespassing on Burmese territory, and said he believed that refusal to pay the fee prompted Wednesday's attack. However, a Thai military source said it was more likely that the attack stemmed from a past drug conflict between the USA and the Kuomintang.

THAILAND

OFFICIAL SAYS 'ONLY 50 ACTIVE INSURGENTS' IN NAN

BK300412 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 30 May 84 p 5

[Text] Nan--After 20 years of fighting with successive governments, Communists in Nan have practically nothing to boast of.

Civilian-police-Military Command 32 Chief-of-Staff Col Udomchai Ongkhasing told the BANGKOK POST recently that there were only 50 active insurgents in the province compared to thousands 4 to 5 years ago.

The communist remnant, led by "Comrade Somsri," were concentrated in a region near the Thai-Lao border, southeast of Pua District, said Colonel Udomchai. He said the Communists were now preoccupied with hiding, so as to avoid armed clashes with government forces.

Colonel Udomchai said that while this could be interpreted as a bid to avoid more losses, the Communists "could be playing for time, waiting for the right moment to become influential." However, he said he believed that Nan would be free of insurgents by 1987.

According to Colonel Udomchai, the insurgents started losing heavily after policy 66/23 was effected. "Under it," he said, "we managed to attract many communist sympathisers to our side, thus depriving the fish of its water, so to speak.

"And with troops in action simultaneously, the Communists simply could not hold their ground," he said.

A series of military operations launched from 1982 to 1983 succeeded in overrunning all their strongholds and bases, including the strongest base in Thung Chang District.

Operation Suriyaphong 4, launched last March, was the biggest operation ever carried out in Nan and it met the stiffest resistance, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.

With the insurgency problem expected to end soon, Colonel Udomchai said Command 32 would be cut back by 30 percent at year-end. "It will be dissolved by the end of next year, with a smaller unit taking over its duties," he said.

ANALYST REFLECTS ON CHAT THAI POSITION

BK190444 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 19 May 84 p 20

[Article by Chadin Thepphawan]

[Text] Emerging from Parliament after a double defeat, an apparently happy Chat Thai secretary-general said the events of the day had relieved political tension.

Continuing in this contented vein, Banhan Sinlapa-acha said: "There is no more talk about a dissolution of Parliament because the situation has turned out well."

The comment is quite strange coming from a politician whose party has just, in all probability, lost its chance to censure Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and his 18 ministers.

But it also reflects the government's curious hardness and disregard for its political reputation as shown in its determined fight to spare Gen Prem from little more than a minor irritation.

In doing so, the government had to do an about-face, throwing its weight behind Prachakon Thai MP Yingphan Manasikan's motion which called for Chat Thai's initial motion against Interior Minister Sitthi Chirarot to be put to the vote.

The chances are that Chat Thai will again suffer defeat and lose its last censure weapon for this parliamentary session. Only if the opposition overcomes massive odds and wins the vote will it be able to fight another day.

On 9 May, government MPS outvoted the opposition and ruled that Constitutional Article 137 bars House Speaker Uthai Phimchaichon from using parliamentary Regulation 47 to drop Chat Thai's motion against General Sitthi. This paved the way for Chat Thai to submit a broader motion aimed at General Prem and his 18 ministers.

Aside from the contentiousness of the act, government MPS, including Social Action Party Deputy Leader Kasem Sirisamphan, reached a compromise where it would not be retroactive and that the opposition could still try its luck against General Prem.

But last Wednesday, Mr Yingphan and two other MPS won the blessing of the coalition's Parliamentary Coordinating Committee to submit a motion the next day to overturn the compromise gesture.

On Wednesday, Chat Thai held a meeting during which rumours of a dissolution were rife. Party sources said the military, which had publicly expressed its annoyance at the move against General Prem, made its feelings even more clear in a telephone call to Mr Banhan.

Since Thursday, the government has been bombarded with charges of cradling General Prem, but some observers attribute that to overzealousness by the premier's supporters rather than abiding by the wishes of Si Sao House.

One observer close to the military said: "You know that General Prem is sensitive to that. They are not about to stand by and let him be criticised, particularly not with the type of scathing personal remarks they have heard during Chat Thai's no-confidence debate outside Parliament."

Chat Thai failed to weather the political storm and emerge unscathed. Since the opening episodes of the censure saga, the party has been beset with internal squabbles. First, deputy leader Col Phon Roengprasoetwit said his 20 MPS threatened to quit the party and Thawi Kraikhup and his trio strongly opposed the move against General Prem.

The squabble became a rift when the Young Turks led by Piyanat Watcharaphon, Maj-Gen Praman Adireksan's son Mr Pongphon and Chaowarin Latthasaksiri, openly criticised Colonel Phon and the Maj-Gen Praman-led old guard, whom they call the Sae Yit (over 70) clique.

"The Old Guard are so sensitive," commented one Young Turk, "that if they see anything flashing they get afraid."

The Young Turks want the party to adopt a more aggressive approach and they are reaching the ears of Maj-Gen Praman through his son.

Maj-Gen Praman's 3 May stunt when he failed to open the attack on General Sitthi bore the unmistakable stamp of the Young Turks; even Mr Banhan was oblivious to it.

When Songtham Panyadi submitted his motion on Thursday calling for a debate on whether or not the Sitthi motion had been dumped, it was the Young Turks who were in the dark. Mr Banhan said this was not intentional.

The Young Turks opposed Mr Songtham's motion, saying the party should have taken no part on Thursday's debate. "This is the government's game which went against democratic principles. All we should do is sit still and let them play their game by themselves," Mr Piyanat said the day before.

During Thursday's vote, the various Chat Thai factions abstained and it was noticeable that Mr Banhan's clique did not vote with the Young Turks in support of the contention that the Sitthi motion was legally dead and buried.

Some Young Turks said that they were frustrated with the party's impotent image and admitted their move against General Prem was prompted by SAP [Social Action Party] leader M.R. Khukrit Pramot's remark that the opposition did not know how to do its job and the government had to do it for them.

Observers said the Young Turks are skilled in tricky parliamentary maneuvers but they would need to mature more if they expected one day to assume leadership of the party.

As things stand, the Sitthi vote will be held on Thursday but the Young Turks, much to Mr Banhan's dismay, are set to submit a motion challenging the interpretation of Article 137 so the debate against the minister can be revived.

How the government will react to this challenge is not yet clear. Hopefully, however, political maturity will be seen to be a quality lacking only among the Young Turks.

CSO: 4200/807

BRIEFS

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES' TRAVEL RIGHTS--The Interior Ministry has decided to give certain Vietnamese refugees travel rights outside their restricted areas, an Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) official said yesterday. Col Chakon Thotsawat said the refugees would be given a 1-year freedom of movement pass. Refugees seeking the pass must be employed, with no criminal record, must possess papers proving that they have been paying taxes for at least 3 years and must have a useful role in their society. Pass applications are subject to Interior Ministry approval, said Colonel Chakon. [Text] [BK250401 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 25 May 84 p 5]

WARNING ON BOAT PEOPLE--The Royal Thai Navy [RTN] yesterday repeated its warning to Thai fishermen not to bring ashore Vietnamese boat people. Secretary of the RTN Rear Adm Prasan Chuchinda said yesterday that between 26 April and 23 May this year, a total of 143 Vietnamese and Kampuchean refugees landed on Thai shores. He said 126 of them were Vietnamese and the other 17 Kampucheans. He said many of the refugees were taken ashore by Thai fishermen. [Text] [BK250529 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 25 May 84 p 2]

RANGERS WOUNDED IN CLASH--Uttaradit--Four army-trained Rangers were wounded on Thursday in a 30-minute clash with Laotian troops about two kilometres inside Thailand, an authoritative source said this morning. The clash took place at 11 am when a Thai Ranger patrol spotted Laotian troopers trespassing about two kilometres inside Thai territory close to a Ranger camp in Kok village, some 47 kilometres north of Uttaradit town. The Laotian troopers opened fire with HK rifles and RPG rockets, injuring four of the Rangers. The number of casualties among the Laotian troopers was not known. The four wounded Rangers were Somphong Letkham, Chamlong Insa, Cha-re Phimchan and Lang Khuanthum. All were hit by grenade shrapnels, the source said. Meanwhile, Admiral Samut Sahanawin, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Military Affairs, said yesterday that the committee had invited officers from the Supreme Command to brief the team on the situation along the Kampuchean, Burmese and Lao borders. Admiral Samut expressed concern over the influx of Karen refugees who fled the fighting inside Burma into Thailand. [Text] [BK260844 Bangkok BANGKOK WORLD in English 26 May 84 p 3]

MILITARY OFFICERS TO RETIRE--A total of 114 top-ranking military officers, including Supreme Command Chief-of-Staff Gen Pramot Thawonchan and Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm Praphat Chanthawirat, will retire on 1 October this year, the Defense Ministry announced this morning. Twelve of the 114 officers are attached to the Defence Ministry's Permanent Secretariat, 32 to the Supreme Command, 31 to the Army, 24 to the Navy and 15 to the Air Force. Besides these top men, 524 lower ranking military officers will also retire on 1 October, the announcement said. Apart from General Pramot and Admiral Praphat, other top-ranking officers to retire include Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army Gen Sup Aksaranukhro, First Army Region Commander Lt-Gen Phat Urailoet, Second Army Region Commander Lt-Gen Phak Minakanit and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Sawang Kannapa. Among top officers retiring from the Air Force are Deputy Commander-in-Chief ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Bundit Chotichanapibal and Deputy Chief-of-Staff Air Marshal Prapha Wetchapan. [Text] [BK250909 Bangkok BANGKOK WORLD in English 25 May 84 p 3]

CSO: 4200/807

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EDITORIAL EXPLAINS MILITARY INDUCTION FORMALITIES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Apr 84 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Satisfactorily Carry out Military Induction"]

[Text] The law on military obligation states that every year, by order of the commanders in chief of the military forces in precincts, districts, cities and municipalities subordinate to provinces, male youths reaching the age of 17 during the year and male citizens of draft age either having served in the ranks of the Vietnamese People's Army or not must enroll for military obligation.

The objective of the enrollment for military obligation is to manage both the persons ready to join the army and the reservists in order to promote the task of building the army in peacetime and mobilizing forces in wartime. Therefore, all localities must carry out propaganda and education, thoroughly understand the objective, meaning and essence of military induction and make all citizens fully realize their responsibilities for this task. Any locality which carries out military induction satisfactorily in one which has properly managed citizens of draft age.

Since they are places which record and manage the citizens' household registrations, villages are the first units to be entrusted by the state with the task of tightly administering male citizens ready to join the army as well as reservists. Villages are places which organize propaganda and education to induce people to strictly implement the law on military obligation and which urge citizens to enroll for military obligation. Villages must get an accurate knowledge of the political and ideological state of each citizen and of his qualities, virtues and specific circumstances and must examine these factors and submit to districts the lists of citizens to be called up for military service, to be granted a deferred induction or to be exempted from military obligation. In addition to taking firm hold of both the youths ready to join the army and the reservists, the village leadership must regularly and quickly record any change in their own persons and in their residences and working places and report these changes to the districts to make it possible to transmit induction or mustering orders in a quick and accurate manner.

To help local military organs tightly manage both the persons ready to join the army and the reservists, Article 62 of the Law on Military Obligation states: People's courts, the People's Organ of Control, public security organs and other agencies concerned--each within its own scope of action--have the duty to coordinate with the local military organs at the same level to implement regulations on the management of persons ready to join the army and of reservists.

All persons ready to join the army and all reservists must directly enroll in districts because these are the most adequate places for registration and are the places which draw up the plan to call on the youths to enroll for military obligation. Indirect enrollment may be allowed when persons due for military induction are absent for good reasons. However, during their absence, such persons must report to the [nearest] district military organ to review the previously recorded data and to sign the acknowledgment that they have received a military induction certificate.

To carry out military induction satisfactorily, realistic preparations must be made right at the outset to secure the documents needed to call up citizens for military service. It is necessary to grasp firmly and meet the enrollment requirement that everyone must be enrolled, that only the rightfully eligible persons are to be enrolled and that enrollment must include all pertinent information and be carried out on schedule. The difficulty with induction is how to enroll all the eligible persons. Toward this end, the first thing to do is to carry out propaganda and education to make all citizens understand the importance of military induction and fully realize the responsibility of everyone--especially male citizens reaching the age of 17 during the year, male citizens aged between 18 and 27 having not yet served in the VPA ranks, and reservists--for the enrollment for military service.

The military induction day must be considered to be a youths' festival with the accent on military activities. To make sure that the military induction is organized in a serious manner and that the enrollment includes all pertinent and accurate information and is completed on schedule, all localities and basic units must have a plan to provide specific guidance and to coordinate with various sectors and mass organizations to intensify propaganda and education to inspire patriotism, the love for patriotism and the respect for the legal system and law of the state and to prepare all male citizens of draft age for enrollment with a sense of responsibility proper to citizens and with a readiness to join the army and fulfill their military obligation.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PEOPLE OF HANOI SAID TO DEFEAT WAR OF DESTRUCTION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 84 pp 45-51

[Article by Major General Lu Giang: "Soldiers and People of Hanoi Resolutely Defeat the Enemy's Many-Sided War of Destruction"]

[Text] Hanoi is one of the largest cities in our country. As Thang Long, Dong Do, and Hanoi it has continually been the capital of our country for thousands of years. In the wars of aggression of the kings and warlords and the Chinese feudalists in the past, as well as the colonialists and imperialists in the recent period, Hanoi has always been one of their foremost strategic objectives.

Today Hanoi is the capital of a unified, socialist Vietnam and has become the political, cultural, and scientific-technical nerve center, and is at the same time a large economic center and an international trade center for the entire nation. Hanoi is the locale of the highest leadership organs of the Party, the state, and the army, and is a place where there are concentrated the central organs of the sectors, the mass organizations, and the diplomatic organs of many nations of the world. The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee has clearly determined that it is necessary to develop Hanoi into a city which exemplifies the socialist system in our country and serves as the base of support for the revolutionary movement throughout our country. In the present many-sided war of destruction waged by the Chinese reactionaries, they regard Hanoi as a very important strategic area of operations. They concentrate their attacks on Hanoi not only to sabotage the great enterprise of building and defending our capital, but also to, by attacking the capital, affect the country as a whole. As regards the soldiers and people of the capital, defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi is not only one of the important, urgent missions of the great undertaking of building and defending their home city, but is also a heavy, glorious responsibility toward the people and soldiers of the nation as a whole, in the great undertaking of building the socialist capital of the entire nation. At the same time, Hanoi must be prepared, along with the rest of the country, to defeat the enemy's war of aggression, should they foolhardily start one.

It is truly a battle that takes place every day and every hour, is fierce, complicated, and protracted, and has taken place and will continue to take place on a broad scale, in many spheres, and in many forms, in the past, at present, and in future years.

In their many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi, the enemy have many very insidious, poisonous plots and schemes. They both crazily, openly, secretly, and directly sabotage the great undertaking of building and defending our socialist capital, and secretly use the Hanoi area of operations as their command and liaison center for attacks all over our country and in the other countries of the Indochinese Peninsula. They also not only aim their attacks at the local installations of Hanoi but also at the central-level organs operating in the capital.

They endeavor to rally forces, including the leaders of reactionary political factions, reactionaries among the Chinese residents, reactionaries in religious garb, the lackeys of Hoang Van Hoan, and the intelligence and espionage chieftains of all kinds. They take advantage of hooligans, thugs, criminals, speculators, blackmarketers, degenerates who have been dismissed, and even negative, backward elements who avoid their military and labor obligations. They also seek all ways to win over and use a number of our cadres and party members who are not steadfast, are not vigilant, and knowingly or unknowingly assist them in their sabotage activities.

With regard to politics, ideology, and culture they use very insidious schemes and -- something that is an outstanding characteristic of a law-like nature -- attack us from within, attack the party and governmental organizations, and attack each cadre, party member, soldier and citizen, especially the young generation, in hopes of bringing that war of destruction into each organization and family and creating opposition between individuals and organizations and between children and parents, combine attacks from within with other schemes of exerting pressure from the outside, and combine direct attacks by forces they have organized with indirect attacks by encouraging the negative and backward elements.

Their most important method is to wage psychological warfare and espionage warfare. They regard psychological warfare as a very general and effective fighting method which serves to clear the way for them to attain their strategic objectives. They continually invent one rumor after another, usually "exciting" rumors regarding the internal and external stands and policies or about personnel, as well as false, concocted stories which slander, exaggerate, or distort in hopes of creating ferment and confusion among the cadres and people. They use many facilities and forms of attacking externally, combined with internal propaganda activities carried out by both modern facilities and such primitive methods as whispering and oral propaganda.

The enemy have endeavored to take advantage of the openings and deficiencies in the cultural work and social management in Hanoi, in order to promote their sabotage activities on the cultural-social front. They surreptitiously send in reactionary, decadent publications and cultural products from abroad, and seek all ways to import such neocolonial vestiges by setting up groups to record decadent popular music, theaters to show "pig" films, "hugging cafes," restaurants with debauched entertainment, stands which rent out poisonous publications, etc., in the rear of public, legal restaurants and stores. They use those dangerous tools to draw weak, spoiled youths and teenagers onto the path of error and crime, to chase after practical, ordinary lifestyles in which

getting money is the objective and *raison d'etre*. When they are short of money they use all ways to make out, even committing crimes. Some of them are enticed into abandoning their families and home areas to serve as lackeys for the enemy and betray the homeland. They also use all ways to revive the bad customs and habits and superstitions, and use people willing to sell out and supposedly scientific information to deceive credulous people and attempt to sow vacillation, disgust, and suspicion among the masses.

Their objective is to cause the soldiers and people of the capital to weaken their fighting will and relax their revolutionary vigilance, to erode confidence in the regime, and to cause an important part of the masses to become spoiled and prepared to serve as their lackeys. They regard that as a very important "foundation" on which to carry out their many-sided war of destruction in the immediate future, while also preparing long-range schemes to create opposition and rebellion and to overthrow us when the opportunity arises.

With regard to economics, they concentrate on attacking the party's economic line and its stands and policies regarding the socialist transformation and the building of socialism, and on distorting and attacking the party's leadership role in the economic sphere. In the Hanoi area, the enemy pay much attention to sabotaging the production relationships, the state economy, and the collective economy, and to restoring and developing the old way of livelihood, of pursuing profits and the market. They are concentrating on sabotaging distribution and circulation, in hopes of directly causing additional difficulties for production and life.

They are endeavoring to take advantage of production and life in Hanoi, which are still beset with many difficulties, and of the many weaknesses in economic and social management, in order to attack us. They use dishonest merchants, speculators, and blackmarketers, including international blackmarketers, blackmarketers in foreign exchange, gold, precious stones, and antiques, especially speculators in strategic goods, raw materials vitally important to the economy, and goods essential for the lives of the people, while also using people who are lazy, avoid labor, and are unwilling to work for a living, and cadres and state personnel who are degenerate, etc., to collude, obtain state goods, increase prices, control the market, and disturb economic order.

Even more brazen, they have also sought ways to commit sabotage, with the intent of directly exerting an adverse influence on the production and life of the soldiers and people of Hanoi, on the mission of building and defending the capital, and on the activities of many economic-technical sectors, such as by burning and blowing up storage depots, stealing materials, damaging machinery, causing train accidents, tapping pipelines to obtain oil, cutting telephone lines, cutting electricity lines, cutting water lines, etc.

Even more dangerous, they seek all ways to infiltrate the economic organs, factories, and enterprises of the local level and the central level in the city, in hopes of organizing internal spies, collecting intelligence, bribing cadres, and ferreting out economic secrets. They pay much attention to inciting mercenary activities and taking advantage of the economic policies that have been promulgated to openly and "legally" violate socialist property, waste and damage property belonging to the state and the people, and corrupt a number of cadres with economic management responsibilities.

The enemy's sabotage on that front is very complicated. In some cases the enemy act directly but in many other cases they take advantage of negative elements to carry out their attacks; negativism has become their ally in sabotaging us. The enemy attack both local objectives in Hanoi and many important objectives of the central level which operate in the city, so they not only harm Hanoi but often affect the other localities.

With regard to national defense and security, the enemy seek all ways to weaken the fighting strength of the soldiers and people of the capital, especially to weaken the combat readiness of the city's two reliable, sharp tools of violence: the people's armed forces and the people's public security forces.

They endeavor to collect military secrets, pick up information, steal documents, organize the stealing of aircraft, steal weapons, cut military telephone lines, and destroy military oil line. They also use all schemes to incite sabotage of the policy of drafting youths, the army's rear area policy, the national defense construction policy, and the policy of building the capital defense line. They also seek ways to divide the army and the people, the public security forces and the people, the army and the public security forces, and the army and public security forces from the other sectors. One very dangerous scheme is that the enemy uses psychological warfare, such as creating the illusion of peace, paralyzing vigilance, taking advantage of the difficulties in life and the deficiencies in military-civilian relations, etc., to affect the armed forces and the public security forces, in hopes of causing some of our cadres and men to waver and gradually become corrupt and degenerate, after which they can persuade them to assist them in carrying out sabotage.

As in the political and economic spheres, with regard to the national defense and security front the enemy's sabotage is aimed not only at the city's local armed forces and public security forces but, even more insidious, also at the central national defense and security headquarters in the city. Of course, the enemy cannot easily penetrate that front, but because they are very important organs which are directly related to the great undertaking of protecting security and the homeland, we must be extremely vigilant and meticulous in guarding against, and resolutely and promptly defeat, all sabotage schemes of the enemy.

Defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi was and is an important, urgent mission of the great undertaking of defending and building the capital. It is part of the struggle between the two paths, socialism and capitalism, in the sphere of the city, and is part of the struggle against negativism and backwardness among the people and in the apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship in Hanoi. It is part of the task of preparing the capital, along with the entire nation, to defeat the enemy's war of aggression, should they foolishly start one.

The mission of defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi demands above all that we strengthen the leadership of the Party at all levels and in all sectors, develop the combined strength of the proletarian dictatorship system in the capital, and strengthen vigilance toward and take

the initiative in eliminating all other sabotage capabilities of the enemy in the city. We must strengthen the measures of taking the initiative in protecting the economy, getting the economy on the right track, and uncovering and effectively stopping all economic sabotage activities. We must consolidate the socialist ideological battlefield and continually enable all cadres, party members, soldiers, and people in the capital to clearly understand the enemy's sabotage activities and the difficulties and complications which must be overcome, and resolutely defeat all of the enemy's sabotage schemes under all circumstances. We must uncover at all costs the internal espionage infrastructures and resolutely expell from the Party people who are not qualified to be party members, ensure that the Party's inner ranks are pure and strong, promptly consolidate the tools of the proletarian dictatorship, and not allow the enemy to infiltrate, incite, and cause trouble. We must punish the professional hooligans, thieves, and thugs, especially those who are organized into gangs and are armed, while at the same time endeavoring to educate and transform wayward people in the subwards and hamlets, not allow the enemy to take advantage of the situation to disturb social order and safety in individual installations as well as in the city as a whole, etc.

Defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi is clearly a very deep, broad, and complicated fight which requires centralized, unified leadership and resolute, sharp guidance. It is essential that it be carried out completely and that many aspects and many measures must be closely combined. Taking the initiative and continually attacking the enemy must be combined closely with positively and continually strengthening ourselves. Our political-ideological construction must be closely combined with organizational consolidation. Fighting the enemy's sabotage must be closely combined with opposing negativism in the inner ranks and in society at large. Opposing the enemy's political, ideological, and cultural sabotage must be closely combined with opposing the enemy's economic, national defense, and security sabotage. The ensuring of political security and social order and safety must be closely combined with protecting the economy and protecting socialist property. The correct leadership of the Party committee echelons is closely bound to the effectiveness of the governmental administration in guiding the organization of implementation and to a deep, broad, and strong mass movement against the enemy's sabotage in each installation as well as in the city as a whole.

First of all, Hanoi must endeavor to build and defend strong, pure forces and develop the capital into a city that is exemplary of the new regime, stop the insidious plots of the enemy to attack us from within, and create basic conditions for defeating the enemy in all spheres.

Building and protecting strong, pure forces and ensuring that our forces have no internal spies or degenerate elements who aid the enemy, etc., are extremely important aspects which enable Hanoi to become stronger in all ways and defeat the enemy's plot to weaken our fighting strength. Building and protecting strong, pure forces is also a basic, important, and indispensable if we are to wage an all-round people's war by the entire population to defeat the enemy's plots and schemes to sabotage us in many regards. The more steadfast and stalwart our forces in the capital are the greater will be their good effect on the common struggle of the entire nation.

First of all, it is necessary to build a strong, pure Hanoi party organization. The centralized, unified, all-round leadership of the party committees at all echelons, and the strength and purity of the basic-level party organizations all over the city, are basic assurance of the defeat of the enemy's many-sided war of destruction. As the Political Bureau pointed out, in addition to the its accomplishments and progress the Hanoi party organization still has deficiencies and weaknesses. The resolution of the recent Ninth Congress of the Hanoi Party Organization stressed that the direction for building the party organization is to increase its combat strength and leadership ability. It must be strong with regard to both ideology and organization; the cadres and party members must strengthen their fighting will, initiative, and creativity, and not be sceptical, vascillating, or indifferent, but must strengthen their party discipline, strengthen their sense of responsibility toward serving the people, praise and award outstanding, exemplary cadres and party members, and resolutely expell from the party degenerate, corrupt elements. In each period it is necessary to review the inner ranks and ensure that each party chapter and basic-level party organization is truly strong and pure, truly resolute and creative, and worthy of being the staff in the fight against the enemy's war of destruction and against negativism and backwardness in each base.

In addition to the Hanoi party organization, there are still many party organizations of the central organs of the Party, the state, the army, and the other sectors, which have tens of thousands of cadres and party members who have operated and are operating in the city. They are a very large, very strong force which only Hanoi, the capital, has. The matter of building pure, strong party organizations in those organs and bringing into play the great strength of those forces, which are also of decisive importance in the struggle against the enemy's sabotage in the capital.

In addition to building strong and pure party organizations, it is necessary to build, rectify, and consolidate the city's governmental administration and its economic management and social management systems. The resolution of the Hanoi Party Organization Congress clearly pointed out that it is necessary to strengthen organization and ensure the quality of cadres, especially the managing cadres of all echelons and sectors, above all the public security, army, economic management cultural, and circulation-distribution cadres. They are the key forces in organizing the implementation of the struggle against the enemy's sabotage in each sphere and base and in the city as a whole.

In addition to building the Party and the governmental administration, it is necessary to motivate and organize a truly deep, broad, and effective mass movement among all citizens of the capital, including the cadres, enlisted men, and people of Hanoi and all cadres, party members, and other personnel operating in the city to serve as the collective masters in the struggle against the enemy's sabotage. That is an extremely important matter which plays a decisive role in victory. In that regard, comrade Le Duan, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, affirmed that "Collective mastership is the greatest strength in defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction." (1) He also pointed out that "In Hanoi, it is necessary to implement the system of everyone serving as the masters every day. The Hanoi Trade Union Federation, the Hanoi Youth Union, the Hanoi Women's Federation and the Hanoi Collective Peasants Association must be the strongest collective mastership orgnaizations in the nation." (2)

Building our forces in Hanoi in such a manner is clearly a basic condition of foremost importance in defeating the enemy's sabotage schemes in the capital. To do so is also to implement the collective mastership system, with the Party leading, the state managing, and the people serving as the masters, in the enterprise of defending the nation and in the struggle against the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in the capital.

Resolutely and continuously attack the enemy, and take the initiative in guarding against, stopping, and defeating all of their sabotage activities in Hanoi.

First of all, the echelons and sectors in the capital must pay attention to grasping the enemy continuously, basically, and systematically; correctly evaluate their plots, schemes, and operational laws; correctly determine the main, most dangerous categories in the key, strategic areas; set forth prompt, effective policies and measures for fighting the enemy when they first expose themselves; and not be passive, lax, or rightist. Grasping the enemy must become a system and habitual practice, both on a regular and an ad hoc basis, and must be directly reviewed and evaluated by the managing party committee and military commander.

Hanoi must concentrate on fighting psychological warfare and espionage warfare, and promptly stop degenerate, decadent phenomena and eliminate decadent, reactionary culture. In the fight against psychological warfare it must pay all-out attention to tracking down the sources of distorted, reactionary arguments and "untrue" news, and subject them to mass struggle in the neighborhoods, organs, and enterprises, in order to educate and warn people who help the enemy and punish the ringleaders and instigators. It must resolutely motivate the masses to promptly uncover and eliminate places which sell decadent, reactionary publications, and confiscate illegal movie projectors and poisonous films. At the same time, it must appropriately deal with people in charge of organs who engage in improper acts and in the name of "research" show bad, poisonous films to make a profit or satisfy their individual desires.

Hanoi is endeavoring to combine economic construction with protecting the economy, perfecting the production relations, restoring order in distribution and circulation, and the struggle between the two paths; to combine fighting the enemy's economic sabotage with opposition to negativism, laziness, the production of ersatz goods, commercialism; and to combine opposition to dishonest merchants, speculators, black marketers, and thieves with opposition to degenerates who sneak state goods out to the free market. Hanoi has promoted a mass movement to defend the homeland, the capital, the economy, and socialist property, while also preventing the enemy from carrying out economic sabotage and preventing negative phenomena. In Hanoi there have appeared more and more bases which have clearly made progress in that regard, such as the port of Hanoi, the Co Loa railroad station, the Yen Vien railroad station, the Giap Bat railroad station, the Hanoi railroad station, the Mt. Tram area, etc. In some places and at some times there has been a reduction of 70 to 80 percent in the number of violations in the same area or at the same time in the past. Opposition to the enemy's sabotage in the sphere of distribution and

circulation has been a focus of struggle. Hanoi has resolutely restored order at the markets, implemented the industrial-commercial tax policy, and investigated and dealt with instances of illegal buying and selling. Punishing hooligans and thugs and maintaining social order and discipline are tied in not only with the struggle against enemy's political sabotage but also with their economic sabotage. A very important measure in taking the initiative in guarding against the enemy's economic destruction is to review the ranks of the managing cadres of the economic bases and the personnel who have direct relations with socialist property, in order to ensure not only that the enemy are not allowed to sneak into those key positions but also to prevent those reliable cadres and personnel from being bribed and won over by the enemy and helping them sabotage the economy. That has the especially important significance that the soldiers and people of the capital must manifest a strong sense of self-reliance and a tradition of diligent labor and creative talent, overcome difficulties, endeavor to build a rich, strong capital, gradually meet the needs of production and life in the city, and contribute more and more to the great undertaking of developing the national economy throughout the nation.

Hanoi continually builds and perfects the people's security network and the capital's defensive position and combine national defense with security, with the municipal public security forces and the Military Region armed forces serving as the staffs for the party committee echelons and the hard core of the struggle. The municipal public security forces, along with the armed forces of the Military Region and the units stationed in Hanoi, coordinate closely with the sectors in opposing the enemy's sabotage with regard to national defense and security, and with regard to the other aspects. The most outstanding feature is ensuring the absolute safety of the leadership organs of the party and state. A very important measure is the participation of the municipal armed forces in building the bases (subwards, villages, organs, enterprises, and schools) that are strong, pure, and safe, especially those in strategic areas. In Hanoi there have appeared more and more areas which are well protected by the on-the-spot forces and the mobile forces, such as the maintenance of order in such area as Nguyen Trung Truc Subward in Ba Dinh Ward, Le Dai Hanh Subward in Hai Ba Trung Subward, Hang Bai Subward in Hoan Kiem Ward, Duc Tu Village in Dong Anh District, Yen So Village in Hoai Duc Village, Thanh Xuan Village in Soc son District, Dich Vong Village in Tu Liem Village, Phu Thuy Village in Gia Lam District, Thanh Liet Village in Thanh Tri District, etc.

Attacking the enemy in the struggle against the enemy's many sided war of destruction, as Hanoi's actual experiences have shown, cannot be subjective and must be very active: it is necessary to take the initiative in locating the enemy, pursuing them, and tracking them down, in discovering the enemy as soon as they expose themselves, attacking them before they have had time to engage in sabotage activity, and in tracking down the enemy to their point of origin. It is also necessary to attack their ally, negativism, and to prevent people from aiding the enemy unintentionally. That is a very difficult and very complicated matter. Hanoi has achieved initial successes and gained valuable experience. It must make even greater efforts.

Bringing into play the combined strength of the forces throughout the city, and effectively organizing and using the four hard-core forces in opposing enemy sabotage.

The experience of Hanoi, like those of many other localities all over the nation, indicate that in the struggle against the enemy's many-sided war of destruction it is essential that we bring into play the combined strength of the proletarian dictatorship system and the entire population, in accordance with the structure of the Party leading, the state managing, and the people serving as the masters.

One of the first successful experiences of Hanoi was the carrying out of programs to coordinate the activities and develop the combined strength of the four forces -- the public security forces, the armed forces (especially the self-defense and militia units), the Youth Union, and the Trade Union Federation -- in the city, to serve as the hard core of the mass movement to defend the capital and the homeland against enemy sabotage and against negativism.

They are important parts of the forces protecting the capital and are present in all bases in the sphere of the city and are very concentrated in the strategic areas. They are very strong forces which include many cadres, party members, servicemen, and Youth Union members who have been educated and trained and have overcome difficulties and challenges, are capable, and can in fact perform many tasks effectively in opposing both enemy sabotage and negativism.

The operational mode of those four forces is to work together in implementing programs to coordinate their activity, on both a permanent and ad hoc basis, and in each "campaign" against enemy sabotage and negativism in each sphere, in each area, etc., under the centralized, unified, all-round leadership of the Municipal Party Committee, the Municipal People's Committee, and the party committees and governmental administrations at the ward, district, subward, and village levels.

Those four forces have begun to contribute importantly in protecting the economy and socialist property. They have struggled effectively, reduced the incidence of negative phenomena, and prevented and stopped enemy sabotage in many areas, especially the key areas. The four forces have coordinated with the distribution-circulation sector in organizing the implementation of the industrial-commercial tax policy, restoring order at the markets, inspecting hundreds of stores and stalls, promptly dealing with many violations of laws and policies, and coordinating with the electricity sector in carrying out a large number of inspections and promptly dealing with hundreds of households which used electricity illegally and engaged in illegal livelihoods. The four forces also serve as the hard core in investigating and disposing of hundreds of cases of building or buying expensive houses and paying for them with illegally earned funds.

The four forces coordinate closely in punishing the hooligans and thugs and contribute directly to maintaining order in the city and social discipline. Because tens of thousands of cadres, policemen, MP's, self-defense cadres and

men, militiamen, Assault Youth members, workers' inspection teams, etc., guarded and patrolled day and night in the bases, neighborhoods, hamlets, etc., stopped and arrested many suspicious people, confiscated dozens of weapons and bayonets, greatly reduced the number of crimes, and caused security and order in the bases, the neighborhoods, and hamlets, especially in such crowded places as markets, railroad stations, bus stations, stores, movie theaters, etc., to undergo good transformations.

One of the four hard-core forces, the armed forces of the Capital Military Region, have coordinated closely with the forces of the sectors, especially the security sector, in opposing the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi, while at the same time preparing in all ways to, along with the entire nation, defeating a large-scale war of destruction, should they foolhardily start one.

The armed forces of the Military Region, including regular forces, reserve forces, and self-defense and militia forces all over the city, are very large forces which are present everywhere in the city. They are a tool of revolutionary violence which not only have the mission of defending the local and basic-level revolutionary administrations but are also directly responsible, along with the public security forces and the other sectors, for ensuring political security and social order and safety, and protecting the economy and socialist property. Their foremost mission is ensuring the complete safety of the leadership organs of the Party and state.

With regard to the local military organs and cadres at all levels, with the MP, military control, self-defense, militia, and other forces, participating in opposing enemy sabotage has been one of the direct, important, and urgent missions. As regards such forces, opposing the enemy's sabotage is a daily and hourly fight, both day and night, without stop and without rest. In those forces, the local military organs and cadres must be effective staffs for the party committee echelons and governmental administrations in grasping and fighting the enemy. The self-defense, militia, and military control forces must be forces which fight the enemy on the spot, in each neighborhood, hamlet, organ, enterprise, school, etc. The MP forces must be mobile forces which fight the enemy rapidly, strongly, and effectively. Only if all of the above-mentioned types of forces coordinate closely with one another, and with the public security forces and the forces of the other sectors can they effectively oppose the enemy and negativism.

The armed forces of the Military Region must endeavor to develop strongly in all regards, in accordance with the requirements of national defense by all the people and people's war to defend the homeland. They must continually perfect the organization of the capital's defense, raise the level of organizations and command of the commanders and command organs, and increase the fighting strength and combat readiness of the troops, self-defense forces, and militia under all circumstances.

In the fight against the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in the capital, although the enemy have many kinds of forces they are not large and strong. The enemy are in an unjust, weak, and illegal position, but our struggle is very complicated because the enemy are very crafty and the struggle between

ourselves and the enemy is interwoven with the struggles between the two paths, the struggle against internal negativism, the struggle with weaknesses and deficiencies in knowledge and ability, etc. It demands that the leadership and guidance of the party committee echelons and the command and management of the governmental administration be very resolute and effective. The organization of implementation by the forces and participation in the struggle by the masses must be very active, wise, prompt, and complete.

The mission of building and defending the capital and the mission of defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in Hanoi are very difficult and complicated. The people and soldiers of the capital, as well as all other cadres and personnel operating in Hanoi have resolutely worked together to maintain and develop the capital's tradition of thousands of years of civilization, its fine, glorious revolutionary tradition, its tradition of solidarity, unanimity, diligent and creative labor, loyalty to the homeland and fidelity to the revolution, and its tradition of maintaining political security and ensuring the absolute safety of the highest leadership organs of the Party and state. Hanoi is determined to struggle to attain the economic-social and national defense-security objectives for the future years assigned to it by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee; to resolutely defeat the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in the capital and be prepared to defeat them under all circumstances in a large-scale war of aggression; to build a rich, strong, civilized capital and strongly defend the capital of the homeland; and to be worthy of its position as a city representing the socialist system in our country and of the confidence and love of the Party, the state, and the people and soldiers of the entire nation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Speech at the Congress of the Hanoi Municipal Party Organization, 13 June 1983, NHAN DAN, No 10,579, 14 June 1983.

2. Ibid.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VPA'S NEW SINGLE COMMANDER SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 84 pp 52-63

[Article by Senior Colonel Dang The Chuong: "The Party's Leadership and the Single Commander System in the Army"]

[Text] The single commander system in the Vietnam People's Army is one of the basic features of the Party's new leadership mechanism for the People's Army.

The Communist Party's leadership of the army is a universal law, a basic, foremost principle of the great undertaking of building the revolutionary armed forces of the working class. Our party has continually strengthened its leadership of the armed forces in order to cause them to always be absolutely loyal to the Party and to the revolutionary undertaking of the working class and the nation, increase their fighting strength, and brilliantly fulfill all missions assigned by the Party and state. The actual situation has entirely affirmed that the leadership of the Party is the key factor which determines all steps toward maturity and all victories of our army.

The Party's leadership of the army is comprehensive and includes politics, ideology, and organization. In order to exercise that leadership the Party has stipulated a leadership and command system for the army. It may be said that when there is a policy to develop the armed forces there is also a policy to build the leadership and command system of the armed forces. Therefore, the leadership system is continually consolidated, perfected, and developed, along with the development of the revolution and the army, to enable the Party's leadership to become increasingly closer to that of the army, the influence of the Party on the army to become increasingly deep and broad, and the effectiveness of the Party's leadership of the army to become increasingly high.

In the period of secrecy, when the first organizations of the revolutionary armed forces were set up, our Party clearly stipulated the leadership and command system.

In March 1935 the political resolution of the First Party Congress regarding the self-defense units stated that "The central committee echelon, each municipal party committee, and each provincial party committee must organize a military committee, one part of which will be concerned with military proselyting and another part of which will be concerned with organizing and commanding the self-

defense units." The parts of the succeeding Central Committee resolutions which dealt with the leadership and command system in the armed forces clearly indicated that each unit had to have a commander and a deputy commander, and with regard to politics had to have a political guide. In April 1945, when the high tide of anti-Japanese resistance rose to a high level, in order to prepare forces for the General Uprising, the resolution reorganizing the Vietnam Liberation Army established the system of political officers in the army. The political officer of each unit was responsible for helping the commander decide all matters, but did not assume direct command and did not have military responsibility. As for matters of a political nature, the command echelon had to reach agreement with the political officer.

In 1945, because of the army's rapid development, the number of party members in the army was still small, many command cadres were not yet party members, the level of the cadres was generally still low, and the army's mission was difficult, so the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee issued a resolution on "Establishing a system of political officers to represent the Party in the army." The resolution stated that at the central level there was to be a chief political officer, at the interzone level there was to be an interzone political officer, and at the regimental level there was to be a regimental political officer. The mission of the political officer was to assume responsibility for the party work and for leading the military work in the army in each sphere: at the national level, at the interzone level, and in each regiment.

In 1952, when the anti-French resistance war developed to a new level, the scale of combat force utilization was expanded, and the Party bases in the army became large and strong, the Central committee issued a resolution on setting up a party committee system in the army and stipulated that each unit was to have a unit commander and a political officer. The political officer and the unit commander had to obey the leadership of the party committee, the political officer was responsible to the party committee for the political work, and the unit commander was responsible to the party committee for the military work. The two sides had to coordinate closely with each other and discuss the implementation of the resolution of the party committee and the directives and orders of the upper echelon. Everyone was responsible to the party committee and the upper echelon with regard to decisions regarding their work. That was the system of the party committee exercising collective leadership and the unit commander and political officer carrying out a division of labor in organizing implementation, depending on their responsibility.

Our army implemented that system from then until the Fourth Party Congress.

With the implementation of the system of the party committee exercising collective leadership and military and political heads sharing responsibility, with the political organ serving as an organ which assisted the party committee, and the continuous strengthening of the unit commanders, the Party's leadership was strengthened and the party-political work in the army was strengthened. The collective party committee was always the center of intelligence of the party organization and the unit; it was the solid base of support for the commander in fulfilling missions and in giving orders and dealing with complicated situations in combat. The unit commander and the

political officer continually assisted each other in victoriously fulfilling all missions of the unit. That leadership and command system, as affirmed by the Political Bureau's resolution regarding the renovation and perfection of the Party's leadership structure in the Vietnam People's Army, "played a major role in building the armed forces and waging revolutionary war over a long period of time, and led our army from one victory to another." Those great results proved that the Party's leadership and command system in the army in the recent phase of the revolution was correct and in accord with the historical conditions of that time, for in the national liberation war our army developed from a small scale to a large scale, with an essentially infantry structure; gradually changed over from primitive equipment and weapons to relatively modern and modern equipment and weapons; ordinarily it had an area of operations encompassing battlefields and zones; and the scale of combat was not yet truly large and the requirements regarding coordinated combat by combat arms and armed forces were not yet high. Toward the end of the anti-U.S. resistance war the offensive and counteroffensive campaigns were on a larger scale and operational coordination was more complicated, but the participation of the armed forces branches and combat arms was still limited. The army's cadres essentially matured in actual revolutionary struggle and armed struggle and had not been trained basically and systematically, so their levels and abilities were not adequate.

As it entered the new revolutionary phase, the phase of the entire nation simultaneously fulfilling two strategic missions: successfully building socialism and solidly defending the socialist homeland. Our army underwent new development in all regards. The organizational structure was made more complete and included many technical combat arms and armed forces branches which were armed with modern equipment, weapons, and facilities. The party cadres in the armed forces matured and developed with regard to both quantity and quality and accumulated much experience in commanding and managing troops, and a small number received relatively basic training in the military institutes and schools.

People's war to defend the homeland under the conditions of modern combat will be very urgent and fierce. Coordinated combat will take place on a large scale and over a large area. Time becomes a factor of decisive significance in the victory of battles and combat. That situation demands that the Party's highly centralized, unified leadership be further strengthened. Furthermore, it is necessary to concentrate the function of commanding and managing units in a single person, to ensure that the commander is fully capable of orienting all efforts of the cadres and men toward fulfilling the unit's combat missions.

The Fourth Party Congress issued a resolution on "Strengthening the collective leadership of the party committee echelons, accompanied by the implementation of the unit command system" in the army. The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress stated that "It is necessary to further strengthen the Party's leadership of the armed forces, while also fully implementing the single commander system and ensuring that the commander can fully exercise his responsibility in fulfilling missions assigned by the Party and state and give orders and deal with the situation actively, decisively, and promptly, and so that the troops can act resolutely and urgently to win victory and fulfill all missions."

Thus the changing of the leadership structure and the implementation of the single commander system in our army were timely and inevitable, and were in accord with the allowable subjective conditions. It was a change in the organization work that was intended to effectively serve the political missions and cause the development of the organization work to keep up with development of the political mission. Because of the appropriate leadership and command structure the effectiveness of leadership and command was increased and the will, ability, and sense of responsibility of the commanders, cadres, and men, and of all organizations, were strengthened, in order to create fighting strength and do a good job of fulfilling all the army's missions in the enterprise of defending the homeland and building the nation.

When we study the development of the Party's leadership and command system in the army we can see even more clearly its revolutionary, scientific, principled, and creative nature in the sphere of our Party's organization. Thus, as is true with regard to the objectives of the renovation and perfection of the Party's leadership structure in the army in general, the implementation of the single commander system is intended to strengthen the Party's leadership and heighten the responsibility of the commander in victoriously fulfilling the missions assigned the army by the Party and state.

In complete contrast to the single commander system in the armies of the exploiting and ruling classes, the single commander system in our army is based on the Party. It is a major content of the Party's new leadership structure in the army.

The resolution of the Political Bureau stated that "On the basis of the Vietnam Communist Party's direct, unified leadership of the Vietnam People's Army in all regards, the single commander system will be implemented at all echelons in the army." That clearly and fully reflects the special characteristics of the single commander system in our army. The changing of the command system and all activities of the command system in the army was constructed on that solid basis.

In the past, with the system of the party committee exercising collective leadership and the military and political heads sharing responsibility for organizing implementation, at all echelons and in all units the party committee was the leadership organ of the party echelon at that level or in that unit. All aspects of the work in a unit were led collectively by the party committee and the commander was responsible for organizing implementation in accordance with his function. Therefore, the unit commanders at all levels were under the direct leadership of the party committee at that level and under the command of the upper-echelon commander.

It is different today. The party organizations, which are set up only in the basic-level units, have the mission of strictly implementing the resolutions and directives of the Party, according to their leadership responsibilities, but do not issue resolutions regarding decisions, the operational plans, the norms of the unit's activity plans, the economic, technical, specialized, and professional measures, etc.. There are no party committee organizations above the basic level. Instead, there have been set up political organs with the new

role and function of "serving as the leadership organ for the Party and assuming responsibility for the party work and the political work in the army." At the same time, with regard to the army's organizational system they are organs to help the commanders carry out the political activities in the units. The Party and state assign full authority to the commander, within the framework of state laws and the orders and statutes of the army, so that they can command the fulfillment of missions, under the direct guidance and command of the upper-echelon commander.

The questions that are posed are whether that will weaken the Party's leadership of the armed forces and whether it is contrary to the Party's collective leadership principle. Could the phenomena of despotism, arbitrariness, militarism, etc., arise and develop?

As we all know, the Party's absolute, direct leadership for the army in all respects is a basic principle of our Party's great work of developing the armed forces, and is the source of all of our army's victories and maturity. That basic principle has been continually affirmed by our Party in both theory and practice. At the beginning of the phase of building and defending the homeland, the fourth and fifth party congresses again affirmed that basic principle, in order to make the army completely loyal to the socialist homeland, unite closely around the Party Central Committee, remain close to the working people, absolutely obey the Party's leadership, be prepared to fight victoriously and strongly defend the socialist homeland, work enthusiastically, and fulfill its international obligations.

Observing that principle, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau decide all major questions regarding the construction and combat of the army. The Party's collective leadership principle is manifested even in the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The Ministry of National Defense applies the resolutions of the Party, the Party Central Committee, and the Political Bureau to all of its command and management activities throughout the army and organizes the fulfillment of its missions on the basis of the resolutions and directives of the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The unit commanders at all echelons carry out the orders and directives of the Minister of National Defense, under the direct command of the upper echelon. Thus all activities of the command system in the army are above all intended to transform the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau into actual results. Clearly, the renovation of the command system in our army can never weaken the Party's leadership role vis-a-vis the army. Indeed, it enables that leadership to be even more centralized, unified, and solid. The higher the managerial effectiveness of commanders and the state, and the more the leadership of the Party is strengthened, the more the collective leadership role of the masses is brought into play. That is an inevitable manifestation of the leadership role of the Party under the conditions of it being in power. Thus there is clearly no basis for thinking that the implementation of the single commander system will weaken the leadership role of the Party.

Of course, the leadership of the Party and its influence in all activities and the lives of the troops must be exercised by means of the activities of the

political organs at all levels, with new functions and missions, and by means of the activities of the Party organizations, the corps of party members, and the corps of cadres, including the command cadres and the mass organizations of the Party in the army.

Since 1979 the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, carrying out the resolution of the Fourth Party Congress, has gradually implemented the single commander system in the army. Although the territorial organization has not changed, that new command system has served to heighten the responsibility of the commanders. The implementation of the single commander system, with higher, more complete contents, will more fully develop the effectiveness and responsibility of the commanders at all levels in commanding and managing the troops. The commanders can take the initiative in making decisions under all circumstances, which ensures the more rapid and more effective fulfillment of the political missions assigned to the unit by the Party and state. The prestige and influence of the Party are further consolidated and increased. The cadres and men have more confidence in the leadership of the Party and the Political Bureau, unite closely around the Central Committee, and are determined to carry out all lines, stands, and policies of the Party and all orders of the commanders.

The commander is a cadre of the Party and the state in army, and the corps of command cadres is a part of the corps of Party cadres operating in the army and is trained, educated, forged, and assigned the mission of managing and commanding the troops. Therefore, whether the commander is or is not yet a party member, he must obey the leadership of the Party, and command the troops in correctly carrying out all lines and policies of the Party.

The Party and state assign to the commanders the function of commanding and managing the units in all regards -- military, political, rear services, technical, etc. -- so they must be people who profoundly understand the principle of the Party leading the armed forces, clearly understand the position and mission of the party-political work, and be responsible for the party-political work in the unit.

At present, nearly all command cadres in our army are party members. Of course, the commanders at all echelons must accept the management of the basic-level Party organizations, must strictly carry out all resolutions of the basic-level Party organizations, must endeavor to fulfill all five missions of party members, must be vanguard and exemplary in all regards, and must observe Party discipline.

With regard to the qualifications of Party members, due to their position and responsibility, the commanders at all levels must be outstanding party members with a strong party nature who always view things from the viewpoints of the Party, resolve all problems regarding the activities and lives of the troops, flexibly combine the position of the commander with the role of a party member in work and activities, and continually develop the influence of the Party in all of their actual activities. The Party and state assign the commanders full authority within the sphere for which they are assigned responsibility in order to fulfill their missions and responsibilities. That authority is used to fulfill missions, not to build up individual power, and they cannot abuse their

implementation. Reports to the upper echelon, including those to the upper echelon of the same sector, must also be communicated to the commander at their echelon.

The commander must respect the deputy commanders and must create conditions for them to fulfill their missions. First of all, he must respect the responsibility of the deputy commanders and ensure that they show initiative and creativity in fulfilling their functions fully and accurately, without encroaching upon the commander's right to make decisions and his doing the work of, and encroaching upon and improperly intervening in the functions of, the deputy commanders. It would be incorrect and very unwise if a commander would carry out all aspects of a task or, when something happens that displeases him, "scream and shout" and force the deputy commanders into a situation of confusion and passivity. If that is the case the commander will become exhausted and the deputy commanders will become less effective as regards the masses, the work cannot be completed, and there can be no internal solidarity.

At the brigade, regiment, or lower level there is a deputy commander for political matters. The relationship between the commander and the deputy commander for political matters differs from that between the commander and the other deputy commanders. First of all, it is a relationship between the person who heads the unit and the person who represents the upper-echelon political office and is responsible for the party-political work in the unit. The commander and the deputy commander for political matters must be close as "a person and his shadow" in all aspects of the unit's work, in resolving problems in the unit's activity and life. The commander is responsible for promptly informing the deputy commander for political matters of the orders, directives, and missions given to the unit by the upper echelon, and clearly state to the deputy commander for political matters his intentions toward carrying out those orders, directives, and missions, so that he can plan the leadership work. With regard to the command relationship, the deputy commander for political matters is part of the commander's lower echelon and helps the commander explain the lines, stands, and policies of the Party and the laws of the state to the cadres and men in the unit, organize cultural-morale activities for the cadres and men, organize socialist emulation movements, conduct political education for the cadres and men, etc. The deputy commander for political matters must report to the commander on the political-ideological situation of the cadres and men, and on the leadership quality and combat capability of the unit's party organization.

Due to the position and nature of the organs in the army's organizational structure, the relationships between the commanders at each echelon with the staff, political, rear services, technical, and other organs at the corresponding echelon are not identical. The staff, rear services, and technical organs assist the commander, so the relationship between the commander and those organs is one of commanding and obeying. According to their functions, those organs must firmly grasp the situation of their sector in the unit as a whole, recommend to the commander directives and plans regarding that sector, and guide, inspect, and supervise the lower echelon in correctly carrying out the directives and plans of the commander. The commander must be concerned with the all-round development of those organs, with regard to organization, personnel, ability, and living conditions, and

authority, which leads to despotism and arbitrariness. The commander is responsible to the Party, the state, and the upper echelon for all aspects of the unit's activity and life. Therefore, all directives and orders of the commander must be in accord with the Constitution, the laws of the state, and the orders and regulations of the army, and the commander is responsible to the upper echelon and the unit for his orders and directives.

In the new leadership mechanism, the commander has an extremely clear role and mission. From the Ministry of National Defense down to the basic-level units, in all combat and combat-service units, and in all national defense organs, schools, hospitals, and enterprises there is a person who has been appointed by the state to command and manage, in accordance with the law. The Party and state define the position, mission, and responsibility of the commanders, while at the same time assigning them authority so that they can fulfill their missions and responsibilities. The commander is personally responsible to the Party, the state, and the upper-echelon commander for commanding combat, developing and managing the troops, carrying out the stands and policies of the Party and state, and fulfilling their missions under all circumstances. They are responsible to the Party and state for the results attained in all of the unit's combat, construction, training, work, and production missions, and for the maturation and progress of all cadres and men under their command. The commanders at all echelons are also responsible for managing, coordinating, and using all forces and material-technical bases assigned by the state and the army, to ensure the fulfillment of the unit's construction and combat missions, in accordance with the systems and policies of the state and the army.

The commander has very heavy responsibilities. What must be done to ensure that the unit fulfills its missions?

The commander is responsible for the over-all situation of the unit, but while fully carrying out this responsibility it is necessary to concentrate his energy on the central mission: the military work (in schools, the training work; in enterprises, the construction work, etc.) The commander is also responsible for the other tasks, which must be continually attended to and cannot be neglected. The problem is to grasp the orders and intentions of the upper echelon, have problems and plans, and inspect and oversee implementation. The deputy commander is responsible for entering deeply into the specifics of each aspect. It would be entirely incorrect to think that once the single commander system has been implemented nothing will be left for the lower echelon, that everything must be decided by the commander. To do so would be for him to do the work of others, be bureaucratic, and not concentrate on the principal mission, while at the same time not bringing into play the responsibility, dynamism, and creativity of the deputy commanders. Therefore, it would be difficult to attain good results in all tasks and internal contradictions and problems could easily arise.

The commanders fulfill their missions under the authority of the upper-echelon commanders and are subject to the direct supervision of the upper-echelon commanders. There will no longer exist the situation of there being a clear division between the collective responsibility of the party committee and the

responsibility of the commander, and between the responsibility of the commander and that of the deputy commanders. There will also no longer exist the situation of learning on the party committee and not stressing a spirit of initiative and individual responsibility. But it is also not entirely correct to think that the commander is free to do anything he wishes, or that he can abuse his authority and act improperly. The commander has full authority to carry out his missions, but that authority is granted in the framework of state laws, the orders and statutes of the army, and the common stipulations regarding the relationships in the new leadership structure. The phenomena of liberalism, arbitrariness, and the abuse of authority are entirely contrary to the nature of our new command system and have no basis for continued existence in our army.

At all echelons in the army, to assist the commanders there is a large number or a small number of deputy commanders, depending on the nature and mission of each type of unit in the army. At the division level or above there are usually a deputy commander-chief of staff, a deputy commander for military matters, a deputy commander for rear services, and a deputy commander for technical matters. At present, those deputy commanders also serve as the heads of the staff, rear services, and technical organs. At the brigade, regiment, battalion, and company levels there is also a deputy commander for political matters.

The deputy commander at all levels is a person who assists the commander and is responsible to the commander at that level for the military, rear services, technical, or other tasks, under the direct authority of the commander. That stipulation was confirmed beginning with the implementation of the single commander system in the Vietnam People's Army, and not only clearly indicated the role and responsibility of the deputy commander but also clarified the responsibility of the commander toward the unit and the commander's authority over the deputy commanders. It differs from the concept of the deputy commander in the "command committee" system in the units in the past. Of course, it is not the case that the deputy commanders and the commander hold collective discussions and then democratically share responsibilities only after reaching unanimous agreement. It is also not the case that the deputy commanders assist the commander in all regards, or that all deputy commanders can replace the commander when the commander is absent. Except for the deputy commander for political matters the deputy commanders are not directly responsible to the upper-echelon commander but are directly responsible to the commanders at their echelon; the deputy commanders are not under the direct management of the upper echelon but are managed directly by the commander at their echelon.

The deputy commander-chief of staff and the deputy commander for military matters assist the commander with regard to military matters; the deputy commander-chief of staff normally replaces the commander when the commander is absent, but the deputy commander for military matters can also replace the commander when the commander is absent. When replacing the commander, the deputy commander is authorized to fulfill all missions and has the same authority as the commander. The other deputy commanders must obey the person who replaces the commander.

The deputy commander for rear services and the deputy commander for technical matters are now called the deputy commander for rear services-director of rear services and the deputy commander for technical matters-director of technical matters. They assist the commander with regard to the rear services and technical work.

The deputy commander for political matters is the person who directly organizes the party-political work in the basic-level units. The deputy director for political matters at the brigade and regiment levels represents the political office. The deputy commander for political matters carries out the party-political work in the basic-level units under the direct leadership of the political office or, if deputy political commanders at the battalion and company levels, under the direct guidance of the deputy commander for political matters at the upper echelon. In the army's organizational system the deputy commander for political matters helps the commander organize the implementation of political activities, and organize the application of the resolutions and directives of the Party regarding the continuous increasing of vigilance, combat readiness, Marxist-Leninist education, education concerning the lines and policies of the Party, increasing socialist consciousness, strengthening socialist patriotism and a will to build and defend the homeland, etc.

The deputy commanders must be the leading specialists in the units, so they must enter deeply into the work to which they are assigned, and concentrate on helping the commander fulfill the missions of the unit. But assisting the commander does not mean being passive, "waiting until targets are pointed out before attacking." On the contrary, the deputy commander is a manager who helps the commander with regard to an important task in the unit, so he is the closest collaborator of the commander with regard to that task. The deputy commander must take the initiative in recommending plans to the commander, and after the plans are approved he must organize their implementation, manage the organ in carrying out that work, grasp the actual situation of the lower echelon, correct deficiencies, and learn lessons and promptly disseminate them. In the implementation process, when a new problem arises but lies within the sphere of the policies, intentions, or proposed solution of the commander, it is necessary to guide the lower echelon in resolving the problem; if it is a problem regarding principle it must be reported, the commander's opinion must be solicited, and the lower echelon must be helped to resolve the problem.

In the new leadership mechanism, at certain echelons in the army military councils are set up. A new relationship that has been established is that between the commander and the military council. That relationship arises from the position and mission of the commander and the position, nature, and mission of the military council.

As stated above, the commander is the person who heads the unit and is completely responsible to the Party, the state, and the upper-echelon commander with regard to combat command and troop development and management. The military council is a collective military leadership organ of a unit that has been appointed by the Party to strengthen the single commander system and has the mission of examining and making collective decisions regarding the major policies and measures regarding the important matters in the activities and

lives of the troops. But the military council does not make decisions with regard to operational intentions and plans or the norms of the troops' activity plans. The military councils are not organized in the form of a system. The resolutions of a military council at a certain echelon are effective at that echelon and are manifested in the form of the commander's commands and directives. Thus the relationship between the commander and the military council is that between the head of a unit and a collective military leadership organization the chairman of which is the commander. Thus the commander must listen closely to and respect the opinions of the members of the military council, and must carry out the resolutions of the council regarding matters which the council has discussed collectively and about which it has issued a resolution. In the event that the commander does not agree with the majority of the members of the council he reports to the upper echelon and requests its decision, but while he is waiting he must act in accordance with the majority.

The relationship between the commander and the deputy commanders is one of commanding and obeying. The deputy commanders must obey the commander in accordance with the principle of the lower echelon obeying the upper echelon. The source of that relationship is the new command system, which concentrates responsibility and authority for managing and commanding combat and troop development in the commander.

The deputy commanders carry out their work in accordance with the commands and directives of the commander and in correct accordance with the intention of the commander (of course, that intention is to carry out the lines, stands, and policies of the Party and the directives of the upper echelon), in order to ensure that the unit always act in accordance with a unified plan and orient all activities toward the fulfillment of the unit's political missions. As regards the deputy commanders, the execution of the orders and directives of the commander is a legal requirement of the state and the army, so they must have very strong consciousness of voluntarily carrying them out. Only that can ensure the fulfillment of their missions and those of the unit, and only thereby can they be exemplary with regard to a strict work style in the unit. But that does not mean restricting democracy and the bringing into play of the intelligence of the deputy commanders when fulfilling missions. On the contrary, if the commander wants his orders and directives to be accurate and effective it is indispensable that he know how to respect and bring into play the collective intelligence of the collective, especially of the deputy commanders, his closest collaborators and the people with the greatest specialized ability in the unit. Therefore, the commander must, according to the specific conditions and circumstances, seek all ways to maximize the exchange of opinions with the deputy commanders before making a decision. The deputy commanders must regard contributing opinions to the commander as part of their responsibility toward the common work of the unit. They must boldly bring up points about which they disagree so that the best decision can be made. Once the commander has made his decision they must strictly carry it out, and speak and act in correct accordance with the commander's decision. That is both a matter of discipline and part of the deputy commanders' skill. Matters related to the vertical command structure that are guided by the deputy commanders at the upper echelon or an upper echelon organ must be reported to their commander and they must seek his opinion with regard to guiding their

enable them to become increasingly mature and keep up with the developmental requirements of the unit and the army.

The political organ, as stipulated by the new leadership structure, is a "party leadership organ which is responsible for the party-political work in the army." At the same time, the political organ is part of the army's organizational structure and part of the organizational structure of command and management organs at each echelon. Therefore, the relationship between the commander and the political organ is both a relationship between the head of the unit and the party leadership organ in the unit, and a relationship between the unit commander and an organ in the army's organizational structure at his echelon.

While fulfilling his function the commander must coordinate closely with the political organ. He must promptly inform the political director of the missions, directives, and orders received from the upper echelon and his plans regarding stands and measures, and recommend matters needing leadership, in order to ensure the fulfillment of missions assigned the unit by the upper echelon.

The political organ must report to the commander on the political-ideological situation of the troops, the situation of the political work in the unit, and the leadership quality and combat strength of the Party organizations.

The Party's new leadership structure is an integral whole consisting of the leadership organization and mode of the Party Central Committee with regard to the army and national defense, the implementation of the single commander system and the formation of military councils, the changing of the functions and missions of the system of political organs, and the building of pure, strong basic-level organizations and strong mass organizations, in order to ensure strong leadership by the Party under all circumstances, highly develop the leadership of the commander, and continually improve the quality of the Party's leadership and the fighting strength of the army.

To strengthen the Party's leadership of the army is to strengthen all links of the organizational structure, not just one link or one organizational system. To do a good job of implementing the system of a single commander is to strengthen the Party's leadership of the army.

In order to develop the new command system the commanders must clearly confirm their positions, firmly grasp their missions and functions, and strengthen the party nature of all relationships. The party-political work must regard as one of its very important missions continually consolidating and strengthening the single commander system. The commanders must continually improve their quality and ability so that they can be worthy of the responsibility and trust the Party and state have assigned them in the development and combat of our army and of all our armed forces in the phase of building and protecting the socialist Vietnamese homeland.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMYMEN INVOLVED IN WEAPON THEFT PUNISHED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Tran Lam: "Theft, Concealment and Purchase of Combat Weapons"]

[Text] The military court in Military Region Y recently held an open session to try in the first and final instance eight culprits (including three army men) on charge of stealing, concealing and buying combat weapons. The gist and nature of this case are as follows: In the space of 2 months, three army men responsible for guarding and protecting unit A's munition depot established connections with some evil-minded civilians, entered the depot four times to steal more than 300 kgs of explosive, nearly 100 grenades and 1 artillery shell detonator, sold the loot to fishermen and shared the money so earned between them. On discovery of this case, the criminal investigation organ of the unit retrieved over 100 kgs of explosive, 80 grenades, a sum of money used by the criminals in buying and selling the misappropriated weapons and another amount of money representing the illegally earned profit. The criminal act of the culprits was of a very serious nature because it constituted a violation of the army's combat weapons--a kind of socialist property of special value--, because it was detrimental mainly to the combat power of the army and to national security and social order and security and because its consequences were not only a loss of combat weapons for the army but also the difficulties and obstacles to be experienced by it in implementing plans, carrying out construction, getting ready to fight and performing combat activities.

Considering the serious nature and consequences of the crime, the aggravating and attenuating circumstances defined by the law on this type of crime, and the situation of the relatives of each culprit and by virtue of Articles 7 and 17 of the 21 October 1970 regulations on punitive measures against violations of the socialist property--, the military court in Military Region Y determined the criminal responsibilities of each defendant and meted out the following sentences:

1. Quach Van Duong, private first class, was the mastermind who incited two other army men to commit the crime, who actively joined his collaborators in contacting buyers, who personally broke into the depot four times to

steal and who gave Truong Van Dang a tip to enable him to sneak into the depot to take away over 200 kgs of explosive. Quach Van Duong was sentenced to 9 years in prison because he was guilty of stealing weapons.

2. Truong Van Dang was a civilian who acted under Duong's instructions and sneaked into the depot to take away the explosive and who was also the buyer of a large amount of explosive and detonators. Truong Van Dang was sentenced to 9 years in prison because he was guilty of stealing weapons (and because he acted as an accomplice).

3. Nguyen Trong Tuyen was a civilian who promised to buy weapons from Duong's clique before these people committed theft and who bought a large amount of misappropriated explosive and grenades. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison because he was guilty of acting as an accomplice in the theft of weapons.

4. Persuaded by Duong, Tran Doan Mo, private first class, agreed to accompany Duong to establish connections with buyers and to enter the depot many times to take away weapons. Tran Doan Mo was sentenced to 5 years in prison for acting as an accomplice in stealing weapons.

5. Incited by Duong, Nguyen Van Vang, private first class, joined Mo in sneaking into the depot many times to steal weapons. Nguyen Van Vang was sentenced to 5 years in prison for his role as accomplice in stealing weapons.

6. Nguyen Duc Thien, a 17-year-old civilian, promised to buy weapons before Duong and his clique committed the crime, and bought 30 grenades. He was sentenced to 2 years in prison for acting as an accomplice in stealing weapons.

7. Tran Van Du was a 17-year-old civilian who bought 84 kgs of explosive and 53 detonators after the criminals had accomplished the theft of weapons. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison for concealing and buying weapons.

8. Dao Van Xuan was a civilian who bought 52 kgs of explosive and over 300 detonators after the criminals had accomplished the theft of weapons. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison for concealing and buying weapons.

Apart from the above-mentioned culprits who were severely punished, the military court in Military Region Y also summoned 17 involved persons (those guilty of a petty offense were exculpated from criminal responsibilities by the military organ of control) for the purposes of education and proposed to the local administration to take appropriate administrative measures against them.

Following is our opinion on this case:

--Commanders of basic units--especially those directly responsible for managing the army property--must pay due attention to raising the sense of responsibility and discipline in executing tasks among armymen with the function of warehouse and fund keepers and must remind them of the need to do their best to avoid all kinds of negligence stemming from a lack of responsibility and a failure to implement strictly and fully various systems and regulations on property management because criminals may take advantage of such loopholes to commit crimes.

--Armymen entrusted with the task of standing guard on depots must be carefully chosen, properly educated and strictly controlled. The cadres responsible for these armymen must intensify control and must quickly detect and sternly deal with unwholesome practices from their beginning.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PHASE 1 1984 INDUCTION COMPLETED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Nguyen Xuan Cac: "The Country Has Filled Its Quota in the First Phase of the 1984 Youth Induction on Schedule, Quality Is Better Than in Previous Phases"]

[Text] Under the combined leadership and guidance of the Party committee echelons and the People's committees of different levels, the task of calling young men up in Phase 1 of the 1984 induction has become the central task of the different localities. This induction phase was prepared carefully beforehand. All levels of the local military organizations were [thoroughly] trained to that the induction and receiving and delivery of recruits proceeded quickly. Many localities had a fairly good grasp of their forces, their research and physical examinations were relatively accurate and so fewer alternates were called up than in other years.

Till 10 March, the provinces, municipalities, regions under central rule have completed the first induction phase of 1984, the quota was filled within the time limit, the quality [of the inductees] was good. Almost all the new inductees had class A health, were fairly well educated about the Military Duty Law which clearly defines the duty to protect the Fatherland and so all eagerly and enthusiastically departed. The percentage of districts, wards, cities, municipalities subordinate to a province, villages, subwards, towns where the induction process was successful is high. The districts that were instructed to call up their [full] annual quota of draftees in this first phase of the 1984 induction were successful in following this directive. The delivery and receiving of recruits between the localities and the [military] units proceeded according to plan, guaranteeing the [spirit of] solidarity, and created advantageous conditions for them to fulfill their duty successfully.

After 2 years of calling up young men in accordance with the new Military Duty Law, this induction phase made many new advances, met the requirements in many aspects, gradually resulting in orderly inductions.

Today, many localities are making plans and preparing for the second phase of induction to be an even bigger success.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SON LA TRAINING PROGRAM FOR RESERVE OFFICERS DESCRIBED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Thanh Phong: "The Right Training Course"]

[Text] Having a serious concept of the role of a Reserve officer, in the past few years Son La province has devised a correct and highly effective training program for Reserve officers.

A contingent of cadres, organization and Reserve commanding officers has been created, comprising local cadres and comrades who are knowledgeable about the local situation, customs and practices. Because the corps of Reserve officers is small and scattered, the Son La province military organization ordered a study, a review to correctly assess the situation. To accomplish this task, the province's military command organization canvassed the district in association with the province's regiment of Reserve draftees to inspect and tighten the force. Through the investigation, the province has discovered the weak areas and missing points, and has devised a training program with special attention to the weak highland locations.

[Son La follows] the precepts that "soldiers need cadres" and "cadres are to recruited from among the local population." Taking into account the composition of the organization's Reserve corps, the province has paid special attention to training Reserve officers [recruited from among] the ethnic minorities. These minority Reserve officers have special advantages in that they understand the local customs and practices. To easily control and command the Reserve force is truly the foundation of the building and management of local Reserve forces. Furthermore, the province has also concentrated on training Reserve officers from the lowlands [then sending them up to the highlands] on missions to [help] build the new economy of Son La. Since the cultural level of our minority brothers is still low, during training, the province has looked into a parallel cultural training program to guarantee a successful technical military training course.

Another fact which is important to the raising of the effectiveness level of the contingent of Reserve officers is the fact that the province took care to train Reserved officers that are specialized in technical fields that conform to [the needs of] the Son La Reserve forces, that fit in with the economic industries that Son La has or has the ability to develop. Thus the contingent of Reserve officers can develop their effectiveness in production and building in times of peace as well as guaranteeing our strength in times of war.

To successfully carry out the task of training Reserve officers, the province has invested much in the local provincial military school. Till now, the materials and equipment and the school's teaching ranks has been adequate enough to accomplish the task entrusted it. During the past years, the local Son La military school has viewed the task of training Reserve officers as its primary duty. The Reserve officer graduates have filled the expanding needs of the province's Reserve forces.

Today, the number of Son La province's Reserve officers equals 10 times that of 1980, among them the number of officers specialized in a technical field has multiplied three fold. The number of trained Reserve officers per year exceeds expected figures by 30-40 percent taking into account the funds provided by the Military Region. The percentage of Party members among the Reserve officers gets higher every day. In 1980 the percentage of minority Reserve officers was 60 percent; it is 78 percent today. The province's military organization has [succeeded in] placing 82 percent of the Reserve officers in a specialized technical field.

The task of overseeing the contingent of Reserve officers has improved by an important step. The province has associated with the district's military organizations, the security [agencies], the enterprises, the schools to control the Reserve officer force. The Reserve units are neatly assigned to each village, with a Reserve officer from that same village in command, creating advantages in case of mobilization. To do this, the province used the drafted Reserve regiment to oversee the problem. Today, the Reserve officers are in every village, the force of Reserve officers has been equally and logically deployed. The province's military organization has also organized annual exercises, training missions for the contingent of cadres serving as Reserve officers, it has organized reviews to extract every ounce of experience from the missions in time in each concrete phase, to involve these Reserve officers more deeply in the organization every day.

Because of this correct training program, the consciousness of the collective mastery to build the force, to protect the masses' Fatherland is raised, Son La's contingent of Reserve officers matures more and more every day. Witness, through four alerts, the Reserve draftees forces of four bases: Son La village and the districts of Thuan Chau, Moc Chau, Quynh Nhai assembled quickly, within the time limit, immaculately dressed, among them, Quynh Nhai district, a highland district, had the best performance.

Speaking about the prospects for the contingent of Son La's Reserve officers, Comrade Nguyen Trong Thanh, deputy commander-in-chief of Son La province's military organization told me:

"In training Reserve forces, the province will concentrate on rejuvenating the contingent and on increasing the percentage of minority Reserve officers. The province is perfecting the structure of the organization and the specialized technical fields step by step, creating a total strength for the province's contingent of Reserve officers."

HA NAM NINH REPORTS ON CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 pp 3, 4

[Article by Nguyen Van An, secretary of the Ha Nam Ninh Provincial Party Committee: "Focusing Efforts on Resolving the Grain Problem Well, Achieving Socio-Economic Stability and Carrying Out Socio-Economic Development"]

[Text] In keeping with the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the various resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the armed forces and people of Ha Nam Ninh Province are upholding their tradition of unity and self-reliance and working hard to bring about a change in the socio-economic situation within the locality. During the past 3 years, following the serious decline that occurred between 1978 and 1980, every aspect of the situation within the province has gradually been restored and developed. Six consecutive bumper crops have been recorded in agricultural production. The output of all industrial and food crops has increased. Livestock production has been restored and developed, especially within the household sector (the cattle herd has increased by 5.6 percent compared to 1980). In 1983, nearly 120,000 tons of salt were produced. Compared to the final year of the previous 5-year plan, the output value of local industry rose at an annual rate of 10 percent in each of the past 3 years. Within local industry, the output value of small industry and all handicraft trades has increased rapidly and was 7 percent higher in 1983 than in the previous record year (1978). Under the guideline "the state and the people working together," efforts have been concentrated on completing construction projects once they have been started; the province has constructed many medium and small-scale projects supporting the expansion of production and the improvement of the people's welfare. On the distribution-circulation front, although many shortages still exist, initial advances have been made in procurements and in controlling the flow of goods and money. Many efforts have been made in export activities and tourism. In 1983, the value of our exports doubled compared to the yearly average from 1978 to 1980. Educational and cultural work, public health activities, the protection of mothers and children and physical culture and sport activities have been maintained and, in some areas, developed. Our national defense and security posture has been maintained and strengthened.

Foremost among the victories that have been won is the victory in grain production. During the 5 years from 1976 to 1980, total grain output averaged

706,000 tons per year. During the past 3 years, we produced an average of 877,000 tons per year (an increase of 8 percent per year). In 1983, despite natural disasters that caused extensive damage, we still managed to produce a total of 906,000 tons of grain. The uniformity of rice yields among the various areas, districts and cooperatives has constantly increased. During the past 2 years, on the basis of the victory won in production, we have achieved virtual self-sufficiency in grain within the province and fulfilled our obligations to the state well. These results, although very important, only mark an initial change. Generally speaking, the development of the locality's potentials and strengths, especially those that lie in its labor and arable land, has not met requirements. In many areas of production and daily life, we have yet to bring about strong, uniform and steady change.

In keeping with the resolution of the 5th Party Plenum, the executive committee of the Ha Nam Ninh provincial party organization has established our socio-economic tasks for 1984 and our targets for 1985 and proposed practical measures for meeting and exceeding the main objectives set forth by the provincial party organization congress. Firmly adhering to our central task throughout the period of transition, namely, the task of carrying out socialist industrialization, we will, in the next 2 years, focus our efforts and intelligence on successfully resolving the food and clothing problems, rapidly increasing the supply of consumer and export goods, stabilizing and gradually improving the standard of living of the people and accumulating capital so that we can carry out expanded reproduction. Under these guidelines, the foremost, immediate task of our province is still that of continuing to promote the full-scale development of agricultural production, the center of which is grain production. This is the number one target in resolving the food problem, laying the groundwork for the redistribution of labor, developing the sectors and trades and establishing a new balance within the locality. In 1984, we will try to produce 940,000 tons of grain and then raise this output to 1 million tons in subsequent years.

To achieve this important target, it is necessary to vigorously uphold the right of socialist collective ownership of the laboring people and utilize the combined strengths of all levels and sectors to resolve the following four main problems well:

1. We must reorganize production, improve and strengthen material-technical bases and meet the requirements of intensive cultivation, multicropping and the expansion of the amount of land under cultivation. Ha Nam Ninh is a densely populated province with limited farmland. We must do a better job of managing and utilizing cropland and stop the illegal occupation and wasteful use of cropland. Importance must be attached to reclaiming land from the sea and expanding winter production in order to raise the coefficient of cropland use as much as possible. On the other hand, special attention must be given to making investments in depth to develop the potentials that lie in our arable land and produce much commodity grain. On the basis of the specific conditions that exist at each place, we have established production guidelines and crop allocations suited to each area, each cooperative, each field, each class of soil and each growing season in an effort to raise the uniformity of crop yields, rapidly increase the output of both rice and subsidiary food

crops and stabilize and develop the production of exported industrial and food crops.

Under the basic guideline of practicing intensive cultivation, the entire province has attached importance to the widespread application of technological advances in production, most importantly the establishment of good water conservancy networks to meet the requirements of effective, scientific irrigation and drainage. At the same time, we will make appropriate investments in seed and fertilizer, correct the tight supply of draft power and production tools and strengthen the pest forecasting and crop protection system from the provincial level to the installations to insure continuous increases in crop yields and limit the damages caused by natural disasters.

2. We must continue to strengthen production relations, improve the management of agriculture and heighten the sense of collective ownership of cooperative members. This is a matter of very important significance, a matter of basic and pressing significance. The directive of the Party Secretariat on the product contracts within agriculture has generated enthusiasm for work in the fields of Ha Nam Ninh and resulted in welcomed victories. However, in the process of implementing these contracts, mistakes have arisen that must be corrected with a view toward improving product contracts and the management system and strengthening the socialist production relations within agriculture.

3. We must do a good job of mobilizing and procuring grain, improve the management and distribution of grain and practice thorough frugality in the consumption of grain. Each year, the province must provide nearly 20,000 tons of grain (in paddy equivalent) to the non-agricultural sectors. The central level has assigned a total grain mobilization quota of 210,000 tons per year. The province's stable grain obligation is 110,000 tons per year. Thus, our province must procure roughly 100,000 tons of grain over and above obligations each year. In years of bumper harvests, even larger procurements must be made in order to provide a well balanced supply of grain within the territory, make contributions to the central level and establish reserves. To accomplish this, we, in conjunction with heightening the awareness and sense of responsibility of each citizen through education, must concern ourselves with strengthening the procurement organization and prepare a better supply of cash and goods for use in trading with cooperative member families for grain. In management and distribution, the province has taken thorough measures to curb waste and losses and combat smuggling, profiteering and the hoarding of grain. Many districts have begun to give their attention to instructing their people in processing subsidiary food crops by manual methods and incorporating them in their main meals, thereby gradually improving the structure of the diet in order to save grain.

4. Positive efforts must be made to reduce the rate of population growth and raise the average amount of grain per capita. During the past several years, despite the intensification of the planned parenthood campaign, the rate of population growth has remained high in Ha Nam Ninh (2.1 percent in 1983). As a result, even during years of bumper harvests, the amount of grain per capita still does not exceed 350 kilograms. Therefore, in conjunction with

increasing production, we must consider it extremely important to limit the rate of population growth and practice planned parenthood. In 1984, Ha Nam Ninh Province will endeavor to reduce the rate of population growth to 1.9 percent and to 1.7 percent in 1985. In the next 2 years, redistributing labor is also a very urgent requirement. Together with redistributing labor within the locality, we must continue to send tens of thousands of laborers to build new economic zones outside the province. By succeeding in these efforts, we will help to raise the average amount of grain per capita, resolve the problem of food for humans and develop the production of livestock and poultry.

The immediate socio-economic tasks of the party organization, armed forces and people of Ha Nam Ninh Province are very large and we still face many difficulties. However, under the light of the resolutions of the party and with the wholehearted assistance of the ministries and sectors on the central level and other provinces, our province's movement has been and is undergoing positive change and more and more advanced model units and new factors are emerging, thus creating favorable conditions for subsequent stages of development.

"United and self-reliant, displaying initiative and creativity and attaching importance to results and discipline," the party organization, armed forces and people of Ha Nam Ninh are determined to overcome every difficulty and challenge and constantly work to quickly make Ha Nam Ninh a socialist industrial-agricultural province that is economically prosperous, politically stable, strong in the fields of national defense and security and beautiful from the perspective of its culture and lifestyle, thereby making worthy contributions to the cause of building and defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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CSO: 4209/281

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CONFERENCE REVIEWS HOME TRADE SECTOR IN 1983

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 4

[Article: "Home Trade Sector Makes Progress in Controlling Goods But Its Progress Has Not Been Commensurate with Production Results"]

[Text] The home trade sector has begun to make progress in controlling the flow of goods. In 1983 as well as during the 1st quarter of this year, the procurement of many main products met and exceeded plan quotas. In addition to such agricultural and food products as pork, ocean fish, beans of all types and so forth, the procurement of such industrial goods as sugar, salt, tobacco, knitted clothing, bicycles, bicycle tires and tubes and dry cell batteries has also increased considerably. In 1983, 140,000 tons of hand milled sugar were procured, enough to meet minimum needs, which we previously had to meet through imports. The procurement of rice bowls increased 60 percent compared to 1982. During the 1st quarter of this year, the total value of agricultural products procured equalled 183.8 percent, the total value of food products procured equalled 179.2 percent and the total value of marine products procured equalled 109.6 percent of the procurements that had been made by the same time last year. In the procurement of industrial goods, the North exceeded its quarterly procurement plan by 12.4 percent and the South by 58 percent.

However, compared to the results of production, the quantities of certain products being procured are still low. For example, 1983 was the first year in which we managed to procure 200,000 tons of pork; however, this only represented 50 percent of market weight hogs. The quantity of hand milled sugar procured was six times greater than the amount of sugar produced by sugar mills but only represented about 56 percent of the total output of hand milled sugar. As regards the products of the small industry and handicraft sector, especially those products produced by installations using raw materials acquired on their own, socialist commerce is only controlling about 20 to 30 percent of output; the balance is flowing to the free market.

Recently, the home trade sector held a conference to review its work in 1983, conduct a preliminary evaluation of the results achieved during the 1st quarter of 1984 and propose many ways to correct the weaknesses that exist.

Tran Phuong, member of the Party Central Committee and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, attended and addressed the conference.

To quickly correct the weaknesses in procurement activities and control the sources of goods, the conferees proposed specific, practical measures related to the following: having an impact upon production in order to create additional sources of goods; organizing two-way economic contracts and very effectively managing and using the supply of goods allocated for use in the procurement of agricultural products; expanding the marketing cooperative network; promoting the transformation of private merchants; establishing a division of labor and responsibilities among procurement sectors and units...

The conferees also proposed specific ways to correct the weaknesses in the organization of retail sales, service activities and the transformation and management of the market in an effort to meet the following targets for socialist commerce in 1984: controlling from 70 to 80 percent of wholesale sales, 60 to 70 percent of retail sales and from 35 to 50 percent of the business in public food and services on the social market.

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HA NAM NINH'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN DISTRIBUTION-CIRCULATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Thanh Nam: "On the Distribution-Circulation Front"]

[Text] Procurement of Agricultural Products and Industrial Goods Exceeds Plan Quotas

In 1983, Ha Nam Ninh Province mobilized more grain and food products than ever before: 194,000 tons of grain and 13,400 tons of pork. As regards pork, the province exceeded its initial quota requiring the delivery of 1,000 tons to the state and did so at a date earlier than in any previous year. The percentages of peanuts and rushes mobilized increased rapidly. As a group, the value of industrial goods procured exceeded the plan by 58.3 percent. To compensate for the decline in the supply of level I goods, the province has broadened its economic ties with other provinces and increased the percentage of goods obtained from them from 9.8 percent in 1980 to nearly 19 percent of the total goods procured.

As a result of increased procurements to give the state control of goods, state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives raised their retail sales on the organized market 28.7 percent above the level required under the plan, thus helping to stabilize prices. Manual workers and civil servants have been receiving a regular and full supply of essential rationed goods.

Total Cash Revenues Increase by 71.9 Percent

On the basis of developing production and controlling goods better, the finance and banking sectors took many steps in 1983 to increase budget revenues and increase the flow of cash through the bank. High revenues were collected from all three major sources within the local economy, agricultural taxes, industrial and commercial taxes and state-operated revenues from the local enterprises. The revenues collected from the two types of taxes under the revised regulations of the state more than doubled compared to 1982.

Total cash revenues collected through the bank increased by 71.9 percent, thereby helping to meet basic expenditure needs and reducing the issuance of additional money to meet unforeseen expenditure needs by 56 percent. The

province promoted the savings campaign and raised the balance in savings accounts at the end of the year by 97.8 million dong.

Seventy-Three Percent of Export Goods Produced from Local Raw Materials

Last year, Ha Nam Ninh raised the total value of its exports to 241 million dong, the highest level ever recorded. This rapid increase in the value of exports was primarily accomplished by increasing the percentage of exports produced from local raw materials from 50 percent in 1982 to 73 percent. The exportation of peanuts has increased rather rapidly. Last year, the province organized many new sources of export goods, such as sesame, apricots, longan, Voi tea buds, special product rice, shrimp dumplings, etc. The Federated Exports Corporation exported nearly 18,000 trumpet flowers on a trial basis. Hai Hau District has begun to organize a network to procure dried apricots and dried pimento in order to develop additional sources of export goods.

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EDITORIAL CALLS FOR STRONGER STATE CONTROL OF RETAIL GOODS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Organizing Procurements Well and Controlling the Flow of Goods"]

[Text] Whether or not socialist commerce is capable of controlling the market depends upon one very important matter of decisive significance, controlling the flow of goods. Controlling agricultural products, food products and industrial goods through procurements not only lays the groundwork for supplying essential goods to cadres, manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces, but also creates the conditions needed to strengthen socialist commerce so that it can control the unorganized market, transform private commerce and stabilize prices and the standard of living of the people. Recently, progress has been made in procurements to control the flow of goods. In 1983, the home trade sector exceeded its procurement plan quotas by 24 percent in the procurement of agricultural products and by 25 percent in the procurement of industrial goods. Applying a single price to a number of main products, the procurement of agricultural and food products increased by 11 percent and the procurement of industrial goods by 19.4 percent in 1983 compared to 1982. During the 1st quarter of 1984, the procurement of these goods exceeded the plan by 22.3 percent and equalled 175 percent of the amount procured during the same quarter last year. One new factor is that many provinces, in addition to stepping up their procurement activities in specialized farming areas and key production areas, have increased their procurements at places where production is decentralized and the products being procured are raised as companion crops. Uniform progress in procurements has been made in both the North and the South, in the cities and the countryside, in state-operated commerce and at marketing cooperatives. Many old products have been restored and many new products have been developed, thus increasing both the output and variety of business products on the organized market. As a result, many provinces, municipalities and industrial centers have been able to maintain the supply of essential rationed goods to cadres, manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces. The supply of goods allocated for use in the procurement of agricultural products and retail sale at business support prices has increased, thus making an important contribution to the struggle to stabilize prices and manage the market.

The advances mentioned above, in addition to being the result of the efforts made by the agricultural, industrial and marine products sectors to increase their production, have also been due to initial changes that have been brought about within the commerce sector by reorganizing its business forces and product sectors, utilizing, managing and transforming private merchants and expanding the business operations of state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives. However, the sources of goods controlled by socialist commerce are not commensurate with requirements and tasks, especially with the quantity of products being produced by society. Socialist commerce controls only 50 percent of market weight hogs; about 56 percent of hand milled sugar, 20 to 30 percent of small industry and handicraft products produced from raw materials acquired by installations on their own; virtually no building materials (with the exception of cement) and so forth. Generally speaking, the desire to develop sources of goods within the locality is not strong; consequently, some places have not had a positive impact upon production installations or provided them with assistance in order to create additional sources of goods. Socialist commerce is capable of helping to restore the production of ducks for meat and eggs, fresh water pisciculture and the production of a number of other crops and animals to meet the needs of life but not very much has been done in this regard. The output of the specialized vegetable growing areas and tobacco growing areas has declined, procurements have fallen and the business in fruit and dried products is still small. Small industry and handicraft products are very plentiful and diverse but there is still a scarcity of these products at state stores. The tendency to give light attention to developing local, domestic sources of goods, prefer foreign goods and rely upon goods supplied by the central level is still strong. As a result, a significant quantity of society's products is flowing to the unorganized market and being controlled by private merchants. If state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives controlled these products, the distribution of consumer goods to the people would be greatly improved.

Putting the vast majority of the sources of goods under state control and organizing the fair and efficient distribution of products to serve the daily needs of the people and support the development of production are the foremost task of socialist commerce. Of utmost importance in carrying out this task are the need to have a positive impact upon production in order to establish the conditions needed to control goods at their source and the need to attach special importance to developing local sources of goods, considering this to be the key to controlling the flow of goods, stimulating the development of production and rapidly increasing the supply of goods at the lowest possible cost. In addition to organizing procurements well and controlling virtually all primary products, state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives must be given the responsibility of controlling many more products which, although not primary products, are very necessary in supporting the daily lives of the people.

The establishment of a division of labor and responsibilities in the procurement of products among the central sectors, between the central level and the locality and between state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives must be urgently carried out on the basis of reorganizing the various product sectors and the procurement and sales network. The practice of a number of sectors or installations competing in the procurement and sale

of the same product within the same area at widely divergent prices must be stopped. At the same time, we must organize and guide procurement activities in a very dynamic, flexible and timely manner, resolve price, shipping and receiving, transportation, packaging and other problems well and attach importance to making well coordinated use of all three types of measures: economic, educational and administrative. We must be determined to not allow private merchants to buy agricultural and food products in centralized production areas that produce important products. Marketing cooperatives must quickly expand their procurement activities as agents for the various state-operated sectors, primarily state-operated commerce, in order to make it easy for producers to sell their products. The supply of goods allocated for use in procurements must be tightly managed and a full accounting of these goods must be made after each phase of procurements.

Organizing procurements well and putting the majority of the sources of goods under state control are the first responsibility of socialist commerce.

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ARTICLE DESCRIBES SITUATION IN HA NAM NINH'S MACHINE, TEXTILE SECTORS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 3

[Article: "Developing the Machine and Textile Industries"]

[Text] Ha Nam Ninh is not only one of the provinces that produces much rice, it also has broad potentials in its local industry. Of the province's industrial sectors, the machine and textile sectors account for nearly 70 percent of total output value.

Following the 2 years spent reorganizing its production, the machine sector emerged as a rather uniformly distributed network producing a high output of products and goods. In addition to the Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh and Ha Nam industrial centers, all 17 districts and cities of the province have medium and small-scale machine installations. Some 50 percent of the province's agricultural cooperatives have machine sections. The province also has eight shops that specialize in the repair of large tractors under the Agricultural Machine Branch Department and hundreds of blacksmith forges scattered throughout the countryside. The central task of the machine sector is to support agricultural production, primarily by providing tools and implements for the preparation of fields, irrigation, transportation and the harvesting and processing of agricultural products. Last year, 100,000 hectares of land, 30 percent of the land under cultivation, were plowed and harrowed by tractors. The machine sector has supplied to agriculture 173,000 hand tools of all types, 40,000 animal drawn plows and harrows, more than 5,500 improved carts and many new products, such as peddle operated rice threshing machines, small water pumps, livestock feed grinding machines, centrifugal milling machines, etc.

Besides this central task, the machine sector is trying to expand the variety of consumer goods produced. The Federated Bicycle Enterprise and dozens of "satellite" cooperatives annually produce 6,000 bicycles bearing the Ha Nam Ninh label and 672 tons of bicycle parts.

The textile sector of the province has accepted a plan for 1984 that calls for the production of 21 million meters of cloth of various types, an increase of 30 percent over 1983. The hand loom installations have agreed to produce 6 million meters of mosquito netting and 4 million face cloths and bath towels.

The Thang Long Knitting Mill has accepted a plan that calls for the production of 2.8 million knitted shirts of various types, which represents the greatest increase in the output of textile goods ever recorded.

Ha Nam Ninh has a traditional textile industry producing many famous cloth and silk products. The province's output of textile products plus the more than 40 million meters of cloth and silk produced by the textile mills of the central level that are located within the locality have made Ha Nam Ninh a center of the country's textile industry. In order to usher in a stage of strong development, the textile sector is focusing its efforts on providing a good supply of raw materials and spare parts for machine repair. In addition to the raw materials supplied by the central level, the province has been promoting the planting of mulberry trees and silkworm cultivation and increasing its exports in order to import cotton and fiber while broadening its ties with the textile mills of the central level and other provinces. The needs for spare parts are being met by establishing close ties between the textile mills of the Ministry of Light Industry and the local machine network. As a result, last year, the textile sector was supplied with hundreds of additional tons of spare parts and many pieces of equipment for the production of hand-operated looms. The cooperatives of the province have equipped themselves with nearly 5,000 looms of various types, some of which have been fitted with electric motors.

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BRIEFS

INCREASED MARKET MANAGEMENT--Precincts and districts in Ho Chi Minh City are presently strengthening market management. During the recent past, 16,600 illegal trade incidents have been prosecuted. The state budget has collected an additional 46 million dong (six times that collected during 1982), including large amounts collected in some precincts and districts such as the 11th Precinct with 12 million dong, the 5th Precinct with 5 million dong and the 8th Precinct with 4 million dong. Precinct and district market management sections have also reviewed and registered businesses for more than 33,000 households (78 percent of the merchant households in the entire city) and have arranged more than 2,500 goods sector teams with nearly 36,000 members. At the present time, 50 percent of the wards and villages have market management teams and 162 markets have market management sections. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Apr 84 p 2] 7300

HA NAM NINH'S 1984 TARGETS--Total grain output (in paddy equivalent): 940,000 tons.
Total number of hogs: 720,000.
Buffalo and cattle: 106,000 head.
Sugarcane output: 85,000 tons.
Rushes: 18,000 tons.
Tobacco: 1,400 tons.
Peanuts: 4,500 tons.
Jute: 4,000 tons.
Trees planted: 17 million (by the people).
Total industrial output: 330 million dong.
Cloth and silk output: 21 million meters.
Value of export goods: 270 million dong. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 3] 7809

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AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL URGES BETTER AGRICULTURAL LABOR DISTRIBUTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Rationally Using Labor, Developing Total Agriculture, Strengthening the Collective Economy"]

[Text] In the process of achieving a new management mechanism, especially the letting of product contracts to labor groups and individuals, greatly affected by the total agricultural production stimulation policy of the party and state, agricultural collectives and production collectives have better used their labor sources in total agricultural development. Everywhere they have promoted grain and food production along a course of intensive cultivation and multi-cropping, developed industrial crops, promoted stock raising and expanded the economic exploitation of forested hills and handicraft trades.

Many cooperatives and production collectives have developed farming, stock raising and trade skills in an outstanding and excellent manner; have a large product volume and total output value with a high income and standard of living for the cooperative members; have great accumulation for expanding production; and have simultaneously well-fulfilled their obligations to society. This developed collective economy has strengthened the new production relations and closely attached the cooperative members to the cooperatives and production collectives.

However, there are still not a few cooperatives and production collectives that are not rationally utilizing labor or expanding labor division. A general situation is that of only accomplishing good work with the rice crop. The slowly developing stock raising and handicraft trades do not match the available labor. The income ratio of these sectors in the total income of the cooperative and production collective is not increasing and is even declining.

Generally speaking, in the agricultural labor structure of the entire nation, the percentage of labor in the farming sector and especially in the production of rice is still fairly high. Only 10 percent of the total labor is engaged in stock raising with 4 to 5 percent in forestry. Still inconsistent labor distribution and use is one of the main reasons that business production in the cooperatives and production collectives is developing slowly and the collective economy has not been strengthened.

The course for rationally utilizing labor sources, as pointed out by resolutions of the party, must be by arranging and using labor on the spot at each

production facility within the district and province area and shifting part of the labor from heavily populated areas to those areas with few people to work with the local inhabitants in developing production, building new economic areas in agriculture and forestry and constructing important water conservancy, transportation and industrial projects.

The use of labor available on the spot in each facility is a great advantage, is inexpensive, directly expands total agriculture and contributes toward development of the local economy.

The production of grain and food is the mission of foremost importance and must receive labor investment, first of all in the construction of fields and water conservancy projects and in increasing the sources of fertilizer in order to achieve intensive cultivation and create increased crop yields and high labor productivity. The experience of production units achieving a yield of 10 tons of paddy annually or two-crop fields indicates that about 500 man-days per hectare must be invested in each crop. The potential for high-yield intensive cultivation is still great. An increase of 1 or 2 quintals of paddy per hectare for each crop is a realistic capability. If intensive cultivation is considered an art, the labor invested in this work must be technical labor which understands the rules of intensive cultivation for each type of crop. Labor investment must have norms, assuring that labor man-day investment is accompanied by an increase in crop yields and a reduction in the man-days expended per product unit. We do not have a great deal of farming land but what we do have is not fully utilized. In calculating only the rice land throughout the country, the coefficient of use is only 1.22 times; in the provinces of northern Vietnam only 1.54 times and in the south still lower, 1.05 times. The area still planted in only one crop is still fairly large. This is an important course in labor investment to achieve multicropping, raising vegetables and subsidiary food crops or industrial crops during the winter to easily return economic effectiveness and to increase capital accumulation for the collective economy and products for society.

With a course of coordinating agriculture with forestry and forestry with agriculture, the cooperatives and production collectives have the conditions for investing labor in afforestation, exploiting forestry products and economic development of gardens and hills. Stock raising and handicraft trades are located nearly everywhere in the rural area. Cooperatives and production collectives, based on the sources of raw materials, consumption, experience and local habits, must reorganize production and provide jobs for everyone.

The land and the handicraft trades attract many laborers and create conditions for the cooperatives and production collectives to achieve intensive cultivation and area expansion to well-resolve the grain problem while simultaneously achieving total production operations to increase the number of agricultural products, stock raising products and export handicraft goods and to increase capital accumulation for production expansion.

To create new labor assignment and rational and effective labor use, many composite methods must be achieved but first of all, primary level units must have the ability to organize production, developing the labor and land ownership role of the people in self-reliantly exploiting the available potential capabilities.

The district level must guide and assist cooperatives and production collectives in defining the proper production course, formulating the plans for best exploiting potential capabilities, improving and raising production and management organization aspects, perfecting the mechanism of letting product contracts to labor groups and individuals for crops, livestock and handicraft goods, and in formulating policies of fair and rational distribution to the various labor types. State policies must be fully implemented such as the policy of encouraging industrial crop production and export trades, the policy of assigning land and forests, etc. to create additional favorable conditions for the primary level units to promote new labor distribution.

Developing the right of independence in production of the primary level units and the collective ownership rights of the laboring people in the rural area in order to well-utilize the land and strongly develop the handicraft trades is aimed not only at strengthening the collective economy and the agricultural cooperativization movement, developing culture, building a new rural area and improving the living standards of the farmers but also at creating a basis for achieving national socialist industrialization.

7300

CSO: 4209/297

AGRICULTURE

HO CHI MINH CITY REALLOCATES FARM LAND

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 84 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Ho Chi Minh City Completes Land Reallocation, Places 26.11 Percent of Farm Land, 35.44 Percent of Farm Families Under Collective Production"]

[Text] Rural Ho Chi Minh City has six districts with 82 villages, three towns and 36 wards of four precincts specializing in agricultural production. There are 188,950 hectares of natural land, 93 percent; and a population of 965,861 people, 29.9 percent of the entire city.

This area previously had great differences in land ownership between the various class elements. An investigation held at six points in rural Ho Chi Minh City during August of 1981 indicated that:

The poor farmer class owned 28 percent of the land compared with the total population of the city's rural area. The average per capita farming area was 500 square meters and of this amount, up to one third of the farm families had only an average of 100 square meters of farming area.

The middle peasant class owned 53.6 percent, including 7.3 percent upper middle class peasants, and the average amount of farm land for each farmer was 3,300 square meters, much greater than the average amount for the entire city rural area of a little more than 2,200 square meters and 6.5 times the amount owned by the poor farmers.

Rich peasants and rural bourgeoisie owned only 3.3 percent but the average farm area rose to 6,100 square meters, 12 times that of the poor farmers.

To the present time, not counting the 30,000 hectares which have been nationalized, the entire city has reallocated 11,240 hectares of land, dividing it among 15,200 poor farm families without or owning little production land.

The city's supervision formula is to introduce cooperativization to whatever extent that land reallocation reaches, placing the farmers under collective production, eliminating exploitation and halting returning class divisions. Consequently, during the land reallocation phase, the districts of rural Ho Chi Minh City and peripheral areas have established an additional 230 production collectives and five agricultural cooperatives, bringing the total number of production collectives to 622 and the number of cooperatives to 15. Ho Chi

Minh City has had 20,179 hectares, 26.11 percent of the farming area, and 35,833 farm families, 35.44 percent of those in the rural city area, placed under collective production. Moreover, the districts have established an additional 520 production solidarity teams, raising the total number to 2,500 teams with 26,659 hectares, 34.5 percent of the farming area, and 42,995 farm families, 42.5 percent of all those in the rural city area.

7300

CSO: 4209/297

AGRICULTURE

MARINE PRODUCTS PRODUCTION DESCRIBED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Apr 84 p 1

[Article: "The Marine Products Sector Fulfilled the Three Directives to Exploit, Buy and Export, the Results Are Better Than Those of the First Quarter of 1983"]

[Text] Competing to produce the [best] performance to celebrate the traditional festival of the fishing industry (1 April), in this first quarter, in spite of a lengthy spell of bad weather and constantly turbulent seas which influenced the mobilization of the fishing fleets, in spite of a shortage of equipment and raw materials, the state [fishing] enterprises, collectives and the country's fishermen endeavoured to accomplish the three directives to harvest, buy, export [a volume of] marine products equal to and surpassing that of the first quarter of 1983.

The provinces of Tien Giang, Cuu Long, Dong Nai, Nghia Binh, Binh Tri Thien organized a concerted effort to work the sea, and the fishing grounds while aiming for a high volume. The provinces of Minh Hai, Hau Giang, Ben Tre, Ho Chi Minh City did a good job organizing their harvesting of shrimps and acquiring the shrimps for export. In the first quarter, the Hai Phong Federation of Marine Products Enterprises alone harvested 100 tons of shrimp, achieving their planned quota of harvested shrimps for the whole year. The refrigerated processing enterprises number 14,3-2 (as published), the Song Huong, Dong Nai refrigerated processing enterprises have improved their production, successfully organized the buying of raw unprocessed shrimp, manufactured [a volume] for export that is two to four times that of the same period last year. The provinces in the Cuu Long river basin are recapitulating their shrimp farming experiences toward an expansion of the cultivation area, a stabilization of the sources of raw unprocessed shrimps for export.

Till today, these provinces have also improved their water surfaces, expanding the area of lakes and ponds where the fish are released for cultivation to 148 percent of that of the same period [in 1983], 109.3 million fingerlings of different species were released. The farming stations that produce fingerlings concentrated on feeding the adult fishes intensively early [in the year] in order to make the spring crop [of fingerlings] the main one. The industry has produced 91 million units of Prolan B to stimulate the reproduction of fishes, enough to satisfy the needs of all the localities that have fishes reproducing for the spring crop.

The Ministry of Maritime Products has guided the localities [' efforts] to realize their planning task, followed the movements of the schools of fishes in order to direct the gathering and capture [of the fish], changed the areas to be exploited so as to bring high economic results.

Following up on the victory of 1983 (fulfilling the government's standards and the duty entrusted to them by the Navy Command: the value of the yield reached 131.68 percent; the exploitation of fish 101.6 percent; the manufacturing of fish sauce 116.1 percent; the exporting of shrimp 196.9 percent), the naval economic units are undergoing new changes and are determined to realize the planned 1984 production.

12654

CSO: 4209/267

AGRICULTURE

DECLINE IN SUBSIDIARY CROPS IN THANH HOA EXPLAINED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by The Nghia: "Concerning Subsidiary Food Crops in Thanh Hoa Province"]

[Text] During the past 3 years, agriculture in Thanh Hoa Province has made marked progress. Within grain production, wet rice and hillside rice have been brought under intensive cultivation in order to raise yields and occupy the position of foremost importance. Between 1981 and 1983, the province achieved virtual self-sufficiency in grain and contributed from 15,000 to 20,000 tons of grain to the central level each year. However, the amount of grain per capita has only equalled 275 to 280 kilograms per year. As a result, only 30 percent of the farm families within the key rice growing areas of the province have managed to set aside small grain reserves; only 30 percent have adequate grain to last through the period between crops; and 40 percent still do not have enough grain to carry them from one crop to the next. Because of this minimum eating standard, Thanh Hoa has not truly stabilized the standard of living of the 2,679,000 persons within the province because one crop failure could easily cause the standard of eating to decline even more. In view of this reality, subsidiary food crops become increasingly important to Thanh Hoa in maintaining the standard of living and developing livestock production.

Subsidiary Food Crops, an Indispensable Part of Grain Production

The most important subsidiary food crops in Thanh Hoa are corn, cassava and sweet potatoes. In addition, western potatoes, galingale and beans are also raised. There are from 16,500 to 17,500 hectares of corn, most of which is raised in the districts of Cam Thuy, Thach Thanh, Quan Hoa, Ngoc Lac, Ba Thuoc, Thieu Yen and Tho Xuan. The eight other districts raise from 200 to 700 hectares of corn on silt fields along rivers and sandy soil along the seacoast. There are 17,000 to 18,000 hectares of cassava, most of which is raised in the eight mountain districts and a portion of the midland districts. Sweet potatoes are raised in all 23 districts and cities, which produce an annual output of 120,000 to 130,000 tons, in paddy equivalent.

The people of Thanh Hoa have attached very much importance to subsidiary food crops since ancient times. Stories about people eating wild vegetables have now become humorous stories. Even in the rice growing districts of Tho Xuan, Dong Son, and Thieu Yen, in the lowlying areas, it is rare to find a family that does not have reserve grain, cassava and sweet potatoes. Even when there is a bumper rice crop, subsidiary food crops still account for the same percentage in the diet of the people. "Strong bones are more important than extra body weight." In the two coastal districts of Quang Xuong and Tinh Gia, fishermen steam cook dried sweet potatoes and fresh western potatoes, pack them in tube-like containers and eat this food at sea in place of cooked rice. No one has forgotten 1980, when both the 5th month and 10th month rice crops failed and more than 25,000 cadres, manual workers and civil servants within the province had to raise enough grain to support themselves for 4 months. That year, the total number of livestock fell sharply. Only 575,000 hogs remained. The cattle herd stopped expanding and the duck flock was not restored until the start of 1982. In the experience of Thanh Hoa, it is a rare year in which bumper crops are recorded during both the 5th month and 10th month season. This is particularly true with regard to the 10th month crop, which, because of natural disasters, frequently produces a low yield or is a complete failure. At those times, the prices of breeder hogs, pork and ducks at the various markets within the province have sometimes been cheaper than in other provinces. This was because farmers and cadres reluctantly sold their own paddy and subsidiary food crops. During the past 3 years, Thanh Hoa's grain output increased by 30,000 to 45,000 tons each year. The province produced 678,000 tons in 1981, 722,000 tons in 1982 and nearly 700,000 tons in 1983. At the same time, the total number of livestock increased proportionately. The number of hogs increased from 602,947 in 1981 to 639,320 in 1982 and 619,000 in 1983. The buffalo and cattle herds increased by 6.8 to 8 percent. At present, some 113 million ducks are being raised. Clearly, the role played by subsidiary food crops in Thanh Hoa has helped to stabilize the standard of living of the people and been a force behind the development of livestock production.

Three Corn Crops, One Cassava Crop and Two Potato Crops

In addition to the one cassava crop raised in the mountains and midlands, the lowland areas of the province raise a winter and a spring sweet potato crop each year. Thanh Hoa has five classes of soil suitable for corn: forest land, hillside land, rice paddies, silt fields along rivers and sandy coastal soil. The forest land cleared for afforestation can only be used to raise corn or hillside rice. On this land, two or three companion crops can be raised until the ground is covered by the shade of the trees that have been planted. The hillside land, which lies in the semi-lowland, semi-midland or semi-mountain districts of the province, can be used to raise one rice crop and one spring corn crop each year. The rice paddies in areas in which water conservancy projects have not been constructed can only be used to raise one 10th month rice crop and one spring corn crop per year. However, two-thirds of the land under the cultivation of corn within the province lies in the silt fields along the Ma and Chu Rivers. Here, three corn crops are raised in rotation: main spring corn, winter corn and fall corn.

Cam Thuy District raises 1,170 hectares of corn on silt fields along the Ma River, 500 hectares of corn in paddies and 500 hectares of corn on hillsides. The total amount of area under the cultivation of corn within the district, 4,900 hectares, accounts for 23 percent of the land under the cultivation of corn within the province. These 4,900 hectares include 3,000 hectares of spring corn, 1,200 hectares of winter corn and 700 hectares of fall corn. The 12 villages on either side of the Ma River raise from 25 to 150 hectares of corn in silt fields. Each year, Cam Thuy District raises three silt field corn crops. The district uses two varieties that are well suited to silt fields, hillsides and rice fields. The VM11 variety of corn, which has a growing period of 125 to 135 days, produces an average yield of 16 to 18 quintals per hectare, as much as 22 to 25 quintals at some cooperatives. The VM11 variety is primarily planted in the spring, after the second week of February, and harvested in late June or early July. The Khuyen Village variety of corn, which is considered a special local product of Cam Thuy, has a growing period of 90 to 95 days and is raised in all three seasons: the winter, spring and summer-fall. However, because it is a short-term variety, Cam Thuy primarily raises the Khuyen Village variety of corn during the fall. It is planted in June and harvested in late September in order to provide land for winter crops. Once winter crops have been harvested, the VM11 variety is sown for the spring crop. The majority of the district's hillside land and rice paddies are planted with the VM11 variety of corn in the spring.

Through the intensive cultivation of three silt field corn crops, one rice paddy corn crop, one hillside corn crop and one cassava crop on land devoted to cassava production, Cam Thuy District has raised its total grain output from 17,170 tons in 1981 to 20,640 tons in 1982 and maintained the same output in 1983. Subsidiary food crop output has increased from 6,421 tons in 1980 to 7,161 tons in 1982 and stayed at roughly the same level in 1983.

Why Has Subsidiary Food Crop Production Declined?

During the past 3 years, Thanh Hoa Province's subsidiary food crop production declined in both the amount of area under cultivation and yield. Subsidiary food crop production declined from 96,617 hectares in 1981 to 89,478 hectares in 1982 and only 70,347 hectares in 1983. The production of all three crops, corn, cassava and sweet potatoes, has declined.

Total subsidiary food crop output reached its highest level ever in 1981, 149,008 tons, in paddy equivalent, and declined to 133,647 tons in 1982 and only 98,105 tons in 1983. Subsidiary food crops as a percentage of grain output declined from 21.8 percent to 18.4 percent and only 14 percent in 1983.

Some persons are of the opinion that bumper rice crops result in neglected subsidiary food crops. Others maintain that subsidiary food crop production has declined because of the heavy investment of labor and agricultural supplies in rice production. Neither of these opinions is entirely correct. The reasons for the decline in the amount of area under the cultivation of subsidiary food crops are as follows:

The majority of the land used to raise subsidiary food crops in Thanh Hoa lies in the lowlands, where a winter and spring sweet potato crop and a winter

western potato crop are raised. In Thanh Hoa, heavy rains usually occur in September and October just as 10th month rice is being harvested, thus greatly affecting the effort to prepare fields for winter crops. During the 1983-1984 winter-spring season, the province was forced to let a large amount of land used to raise winter sweet potatoes and western potatoes lie fallow. In a number of districts that lack a full understanding of the importance of subsidiary food crops, seed and fertilizer have not been supplied in time for the growing season. In the face of this situation, Thanh Hoa has yet to look for ways to introduce the scientific and technological advances that have been made in raising sweet potatoes and western potatoes on wet land, consequently, many places that have favorable weather raise a winter crop while places that experience difficulties wait for the spring to plant their potatoes.

During the past 2 years, Thanh Hoa has expanded and developed the production of such annual industrial and export crops as peanuts, tobacco, pimento, garlic and so forth. These crops must be raised on land used for subsidiary food crops and must be raised during the winter and spring in the lowlands. Thieu Yen District raised 650 hectares of peanuts in 1982 and 1,200 hectares in 1983; in 1984, it plans to raise nearly 2,000 hectares of peanuts, 500 hectares of pimento and 300 hectares of garlic. In 1982, Vinh Loc District raised 700 hectares of tobacco; this level was raised to 1,000 hectares in 1983 and will be expanded to 1,200 hectares in 1984. Tinh Gia District has increased the amount of area under peanut cultivation by 50 percent compared to 1981. A look at these three districts shows that the production of industrial crops has increased by nearly two to three times during the past 2 years. The province has decided that it must expand the production of industrial crops by 25,000 to 30,000 hectares by 1985, or to a level twice as high as during the period from 1980 to 1984. Developing industrial crop production is a welcomed step in the right direction. However, during the past 2 years, Thanh Hoa Province should have rapidly put land used to raise potatoes and corn in the lowlands under the cultivation of industrial crops as the three districts mentioned above did.

In the mountain districts, there is a shortage of equipment for processing corn and cassava. Cassava tubers are primarily processed as sliced, dried cassava or whole, dried tubers, which the people of Thanh Hoa call "deer antler" cassava. Corn is primarily processed as dried kernels or dried whole ears. Due to the lack of processing and the failure to distribute and circulate these crops in a timely manner, spoilage has resulted in waste and reduced the quality of these products. The economic returns from subsidiary food crop production are low. The mountain farmers at some places have gradually shifted to the cultivation of hillside rice in place of subsidiary food crops. The three examples presented above show that the decline in the amount of area under the cultivation of subsidiary food crops in Thanh Hoa Province has been the result of the allocation of crops.

Thus, the issue facing Thanh Hoa Province at this time is to promptly plan a number of large areas for the production of subsidiary food crops by shifting production from the lowlands into the midlands and mountains so that industrial crop production can be developed. The shift in subsidiary food crop production to the mountains and midlands must not include sweet potatoes and western potatoes but be designed to expand the cultivation of cassava and

corn. Of these two crops, corn is the main subsidiary food crop because it can be easily processed and easily stored and is easier to prepare for consumption than the other subsidiary food crops. A policy should be adopted that provides incentive for the planting of cassava. Cassava processing must also be well suited to present equipment. When subsidiary food crop production is shifted to the midlands and mountains, the province must resolve a number of problems: investing labor and agricultural supplies, upgrading roads and, in particular, establishing a distribution and circulation policy that avoids the problem of farmers saying that those who raise many subsidiary food crops must eat subsidiary food crops.

As regards subsidiary food crops in the lowlands, importance must be attached to both the winter and spring seasons. Of foremost importance is the need to stabilize the allocation of sweet potato and western potato varieties while quickly introducing technological advances so that these crops can be raised on wet land, which is the only way we can take the initiative in scheduling their growing seasons in order to maintain the stable development of subsidiary food crop production.

7809

CS0: 4209/281

AGRICULTURE

ARTICLE DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL CHICKEN PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 2

[Article: "The State-Operated, Collective and Household Sectors Develop Poultry Production Together"]

[Text] The Central Poultry Breeding Stock and Commercial Chicken Corporation has the task of building the fundamental material-technical bases of the Vietnam poultry sector and creating the conditions for the strong development of poultry production throughout the country. Today, following 10 years of development and operation, the corporation can annually produce 3.2 million fertile eggs for supply to poultry producers. The commercial product installations of the corporation can annually supply to the market 50 million eggs and 2,000 tons of chicken meat.

During the past 3 years, on the basis of the two centers built in Ba Vi and Tam Dao in 1974 to produce fertile eggs from purebred stock, 60 state-operated and collective commercial chicken installations have been established in 29 provinces and municipalities, which have a total capacity of 40 million eggs and 1,600 tons of meat per year. In 1983, the poultry sector produced 48 million eggs and 1,800 tons of chicken meat.

We quickly recognized that large-scale commercial chicken production was unsuitable and shifted to medium and small-scale production. This method of operation reduces capital construction time and yields higher economic returns. Household commercial chicken production has been constantly expanding. In many municipalities and industrial centers, tens of thousands of chickens are raised by families, thereby increasing their sources of food products and helping to improve the standard of living of the people. In addition to the two enterprises that produce the basic breeds of chickens, the poultry sector also includes the Tam Duong, 2-12, Chau Thanh and Dong Hoi Enterprises, a federation of six enterprises in Nam Bo and many production installations in the various provinces, thus forming a network that supplies brooder chickens and guides the commercial chicken production movement throughout the country. Starting with 6 million dong in initial capital, the corporation now has 45 million dong in fixed assets. The sector has begun to meet the needs of installations and families for brooder chickens. During the

past few years, the corporation has also helped the two countries of Laos and Kampuchea build efficient commercial chicken sectors.

During the past 10 years, through major efforts, the poultry sector has maintained and quickly multiplied the breeds of chickens supplied by Cuba, acclimated them to the conditions of poultry production in our country and achieved higher economic returns. The corporation has also developed five different groups of crossbred breeds (two groups of laying breeds and three groups of broiler breeds) which produce higher yields. During the early years, we had to import virtually all veterinary medicines and feed for chickens. Today, as a result of the efforts it has made, 99.9 percent of the ingredients used by the corporation in the production of chicken feed are domestically produced. Some veterinary research projects have supported production well, such as the La-so-ta [Vietnamese phonetics] mist spray method. As a result, chickens are plump and free of disease. In addition, the corporation has also undertaking the research of two state level projects and a number of projects under the management of the ministerial level.

The corporation is a unit that fulfills a scientific-technical function and also organizes production and business, consequently, practicing cost accounting and operating at a profit are a matter of very important significance. During the early years, because management was based on administrative management and subsidization, the corporation incurred losses in its production and business. However, the corporation changed its style of management in 1980 and began operating at a profit. In 1983, the corporation earned 2.1 million dong in profits.

In the course of its operations, the corporation has organized its production in an increasingly suitable manner. During the 3 years from 1980 to 1983, under the guideline of "the state-operated and collective sectors producing breeding stock and families raising commercial products," the sector not only maintained its production, but also reached a stronger stage of development. Deserving of attention is the fact that the corporation has successfully carried out the task assigned to the sector by the state: maintaining breeds, developing the breeding stock supply network and guiding the profitable development of commercial chicken production.

The corporation has learned useful lessons from its method of operation during the past several years. Most importantly is the need to attach importance to science and technology because the sector's product is livestock being raised under commercial conditions. On the other hand, the corporation attaches importance to science and technology not only for the purpose of "learning pure knowledge," but also to support production and meet the requirements being raised by production. Everyone from the leaders of the corporation and its various professional offices to its various enterprises always display dynamism in economic management, uses profits to accumulate capital and develop production, uses production to support capital construction and uses returns to meet remuneration standards and gradually improve the product contracts within each job in order to gradually establish an appropriate system of bonuses and penalties. In recent years, the corporation has broadened its ties with other sectors and the various localities for the

purpose of helping one another overcome the difficulties encountered in production.

The commercial chicken sector is entering a new stage of development, one calling for the production of 50 million eggs and 2,000 tons of chicken meat in 1984 and the introduction of commercial chicken production among the families of the major cities and industrial centers. In 1984, the Central Poultry Breeding Stock and Commercial Chicken Corporation will supply to Hanoi some 340,000 brooder chickens. The movement to raise commercial chickens at households will subsequently be expanded to many other cities and industrial centers. This work demands major efforts on the part of scientific, technical and management cadres and the workers of the entire industrial chicken sector, demands that they concentrate on providing a good supply of breeding stock and feed, providing instruction in the techniques of raising chickens and preventing and controlling disease in order to strongly develop industrial chicken flocks, especially within the household sector.

7809

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AGRICULTURE

REPORT ON PORK SUPPLIES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Tran Dinh Ba: "Pork: the Current Surplus and the Continual Concern"]

[Text] The buying and the distribution of pork is an important task of the central and local Agricultural Produce and Food Corporations. The concern of this housekeeping organization is how to gather into its hands the preplanned amount of pork necessary to guarantee the quota to be distributed continually to the cadres, workers, civil servants and the armed forces.

Due to the characteristics of the economy, this important food item in our country is mainly produced by the cooperative households of the agricultural sector.

In these circumstances, to accumulate the 105,000 tons of pork necessary to meet the country's demands is a tremendously difficult task for the commercial sector. But [to find] a steady supply of pork for all the quarters in a year, all the months in a quarter is doubly difficult.

Ordinarily, the task of buying and distributing the pork runs into the most difficulty in the period beginning from the first to the third month of the lunar year after the Tet. Judging subjectively, during the 3 days of Tet, our people consumed up to 30-50 percent of the amount of pork we produce in a whole year. Because of this unusual demand and because of other purchasing needs, almost all the households who keep hogs "empty their sties" before or during Tet.

During this Tet however, on the one hand, because the people was conscious of the "national policy of thrift," and on the other hand, basically because of the big victories in the production battle in agriculture after 3 years of bumper crops, the hog herds in the whole country and the number of market hogs have increased markedly. The "empty sty" phenomenon around Tet was virtually over, the hog herd was preserved, promising a good year for hog raising. The planned goal for pork buying for 1984 of the Fresh Agricultural Produce Corporation 1 (Ministry of Internal Trade) is 112,000 tons (3,000 tons over that of 1983) has a good chance of being attained, after Tet the consumers have not yet had to eat frozen meat. The government no longer owes the cadres, workers, civil servants and people their monthly quota of meat. On the contrary, in the

locality where the most pork is consumed daily, Hanoi, the commercial sector announced the sale of the April quota of pork at the beginning of March. During those days, every butcher in Hanoi had fresh meat to sell. And the pork buyers of the Fresh Agricultural Produce Corporation 1 were quite busy hurrying back and forth, day and night, to different localities to buy, [to find] sources that were ready to supply enough pork to meet the quota for the 2nd quarter.

During those days, in the provinces of Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Ha Son Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh and a number of districts outside of Hanoi, everywhere one finds people and cadres clamoring for [the government to come] buy their hogs. The secretary of the Ung Hoa District VCP Committee told me: the standard given to Ung Hoa was an obligation of 900 tons of pork a year with incentives [to produce more]. Of this [900 tons], the hydro-electric power station of Ha Son Binh was to receive 300 tons of pork. It's almost the end of the first quarter and the station still has not received any? Today, Ung Hoa district can supply 50-100 tons a day, but not enough units were sent to pick up the pork. On 16 March, Ha Bac called the Fresh Agricultural Produce Corporation 1 [and told it] to send two trucks to T district to collect 4 tons of hogs. The corporation sent the trucks as requested, but the people brought out 8 tons of hogs. To transport this number of hogs, one needed four trucks, but the hogs were nonetheless crowded into the two trucks. Therefore, when they reached Hanoi 17 hogs were dead in just one truck, over 1 ton of pork suffocated.

At the Luong Yen slaughterhouse, the largest slaughterhouse in Hanoi, the workers working 24 hours a day still could not process all the 135 trucks a day of hogs, the result being that many trucks had to wait up to 2 days before the hogs were slaughtered.

Is there a surplus of pork? Comrade Pham Huy Chuong, director of the Fresh Agricultural Produce Corporation 1, said:

"This situation, which is exactly the opposite of previous years, is due to the interaction between the weather and the sowing of the spring fifth-month rice crop. Even though we can still expect good crops this year, the severe weather forced many regions to sow seedlings up to four times; the grain reserve of the people is low and food prices in the cities soared. This is why all the households who raise hogs want to sell their pork immediately. This is what is making us busy and concerned!"

[Question] Would the Comrade Director outline the corporation's solution [to the problem]?

[Answer] First of all, the fundamental matter is that the people want to sell and we will buy all [the pork that comes] up for sale. But the people need to be aware of the difficult situation we are in with our cumulative buying of hogs, that is: speaking of means, we only have 35 tractor trucks in operation, a limited number of warehouses. There is still plenty of room on our farms and in the agricultural cooperative zones where we can board the hogs, but the difficulty is that there is no feed, and while the demand is high, the standard supplies are limited.

[Question] Comrade, would you please elaborate on the immediate as well as long-term solutions?

[Answer] I have already commented on the buying. As for a solution to basically [guarantee the supply of] pork to meet the demands all year long, aside from buying continuously, we have to maintain our present herd of hogs at about 2.006 million head; we have to ask the communication sector to quickly move feed [to us] so we can expand our herd to over 3 million head. [We have] to instruct the corporations and organizations to increase their feed reserves, to create new sources of feed so we can maintain our herd of sows, breeding hogs and our reserve of hogs for slaughter. According to the statistics we keep, the Agricultural Produce Corporation of Ha Nam Ninh currently has over 1,000 hogs for slaughter. Recently, Ha Nam Ninh supplied the population with 200 tons of feed to maintain the herd. Hai Hung also dispensed 200 tons of feed. The Ha Bac Agricultural Produce Corporation has a reserve herd of over 2,000 head.

Confronted with the unexpected circumstances in the buying of meat hogs today we feel that to guarantee the needed amount of pork for the whole year and to meet exporting needs, the decisive solution is to maintain the present herd by actively moving feed for livestock, guaranteeing enough supplies to the present herd, expanding the consignment program by giving feed to the population as practiced in Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Bac, Hai Hung. On the other hand, the consumers, especially the big centers, including military units, need to acknowledge the difficulties [and should] be willing to accept the next month quota in advance and, themselves, adapt and use their food sources [intelligently] on site. This is the only way the commercial sector can prevent overcrowding which leads to suffocation of the hogs and gradually cope with the surplus of hogs up for sale in the rural zones where there is a feed shortage.

This current unforeseen difficulty that has arisen in the buying and the distribution of pork is a serious problem for the commercial sector, however it is also an encouragement.

12654

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES SLOW BIM SON CEMENT DISTRIBUTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Apr 84 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Bim Son Cement Plant Produces 107,000 Tons of Cement During 1st Quarter; Greatest Difficulty Now Distribution, Transportation Step"]

[Text] Overcoming many difficulties in electric power, coal and a situation of slow distribution, the Bim Son Cement Plant during the 1st quarter made efforts to produce more than 107,000 tons of cement, double that produced during the 1st quarter of 1983. The production rate each month was greater than the month before; in January 32,000 tons, in February 35,000 tons and in March a cement output of more than 38,000 tons.

The plant has unceasingly strengthened technical management with attention to raising skill levels in order for the cadres and workers to have the abilities to master their jobs, machinery and equipment. On 22 March, the plant applied a method of setting off 34 tons of explosives at one time to acquire 160,000 tons of rock.

Cement distribution is presently the greatest difficulty and the plant has joined the cement transportation forces in discussions on many methods of increasing transportation means and coordinating on the repair of broken down railroad cars. Of the total number of delivered cars, the plant has actively participated in the repair of 80 in order to further increase transportation means. However, with a quantity of more than 2,000 tons of cement produced daily, transportation capabilities only assure the transporation of about 1,500 tons.

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TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

FAULTY TRANSPORTATION OF COAL, EARTH AT MINES REVIEWED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 84

[Article by Vu Hung, of Quang Ninh: "Why Has Truck Transport at Mine Failed to Meet Plan?"]

[Text] The Cam Pha Truck Transport Enterprise has under its management 800 trucks of which 500 have a loading capacity of 27 and 40 tons each; however, in the discharge of its duty to carry coal and earth for four opencast mines and some underground ones in the Cam Pha mining zone, the enterprise failed to fulfill the 1983 plan from many points of view. The enterprise met only over 80 percent of the earth-rock transport norm and nearly 110 percent of the coal transport norm and could hardly come close to all other norms; nor did it reach a high percentage whenever it managed to fulfill them. In particular, the productivity of each tractor ranged only between 35 and 40 percent and the number of hours spent waiting for task assignment or wasted because of vehicle breakdowns was on the increase. In the first few months of this year, transportation at some mines still continued to underfulfill the plan.

First and foremost, let us speak of the organizational task. The Cam Pha Truck Transport Enterprise has made many improvements such as restaffing production teams and transforming them from 1-truck/3-driver teams into 3-truck/9-, 10- or 11-driver teams or 4-truck/13- or 14-driver teams by taking into account the actual technical situation of the vehicles. To serve four major mines, the enterprise has set up four truck convoys in charge of the overall management of these truck teams including the reception of the plan, wages, rewards and other economic-technical norms. The enterprise assumes only the management of the truck convoys. The application of this measure has resulted in eliminating excessive bureaucracy, raising the workers' sense of ownership and enabling convoys and truck teams to take the initiative in fulfilling their mission and carrying out economic management. In practice, however, new difficulties have arisen which lie in the fact that the relationships between the convoys and the mines they serve has not yet really created conditions for both sides to fulfill their own missions. The mines have been in charge of preparing conditions for the trucks' operation by carrying out drilling, detonating explosives, bulldozing the ground and building roads but, in the past few years, the exploitation terrain at the mines has presented

more difficulties and many mines have not yet made adequate preparations to serve the trucks. In addition, the task of operating various means has not been synchronized between the mines and the convoys, thus making it impossible to fully develop the transport capacities of the trucks at the mines.

Here is an example: In the past and up to 1982, the Cao Son convoy in charge of transportation at the new Cao Son mines had a fairly high productivity because the roads and mining equipment were then in good repair but from 1983 to date its productivity has dwindled away because the roads have not been maintained properly; lately, in the first 2 months of 1984, both its productivity and volume of production have dipped too low. In January, the Cao Son convoy fulfilled only 48.8 percent of the plan norm for earth transportation and 18.68 percent of the plan norm for coal transportation; in February, it met only 41.7 and 45.5 percent of the plan norms for earth and coal transportation respectively and the output of each coal and earth carrying tractor was only between 24.8 and 36 percent of the plan norm. On the contrary, Coc 6 mine is an old one which has only a few new types of equipment. In the previous years, Coc 6 mine also paid little attention to the preparatory task but since 1983 its director has realized the importance of this task and has, together with the convoys, held positive discussions and established contracts and pledges exercising a binding effect upon both sides by invoking economic interests and the need for a high cargo handling output. Consequently, the transport output of trucks has proven satisfactory. This result has become more obvious in the first months of 1984. In January, the Coc 6 convoy carried 177,590 tons of coal fulfilling 114.57 percent of the plan norm; in February, it fulfilled 105.3 percent of the plan norm for earth transportation. The output of the old tractors was 63.1 percent and that of the new ones 227 percent.

The difficulties arising from the disproportion between equipment and materials has also exercised a great influence on the transport capacities of trucks at the mines. To our knowledge, the enterprise owns as many as 220 trucks made in the capitalist countries with a loading capacity of 32.5 to 34 tons each. This type of trucks was manufactured in three stages during each of which new improvements were added. No sooner had the users become familiar with the trucks made in the previous production stage than multiple breakdowns occurred to those made in the subsequent one. While the users were somewhat perplexed, the departments responsible for repair and maintenance were plunged into a more passive state. In addition, spare parts and materials have not only proven insufficient but have also not been supplied in time. In 1983 for example, an order for goods valued at \$2 million had been contemplated since late 1982 but the goods were not yet delivered by February 1984. In the meanwhile, the tractor operation plan was handed down at the beginning of the year [1983] so that there was no spare parts available for replacement when the vehicles broke down, which accounted for the failure to fulfill the plan.

In 1983, by overcoming some difficulties with materials and equipments, the enterprise's repair shop overhauled 100 transmission gear boxes and 140 engines for the HD vehicles but could not yet fully satisfy the repair needs of the enterprise. At that time, the machine works in the coal sector and especially the units in the Hon Gai Coal Corporation which owned a modern equipment and were specialized in repairing machines and equipment for the mines did not bring their capacities into full play so that the implementation of contracts on automobile repairs for the mines reached only a low norm. Throughout 1983, the Cam Pha Machine Works--where many working hours were spent fulfilling the task of maintaining and repairing various types of motor vehicles--could fulfill only 6 percent of the contract norm.

The 1984 plan assigned to the truck enterprise at the mines calls for the transportation of a volume of earth and coal representing an increase of 160 to 170 percent over that in 1983. We do know that the number of automobiles will go on increasing but if certain existing shortcomings are not corrected, it will be difficult for the enterprise to increase the trucks' productivity and also to pay the earth-rock debt to the mines [carry the overdue amount of earth and rock] and the implementation of the coal production plan for this year and the forthcoming ones will continue to meet with difficulties.

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POPULATION CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

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PROGRESS IN NOMADS SETTLEMENT, NEW ECONOMIC ZONES REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Apr 84 pp 1, 4

[Text] [From VNA and newspaper DAN] Bac Thai Province is actively aiding the districts of Cho Don, Phyluong, Vo Nhai, Bach Thong and Na Ri to build four more roads, one suspension bridge and six canals, dams and reservoirs to enable the minority nationalities to settle farming and residence, to stabilize their life and to develop production.

Phyluong--a district with many highland villages--is organizing labor and materials to build two roads with a 12-km length and a 50-bed hospital in the Yen Cu-Yen Han area to serve ethnic minorities living in the highlands of the district and in four villages in Na Ri District and another in Vo Nhai District. Cho Don District is urgently building a canal in the montagnard village of Cuon and the Tham Pet reservoir to obtain water to irrigate the ricefields of the Dao tribesmen after they have settled farming and life.

Recently, technical cadres of the water conservancy and communications sectors in various districts have come to the farming and life settlement centers of tribesmen to carry out investigations, surveys and planning and have joined the local peasantry in building communications and water conservancy works to promote production and life. Beside supplying a sufficient amount of essential materials such as iron and steel to enable people to build various projects, the province has also urged districts to motivate the delta people to help the highlanders to settle farming and life and build communications, water conservancy and civil works, etc.

This year Bac Thai will continue to motivate nearly 200 tribal households to settle farming and life and will complete a plan to develop production and build villages for 325 households who have settled farming and life.

In Binh Tri Thien Province, since the beginning of this year, 2,250 families with a population of 8,945 (including 4,239 laborers) have gone to build new economic zones; more than 1,800 of these families have volunteered to go to the Loc Ninh rubber plantation (Song Be Province), to the Chu Kpo state farm (Dac Lac Province), to the Dac Uy 3 state farm (Gia Lai-Kon Tum Province) and to Tanh Linh District (Thuan Hai Province) and Da

Oai District (Lam Dong Province). The districts of Trieu Hai, Quang Trach and Huong Dien are localities having obtained a good result from the task of motivating people to go to build new economic zones outside the province.

The redistribution of labor and population on the district scale has been intensified and new changes have taken place. Attention has been paid to making sure that the work force going to build new economic zones will meet the needs of the receiving areas. Throughout the province, 84 party members, 5 public health cadres, 7 teachers, 18 grassroots cadres and nearly 100 laborers with handicraft and mechanical skills have voluntarily gone to new homelands.

The various localities have contributed hundreds of thousands of dong, thousands of working days and large quantities of grain and food to help the outgoing people. Trieu Hai District has drawn an amount of grain and goods from the typhoon and flood victims' relief fund designed to help families suffering damage caused by natural calamities and has given these commodities to the outgoing people to enable them to overcome difficulties and stabilize life in their new homelands.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

DAC LAC DESCRIBES EFFORT TO SETTLE NOMADS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Apr 84 p 2

[VNA News Release: "Dac Lac Province Carries Out the Settlement of Nomads in Two Ways: Relocating Persons at State Farms and Forestry Sites and Establishing Cooperatives and Production Collectives"]

[Text] Since August 1983, Dac Lac has encouraged and helped more than 3,600 families with 5,655 laborers (members of the Ede and Mnong minorities) adopt settled lifestyles; 1,654 of these families (3,347 laborers) have been recruited at state farms and forestry sites. Since 1977, 32,695 families (64,020 laborers) of the Ede and Mnong minorities, two-thirds of the Ede, Mnong and Jarai minorities within the province, have moved to state farms and forestry sites or participated in the establishment of cooperatives and production collectives in Dac Lac Province.

Dac Lac has more than 210,000 minority members, practically all of whom are Ede, Mnong and Jarai. Prior to liberation day, they lived as nomads, practiced slash and burn cultivation, had a low standard of living, lacked food for 5 or 6 months each year and were afflicted with many diseases. In recent years, each district and town has established five or six settlement of nomad centers where production has been developed and the standard of living has gradually been stabilized. Under the guideline "the state and the people working together" and by coordinating manual labor with mechanized support from the state, they have constructed water conservancy projects, cleared nearly 6,500 hectares of two crop fields and gradually applied the various techniques involved in the intensive cultivation of rice, subsidiary food crops and industrial crops, such as proper plowing and harrowing, the use of new varieties, transplanting in straight rows at the correct density, utilizing organic fertilizer, etc.

In the settlement of nomad areas, each person receives an average of 300 kilograms of grain per year and famine no longer exists. Many settlement of nomad cooperatives, such as E Phe in Krong Pach and E Na in Krong Ana, practice some of the best intensive cultivation of rice in the province.

Since 1980, the province has attached importance to the development of the garden economy. Each family receives from 500 to 1,000 square meters of land

on which to build a house and start a garden. At the Chu Pon and Buon Dung forestry sites and the Phuoc An State Coffee Farm, each family, in addition to raising beans, grain and melons, has also planted 100 or more coffee plants.

The province has constructed cultural and welfare projects, such as schools, public health stations, child care centers, marketing stores and so forth. Dac Lac plans to complete the settlement of nomads by 1985 by encouraging the minorities to participate in collective production and recruiting them for jobs at state-operated installations.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

VIETNAMESE LUNAR CALENDAR CHANGE SCIENTIFICALLY EXPLAINED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Thuyet, Meteorology and Hydrology General Department: "The Scientific Basis for Calculating the Lunar Calendar in Our Country; Tet of 1984 To Be 1 Month Earlier than Old Lunar Calendar"]

[Text] On 8 August 1967, the Council of Ministers issued Decision 121-CP on the use of the calendar in our country. The official calendar is the Gregorian solar calendar, the legal time of our country falls within the 7 hours east [Greenwich plus 7] time zone and the lunar calendar is used in the daily activities (for the most part the Tet [lunar new year] celebration) of the people, calculated in accordance with this time zone. The old lunar calendar was calculated with the 8 hours east time zone (Beijing time), was not accurate as to the geographic position of our country and was thus inconsistent. Therefore, since 1968, the two lunar new years of the Year of the Monkey (1968) and the Year of the Chicken (1969) were 1 day different from the old lunar calendar. This year, because the lunar Year of the Mouse (1984) is not intercalary (the old lunar calendar had two intercalary 10th months), the Year of the Ox (1985) will begin 1 month earlier than the old lunar calendar (the 1st day of Tet in the old lunar Year of the Ox is 20 February 1985 but the new date will be 21 January 1985).

The territory of our country lies totally between 102 and 111 degrees east longitude and is within the 7 hours east time zone. Using the 7 hours east time zone as the legal time and as a basis for calculating the lunar calendar is scientifically consistent. Since the climatic changes and growing seasons as well as the daily activities of the people in our country differ a great deal from China, we cannot use the Beijing time zone to calculate the lunar calendar.

The lunar calendar is calculated in accordance with the movements of the moon, each month has 29 1/2 days and each year has only 354 days, about 11 days less than the climatic cycle.

The climate is decided by the amount of radiation from the sun with virtually no influence from the moon. Because it is 11 days faster than the solar year, the lunar year every third year is 1 month faster and totally out of synchronization with the climatic cycle. Therefore, an intercalary month must be inserted. Naturally, even though an intercalary month is inserted, the lunar calendar still does not express the periodicity of the climate and is only

correct on the first day with no moon (the moon is at the conjunction point of the moon, the sun and the earth, meaning that the center of the moon and the sun are both located on the same longitudinal plane and both are on a line with the earth), and on the 15th day with a full moon.

To calculate an intercalary month, it is necessary to define the solar division days; any month without such a solar division day is an intercalary month. The 24 solar division days during the year are days in which the sun is at a fixed position in the zodiac. The calculation of these days is a complex mathematical problem of celestial bodies and solar division days are elements of the solar calendar (from the vernal equinox of one year to the vernal equinox of the next is always equal to 365.2422 days or one solar year).

In accordance with this method of calculation, in every cycle of 19 years (in astronomy usually called the Metonic cycle), there are seven intercalary years in the 3d, 6th, 8th or 9th, 11th, 14th, 17th and 19th years. We are at the present time in the 8th year of the cycle beginning with the year 1976 (The Year of the Dragon). This year (The Year of the Mouse--1984), the instant at which the sun is at an angle of 270 degrees (winter solstice) occurs at 2300 (in accordance with the 7 hour time zone) on the 29th day of the 11th lunar month in The Year of the Mouse (21 December 1984) and therefore, this is the day of the winter solstice (in accordance with our new lunar calendar). Because the month has a solar division (the winter solstice), it is not an intercalary month. The same time however, according to the 8 hour time zone, is 0000 on the 1st day of the 12th lunar month in the Year of the Mouse (22 December 1984). Thus, because the 11th month in accordance with the old lunar calendar has no solar division day, it is an intercalary month and is called the second intercalary 10th month. Therefore, from the 1st day of the 11th lunar month in The Year of the Mouse, a difference of 1 month will exist between the lunar date of the old lunar calendar and our new lunar calendar. This phenomenon will last until the 3d lunar month of The Year of the Ox [1985] when the calendars will again coincide. Our people will observe Tet of The Year of the Ox 1 month earlier than the old lunar calendar.

Every adverse opinion on this occurrence only expresses a lack of understanding of astronomy. Our people are today conducting their daily activities in accordance with science. In the legal aspect, we must thoroughly comply with the stipulated articles of Decision 121-CP and the Tet holidays must follow the day and month recorded in the "20th Century Calendar," the official almanac promulgated by the state. Every other type of calendar which differs from this day and month and with methods of recording the dates not approved by the Vietnam Institutes of Science is illegal and its circulation is not permitted.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

NGHIA BINH PROVINCE ENCOURAGES NEW ECONOMIC AREA RESETTLEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Apr 84 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "During 1st Quarter, Number of Nghia Binh People Leaving To Build New Economic Areas Increases by 1.5 Times"]

[Text] Gaining experience from previous years, Nghia Binh Province this year strengthened the supervision of resettling people to build new economic areas, developed the composite strength of all echelons and sectors and carried out a formula of "the people working and the state supporting."

During the 1st quarter of 1984, the entire province transferred 500 families to build new economic areas outside the province, 1.5 times the number during the same period last year; and cleared 400 hectares for the cultivation of subsidiary food crops and various varieties of annual industrial crops in support of exports. The districts of Phu My, Duc Pho, Phu Cat and Hoai Nhon transferred nearly 400 families to build new homes in Cat Tien of Lam Dong Province and Chu Kho Nia of Dac Lac Province.

An increase in propaganda, education and motivation enabled the various classes of people to clearly understand the strategic significance of the policy to build new economic areas and thousands of households voluntarily registered to go. Situations of being ordered or forced to go no longer occurred as during previous years. Villages and agricultural cooperatives encouraged the people to contribute supplies, agricultural implements, seed, grain and goods to build new economic funds and create favorable conditions for the families to build berthing and messing facilities and to immediately begin production from the very first days and months of establishing the operation. Thanks to this, the people feel peace of mind and are extremely enthusiastic.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

THUAN HAI PROVINCE PROMOTES CHAM LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Le Khoa, Education Publishing House: "Editing, Trial Use of Cham Language Instruction Books"]

[Text] At the beginning of 1978, the Provincial Party Committee and People's Committee of Thuan Hai Province decided to establish a committee to edit Level I Cham language instruction books and assigned the Education Service to organize and supervise trial teaching in a number of schools with Cham students. After 5 years of achievement, the Provincial People's Committee held a review conference in Phan Rang, a location with many Cham people. Many Cham intellectuals and common people attended. A five-volume set of Cham language instruction books has been written and experimentally taught. A branch of the Education Publishing House has also arranged for the editing and publishing of two Cham language instruction books for adult education.

With nearly 50,000 Cham people, the 1981-1982 school year had nearly 1,000 kindergarten students, 7,394 general primary school students, 208 middle school students and 315 individuals enrolled in Levels I, II and III adult education who were of the Cham ethnic minority. The number of Cham students in middle and high-level professional schools and colleges increases every year. There are also 257 Cham professors and teachers.

Thuan Hai is initiating a second trial course, is expanding adult education and has proposed a teacher policy of additional teaching of the Cham language.

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